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PREFACE 
PREFACE 
This thesis on the topic "The West and the Arab-Israeh Contlict: 
1967-76" is being submitted to the Aligarh Muslim University by me as 
an independent teacher candidate, in supplication for the award of 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science. 
Creation of Israel in Palestine against the wishes of Palestinians 
is a human tragedy for which Western powers are solely responsible. 
The role of Soviet Union is also important in this context, because 
contrary to its anti-Jewish policy, it stood with rival powers in support 
of Zionist claim over Palestine. In the creation of Jewish state Soviet 
role was limited to the support of partition of Palestine in the UN and to 
provide de-jure recognition to Israel just after its birth. Israel's leaning 
towards America brought Russia to the side of the Arabs. 
The involvement of Soviet Union and United States in a competitive 
drive in the West Asian region has significantly affected the evolution of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict which resulted into five successive wars and 
constant tumioil between the two people. West Asia is a region of great 
significance in world politics because of its unique geographical location 
and oil resources. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. has added 
new dimensions to the strategic importance of the region. The growing 
relationship between oil supply and world energy requirements had 
attracted the attention of the world powers, particularly scientifically and 
technologically advanced powers of the world. For long. West Asia has 
been an area of Western predominance and exclusive presence. As a 
result of decrease in power and influence of Ottoman Empire. Western 
involvement in the Arab region intensified. In the years between the tw o 
great wars. West Asia was dominated by the two Western powers, 
namely Britain and France. In 1918 the Ottoman Empire was destroyed 
as a result of defeat of Germany in the First World War. The Allied 
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powers who had made a plan to divide the Ottoman's territory among 
themselves by an agreement known as Sykes-Picot agreement, even 
before the close of war, established their virtual control on their desired 
areas by virtue of League of Nations in 1919. France was given Syria 
and Lebanon while Great Britain was allotted a Mandate over Iraq and 
Palestine. 
The incorporation of Balfour Declaration in Palestine Mandate h\ 
the League of Nations was a major victory of Zionist over the Arabs. 
Balfour Declaration was a wartime promise made by British Foreign 
Secretary Arthur James Balfour in a letter to Lord Rothschild, head of 
the British Zionist Federation. League of Nation's recognition to the 
British promise provided it a legal cover while after World War 11. 
League's successor United Nations completed the task by adopting a 
resolution for the partition of Palestine. President Truman's personal and 
official influence was significant in shifting from negative to affinTiati\ e 
vote in UN, which fulfilled the age-old dream of the Zionists, fhe 
problem created by Britain was being perpetuated by America who took 
a considerable interest in West Asia after World War II. In the late 
forties the power and influence of Britain and France declined which 
created a power vacuum in West Asia. It happened at a time when 
Russian traditional interests in the region revived particularly after 
increasing US involvement in the political affairs of the Arab world. 
Between 1947-1977, USA developed a very close relationship with 
Israel. In the name of Israel's security America provided every possible 
help to the Jewish state. USA regarded Israel as an strategic asset a 
Western local ally in the Arab world to protect its imperialist interest m 
the region. After Suez war of 1956 the role of Britain and France in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict had been minimized up to the limit of United 
Nations or to the support of their strong Western ally - United States. 
US growing involvement in West Asian affairs intensified the Cold War. 
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which contributed a lot in the increasing Arab-lsraeH hostility, in the 
1967 war. Israel achieved huge territorial gains, which was not possible 
without US backing. US support to Israel was no match to Soviet 
support provided to the Arabs. The fundamental basis of US-Israeli 
relations is the commonality of their interests in the region. 
The efforts made by major powers and the UN for the settlement 
of Arab-Israeli dispute after June 1967 war not successful, mainly due to 
pro-Israeli stand of US which in turn resulted in hardening attitude of 
Jewish leaders to accept any solution which did not favour Israel's 
territorial ambitions. This situation persisted till 1973. After 1973 Arab-
Israeli war it had become evident that when America sincerely desired to 
give some concessions to the Arabs for the sake of her own selfish 
interests in the region, Israel did not disappoint her closest ally. 
In the present study, US has been our main point of reference, 
particularly after Suez episode of 1956 which eroded power and 
influence of Britain and France in the region completely. They were no 
more in a position to act independently in the Arab-Israeli conflict 
except to provide Israel with war material and to stand by America in 
the United Nations in her support to the Israeli cause. In October war. 
they behaved indifferently because of domestic and international 
constraints but generally, they always supported Israeli cause and 
favoured US position. America was the only Western actor who played 
a significant role in the 1967 and 1973 wars, adopting different 
strategies in different situations. 
The present study consists of five chapters followed b\ a 
conclusion. 
1. Chapter first of this study provides historical background of 
conflict evolution in Palestinian-Jewish context which may be 
helpful to a proper understanding of the subsequent events leading 
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to the continuous war and violence in West Asia. It also brings into 
focus the roots of the imperiaHst Zionist alliance that resulted into 
Palestine catastrophe. 
2. Chapter second explains the consequences of Arab defeat in 1948-
49 war against Israel in the Arab world and rise of Pan-Arabism and 
Arab Nationalism under the revolutionary leadership of Gamal 
Abdul Nasser. It also focuses over increasing Soviet-American 
interests in the area. In a competitive drive they tried to establish 
their respective influence over the prominent Arab countries. I'S 
failure to trap Nasser into Western Defense Alliance Scheme 
caused its withdrawal from Aswan Dam's financial aid. It led to the 
nationalization of Suez Canal by Nasser, ultimately resulting into 
tripartite aggression by Egypt. Receding intluence of Britain and 
France and Soviet-American intrusion are also taken into account. 
3. Chapter third deals with causes and consequences of 1967 Arab-
Israeli war in the light of growing intimacy between United States 
and Israel. It is also highlighted that US generosity towards Israel in 
providing all sort of backing and support made her capable to defeat 
the Arab armies miserably. After June war the Palestine question 
(which is the core issue of the conflict) receded in the background 
since restoration of the lost territories from Israel became the 
primary objective of the Arab states. Disappointment and 
frustration encouraged militancy amongst the Palestinians. Ihe 
impact of Jewish lobby and personal preferences of respective US 
Presidents, coupled with national interests in fonnation of 
American policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict arc also 
analyzed. 
4. Chapter fourth is devoted to describe the Israeli position in the 
light of its territorial gains of 1967 war. Until June war. Israel had 
no means of pressurizing the Arab states to accept the legitimacy of 
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the Jewish state. However, the acquisition of the Arab territor> in 
1967 war was used by Israeli decision makers as a bargaining card. 
American help in and outside of UN allowed Israel to maintain this 
position throughout the period between 1967-1973 wars. Soviet 
Union provided military and economic support to the Arabs, it 
favoured their stand in UN, but it lacked the spirit and 
determination, which America had to the Israeli cause. Soviet 
interest in the establishment of detente is also taken into account. 
With the failure of every attempt at settlement question between 
Arabs and Israel, Sadat had no option except war. 
5. Chapter five throws light on the changed pattern of Arab-Israeli 
war in which the myth of Israeli military invincibility was broken 
by the Arabs for the first time and surprisingly without Soviet's 
direct involvement at the initial stages. In this war US diplomacv to 
gain the confidence of both the parties succeeded. The greatest 
achievement of the US in the Arab-Israeli diplomacy was 
detachment of Egypt from rest of the Arab world, the dream ol 
American leaders for a generation. Sadaf s unilateral decision to 
conclude a peace treaty with Israel harmed the Palestine cause to a 
great extent but Egypt regained its Sinai. 
The methodology that has been used is analytical based on 
empirical facts and relevant information, which helped in evaluating and 
interpreting the hypothesis. Since history is the main source of acquiring 
knowledge - a historical approach is taken up to explore the background 
of the problem. 
Chapter - I 
ORIGIN OF PALESTINE CATASTROPHE: FIRST 
ARAB-ISRAELI ENCOUNTER 1948-49 
Chapter - I 
ORIGIN OF PALESTINE CATASTROPHE: FIRST 
ARAB-ISRAELI ENCOUNTER 1948-49 
A. Development of Political Zionism: British Backing and 
Support: 
In the political history of the world no other dispute evaded a 
solution for such a long time as the Arab-Israeli conflict in West Asia. 
Ever since the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine, recurrence of wars 
and violence between the Arabs and Jews had been a constant source of 
tension to the peace loving community of the world. What happened m 
Palestine after First, and Second World Wars is a human tragedy, which 
has its roots in the history of emergence of political Zionism. Palestine 
had seen many invasions in the past. It had a long history of nearly six 
thousand years. A number of battles had been fought in and for the land 
of Palestine. People were displaced, land occupied, law and order 
disrupted, economies shattered but Palestine had never experienced such 
a blunder that occurred in 1917, in which, "one nation solemnlv 
promised to a second nation the country of a third.'' It is true, of course, 
that British Government was responsible for taking the first step in the 
form of 'Balfour Declaration' that followed the tragic chain of events in 
Palestine, but the Zionist demand for the creation of a Jewish state in the 
'Holy Land' had the support of many European nations. 
Before the development of political Zionism. Jews did not add up 
any legal or political claim over Palestine, except a pious hope to return 
to "Zion*. The hope of one day returning to the "promised' land alwa\s 
remained alive among the Jewish people. They used to refer the Old 
Testament of Bible as the basis of their claim in which "God promised 
the patriarch Abraham the land of Canaan, roughly ancient Palestine.'"' 
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They believed that the God of Israel at a chosen time would intervene in 
history to bring the Jewish exile to an end. 
Palestine problem started with the rise of political Zionism on the 
one hand and, modem Arab nationalism on the other. The clash of 
interest between Zionist Jews and Palestinian Arabs over the piece of 
land known as Palestine was the core of conflict until 1948-49. The 
involvement of Arab states in the first Palestinian Arabs and Israeli war 
of 1948-49 changed the very nature of the Palestine problem. The end of 
the war converted Palestinian Arabs and Israeli conflict into an Arab-
Israeli conflict, providing a new and wider dimension to it. Ihe 
Palestinians who left their homes in the terror of war were not allowed 
to return even after signing the armistice agreements between the 
belligerents. Since then they were not viewed as the original inhabitants 
of Palestine "' but as refugees to be supported by the international dole or 
resettled within the Arab world '"'*' They were not even considered as the 
potential political claimants of Palestine for a longer period of time. 
The Palestinians, who did not leave Palestine, had been continuously 
harassed by the Israeli army. They were treated as a second-class citizen 
in their own country. Albert Hourani has written that "Civilized 
Governments accept their responsibility for those who live in the land 
they rule"^, but in case of Israelis it did not seem to be applied. The 
creation of a Jewish state in Palestine to accommodate scattered 
European Jews was a unique political solution that was imposed by the 
Western powers upon the original Palestinian inhabitants. It was an 
unusual political remedy that created an ever-burning source of 
problems and strife in the entire West Asian region. 
The Palestinian Arabs were the earliest and the original 
inhabitants of Palestine. They lived in Palestine and in other parts of 
West Asia before the advent of Islam. The conquest of Palestine by the 
Muslim Arabs in A.D. 637^ was not the starting point of their 
occupation of the country. The Palestinian Arabs" claim over Palestine 
did not rest on their conquest or invasion but on their continuous 
inhabitation in Palestine from time immemorial. The Israeli occupation 
of Palestine was merely an episode in the history of the countr>. which 
came to an end centuries ago. The spiritual yearning of the Jews for 
Palestine and their religious belief had been exploited by the modern 
Zionists for the achievement of their political motives. In case of the 
Arabs, their claim over Palestine was not based upon their religious 
association with the country but they derived their right from the 
internationally accepted principle defined under international law that a 
country belongs to it's indigenous people having lived their for 
centuries. 
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Jewish exodus from Palestine was started in A.D. 135 when the 
rebellion was totally crushed by the Roman army under the reign of 
emperor Hdrin. Jerusalem was razed to the ground and the entire 
Jewish population was either killed or driven out of the land. During 
their long 'Diaspora' the Jews migrated to various countries of the 
world. In Western Europe, they met with persecution by Christians who 
disliked Jewish presence in their respective countries. They were bound 
to be confined to special areas called ghettos.'" France and Britam 
expelled the Jews from their territories during the fourteenth centun/. 
The Christians reconquered Spain from the Arabs in 1492." 
During their occupation of Spain, Jewish Community living 
there had to choose between exile or Christian bapfism.'^ It resulted into 
the mass exodus of the Jews from Spain. Muslim world in its greatest 
days gave better treatment to Jews as well as Christians. "Jews enjo\ed 
more autonomy under the Arabs than the Jews of Western 
Chrisfiandom". Before the creation of the state of Israel. Muslim 
population of the Arab world treated the Jews well because their Prophet 
Mohammad instructed them to treat the people of the Book (ahlal-Kitab) 
with respect. Fred J. Khouri had described the position of the Jews 
during the Arab regimes in the following words: 
Since Muslims regulated all aspects of their lives in 
accordance with the principles of their faith, they usually did 
not deny a similar right to those who remained Jews and 
Christians. Christians and Jews held important posts under the 
various Arab Caliphs. All in all, from the beginning of the 
Diaspora, Jewish communities enjoyed a free life in Muslim 
Asia than in Christian Europe.'^ 
The French Revolution of 1789 had a great impact over the 
countries of Western Europe.''* The concepts of liberty, equality and 
nationalism were popularized across the map of the world. Western 
societies, which were more flexible than the societies of Eastern E^urope. 
had shown a visible change in their attitudes towards the Jews. 
Restrictions against the Jews were gradually lifted in France, England, 
Germany. FloUand, Belgium, Denmark, Norway. Austria and 
Switzerland.'^ The growing liberal attitude towards the Jews was 
generally referred as the 'Jewish Emancipation'. But Emancipation of 
the Jews was subjected to the condition of their blending into Western 
society like other Western people. Many of the Jews choose the path of 
assimilation but a series of events, which took place in the latter part of 
the nineteenth century disappointed Jewish community completely. 
Amongst the various events, which took place in Europe, two 
events provided a great impact on the thinking of the Jews, which 
transformed their religious aspirations into a forceful nationalistic drive 
providing the conducive background for the emergence of political 
Zionism. The first event, which ignited the mind of world Jewry was the 
growth of European nationalism.'^ The second European development 
which encouraged political Zionism was the Russian pogroms in 1881.' 
Under Tsar Alexander II, the Jews of Russia experienced some relief. 
The serfs were freed and the many of restrictions against the Jews were 
relaxed. But in 1881, Tsar II was assassinated and Jews" conspiracy was 
suspected behind his murder. As a result, a terrible wave of violent 
persecution of Jews was brought about in the entire Russian empire. B\ 
the end of 1882 "an estimated 250 pogroms had devastated Jewish 
communities across Russia." These pogroms led to a mass exodus of 
Jews to Eastern and Western Europe and resulted into the collapse of the 
Haskalah assimilationist movement. '^ Jews got very much inspired b\ 
Leo Pinsker's pamphlet Auto-Emancipation (1882) which agitated 
Jewish mind further, they started a new movement, called Hibbat Zion 
(The Love of Zion) in Russia. It was the beginning of the Jewish 
struggle for their settlement in Palestine on a permanent basis. Within 
that movement another was formed called 'Bilu' under the leadership of 
Russo-Jewish students. The main purpose of the formation of'Bilu' was 
colonizing Palestine for Jewish community. 
Jews had become convinced that they could never achieve libert\ 
and equality in Russian empire, and therefore, anti-semitism was 
incurable. Moses Hess in his book Rome and Jerusalem (1862). 
predicted anti-semitism as a major and growing problem for Jews. 
Emancipation, he declared, "is failure. European nations may tolerate us. 
but will never respect us." Hess, like most Zionists did not believe in 
messianic trahs of Judaism, instead he floated an idea of building a 
socialist Jewish state in Palestine. The political aspect of Zionism was 
first expressed by Leo Pinsker, a Russian Jew, in his pamphlet Autc-
Emancipation (1882). In the pamphlet he called for the establishment of 
a Jewish state. He came to be associated with 'Hibbat Zion" and "Bilu" 
and inspired the thinking of the followers of these movements. 'Bilu" 
organized the immigration of the Jews to Palestine. 
Between 1882 and 1897 more than 20,000 Jews migrated lo 
Palestine, financially supported by the wealthy Jews of the West such as 
Baron Edmoned de Rothschild who is called the 'father of the yishu(»" 
(the Jewish community in Palestine). It was Rothschild's financial 
help, which diverted Jewish immigration from Western Europe to 
Palestine. The continuous Jewish immigration to Western Europe had 
reached such proportions that it created insecurity amongst the Western 
people. Despite the continuous efforts made by various Jewish 
organizations no central leadership emerg edtill 1896.^Mt was Theodore 
Herzl, an assimilated Hungarian bom Jew, who provided political 
Zionism a concrete shape and most effective leadership. He was a 
journalist by profession. As a correspondent for a Viennese newspaper. 
Herzl covered the 1894 trial in Paris of Captain Alfred Dreyfus, a 
French Jewish army officer. He was court marlialled hastily on the 
charges of selling military secrets to Germany, which were later pro\ ed 
to be false. Dreyfus affair aroused Herzl's bitter memories of the anti-
semitism he had experienced in his early youth. ^ He had become 
convinced that Dreyfus was made a scapegoat because of his 
Jewishness. He thought that if anti-semitism took such an ugly shape in 
liberal France, there was no doubt, that it would appear in other 
countries with greater force. A.W. Kayyali has described that the anti-
semitic Dreyfus affair "was the main factor which converted Herzl from 
indifference to his Jewishness to acfive Zionism."^"* Soon after 1894 
episode, he started working on a pamphlet entitled "Der Judenstaat (The 
Jewish state). It was published in February 1896 and became 'a basic 
document of the new Zionist movement'. In the pamphlet. Herzl 
forcefully put his ideas of making the Jewish question as a political and 
national one. contrary to the religious belief and spiritual yearning of the 
Orthodox Jewrv. 
He was thoroughly unconcerned of the prophecies of traditional 
Judaism; he wanted a solution to the anti-semitic problem. In the 
following year, in August 1897, Herzl convened the first Zionist 
Congress in Basle, Switzerland, to seek a permanent approval of his 
programme from the world Jewry. The Congress adopted a resolution 
favouring a "home in Palestine' for the Jewish people. The World 
Zionist Organization, which was established by the delegates of the 
Congress, elected Herzl as it's first president.^^ The Congress declared 
that the primary' goal of Zionism was to create for the Jewish people a 
home by 'public law'. It also endorsed the following means to achieve 
this objective: 
1. The promotion on suitable lines of the resettlement of Palestine 
by Jew ish agriculturalists, artisans and tradesman. 
2. The organization and building together of the whole of Jewry by 
means of appropriate institutions, local and general, in 
accordance with the laws of each country. 
3. The strengthening of Jewish sentiment and national 
consciousness. Preparatory step towards obtaining government 
consent as are necessary, for the attainment of aim of Zionism."'' 
4. The term state was dropped as envisaged by Herzl in the original 
text. Instead a mild term 'Home' was used by the Congress. 
considering the matter a very sensitive one for the Arabs. 
In 1896, before the formafion of WZO, the author of the T^er 
Judenstaat' proposed the creation of a Jewish state in order to bring an 
end to the problems of the Jews. In 1897, at the conclusion of the first 
Zionist Congress he expressed his strong belief in the foundation of a 
Jewish state. He said: 
In Basle I founded the Jewish state. If I were to say this aloud 
I would meet with general laughter; but in another five years, 
and certainly in another fifty years, everyone will be 
convinced of this. ^  
Ihe establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine within fifty years 
of his statement shows his firm conviction towards his goal. 
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Herzl's efforts to obtain a "Charter" from the Sultan of Turkc>. 
Abdul Hamid. for Jewish settlement in Palestine failed to get Sultan's 
approval."** Herzl was not very particular about Palestine as the 
permanent seat of Jewish rehabilitation. Herzl was very well aware that 
Britain had its colonial interest in Palestine. While proposing his plan 
for the colonization of either Cyprus or Al-Arish in the Northern Sinai 
peninsula to the then British Colonial Secretary'. Joseph Chamberlain. 
Herzl assured him Jewish loyalty towards Britain in return of her 
support to Zionist cause. He argued that British Empire would not onl\ 
"be bigger by a rich colony" but Britain would also be able to get the 
support and services often million Jews. He continued: 
Will all wear England in their heart if through such a deed it 
becomes the protective power of the Jewish people. At one 
stroke England will get ten million secret but loyal subjects 
active in all walks of life all over the world. At a signal, all 
of them will place themselves at the service of the 
magnanimous nation that brings long-desired 
help....England will get ten million agents for her greatness 
and her influence. And the effect of this sort of thing usually 
spreads from the political to the economic.^ *^ 
Herzfs proposal for Cyprus or Al-Arish did not materialize. 
Uganda proposal, which came from British side, was formally rejected 
by majority of delegates participating in the Seventh Zionist Congress. 
Initially Herzl faced opposition for his programme from orthodox Jews 
who did not favour any political solution for Jewish problem. They had 
a firm belief that a return to Zion would be brought about only by divine 
intervention and not by a temporal political authority.^" However. b> 
insisting over Palestine as a Jewish home, Herzl and later his successor 
Weizmann, succeed in satisfying the religioethnic sentiments of the 
Jews who chanted the slogan, 'Next year in Jerusalem' in their dailv 
prayers.'' His efforts got success but his dream of a Jewish state in 
Palestine was not fulfilled in his life. Herzl died in 1904''^  at the age ol 
fourty four without achieving the goal of his movement but it continued 
to attract the attention of bulk of Jews all over Europe. After his death 
his untmished task was accomplished by Dr. Chaim Weizmann. a 
distinguished Jew, bom in Russia. ' He migrated to England where he 
served as a lecturer of Chemistry in Manchester University. Weizmann 
on the basis of his firm conviction that "British were the most promising 
potential sympathizers of Zionism" '*, started his groundwork in England 
to fulfill HerzEs dream. 
B. Emergence of Modern Arab Nationalism: 
Arab nationalism emerged as a result of the development of Arab 
consciousness about their identity based upon common language -
Arabic, common faith - Islam, a common culture and a shared history ' 
This Arab nationalism was in all respects a purely Arab growth, which 
tended to evolve an spirit of humanism throughout the world.^ Arabs 
were unified under the parcham of Islam and became one nation.' 
Although the term 'nation' in this context possessed an Islamic 
connotation, which by absorbing the various form of racial and regional 
identities gave a wider concept of nationalism. It resulted into the 
formation of a new society and a new civilizafion. Arab nationalism was 
not a racial concept like Jewish Zionism. 
However, it possessed most of the attributes of a nation in the 
modem sense; long before modem concept of nationalism came into 
existence. According to professor Ibrahim Jum'a. "The Arab 
nationalism is not an imitation of the nationalist movement that 
appeared in Europe toward the end of the nineteenth century. It is much 
older than they are: it is as old as the Arabs"."^^ Professor Abd al-Aziz al-
Duri also stressed in his work that "the Arab nationalist idea is neither 
ephemeral nor borrowed"^^, as asserted by majority of Western writers. 
It is true of course, that the idea of national self-determination in relation 
to the nation state as the basic unit of world poHtics was European, 
which influenced the Arab concept of nationalism. There emerged many 
channels through which European ideas particularly Western Ideas 
penetrated into the world of Islam. French and American missionary and 
educational activities in the Arab world provided stimulus to Arab 
awakening."**^  It was the time when Christians and Muslims of the Arab 
origin started studying in Europe or at European institution in the Arab 
world. Although the number of the Arabs studying in European 
institutions was very less. The translation movement which was started 
during the nineteenth century in the three main centers - Turkey, Egypt 
and Persia had a great value in this regard.'*^ The growing interest of the 
western powers in trade and commerce and their political advances in 
the West Asian region made Arab-West intermingling inevitable. Out of 
this, there grew modem Arab nationalism. The protagonists of modern 
Arab nationalism were not intended to reject their old values and 
concepts but to reform and reformulate them. They always wanted to 
retain their identity as heirs to a great world civilization spreading from 
Morocco to Iraq."*^  There was a time when Europeans had to borrow the 
knowledge of science, mathematics, medicine, geography and art from 
the Arabs. Many of the English words used in various fields of learning 
have their origin in Arabic language, such as alcohol, alkali, algebra, 
zero, syrup etc.'*'* Arabs out of their natural spirit of charity offered the 
world all that the almighty had bequeathed to them. The nationalistic 
instinct, which was developed among the Arabs during their encounters 
with the West, was diverted towards the despotic rulers of Ottoman 
Empire. Allied powers exploited this situation to achieve their wartime 
goals in 1914. Although subsequent evaluation of Arab nationalism was 
shaped by prolonged presence of European powers in the Arab region. 
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The brief French occupation of Egypt followed by more length) 
British presence created a number of local and regional problems in the 
Arab world. It was Napolean's campaign in Egypt in 1789 and his 
advances in Palestine and Syria, which aroused British interest in Fertile 
Crescent, as it had posed a threat to British overland routes to India/" As 
a safeguard measure Britain opened a Counsellate in Jerusalem in 
1839.'*'' The construction of the Suez canal enhanced the importance of 
the area further. As soon as the Suez Canal was opened for navigation in 
1869"*^  it brought an abrupt change in the British policy towards the 
canal and intensified her interest in Egypt. 
Britain realized the value of Suez Canal. Within no time Sue/ 
Canal proved as one of the most important lines of communication and 
transportation in the world. Britain's predominance in trade with India 
and Far East increased her dependence upon the Suez Canal. Suez Canal 
largely reduced the time and expense of shipping to and from India as 
compared to the lengthy and expensive Cape route. Since Brhish 
government opposed French efforts for a maritime canal across the 
isthmus of Suez connecting the Mediterranean and Red seas, at ever\ 
step, she had no voice in the company's policy. The canal was 
virtually under domination of a single great power - France. It was a 
thing of which Palmerston had formerly been afraid. The year 1875 had 
provided a rare opportunity to the British Prime Minister Disraeli, when 
debt ridden Ismail Pasha sold 44% of the company's shares to Britain 
for four million pounds."*^ After this financial deal British government 
succeeded in establishing her control over Egypt. Britain regarded 
France as her main enemy to her imperialist interests in the region 
Growing Russian and German influence in Turkey had also been a 
matter of grave concern to Britain. Until 1870, German political 
influence in the Turkish region was negligible but the war of 1870 
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brought her closer to the Turks while French influence in the Ottoman 
Empire reduced considerably.^ *^ British entrenchment in the region 
continued. Her occupation of Cyprus in 1878 and establishment of her 
virtual control over Egypt in 1882 were the major events, which turned 
Turkey towards Germany.^' At the outbreak of the World War 1. on 
August 2, 1914, German influence in the Ottoman Empire had grown 
out of all proportions to the influence of other powers.^ Turke\ 
regarded Germany the only Western power that asked for nothing while 
the other European powers had always been motivated to gain their 
respective territorial interests in the Ottoman Empire. Before the 
development of a close liaison between Turkey and Germany, the Turks 
considered Britain and France as their friendly powers. But France 
always tried to exploit the weakness of Turkish Empire for the sake ot 
her interests in the region. The attitude of Britain was rather diplomatic 
because by extending her support to Turkey she wanted to weaken 
French. German and Russian hold in the Ottoman Empire. Mohammad 
Ali's campaign to establish himself as the architect of Arab empire had 
been failed because of British military support to Turkey. British 
contribution in Mohammad Ali's failure was described by Antonius in 
the following words: 
Mehemmed Ali's project of carving out for himself an Arab 
empire from the Sultan's dominions was never realized: it 
crashed on the rock of Palmerston's opposition.^' 
Growing hold of Germany over Ottoman Empire posed a great 
threat to Britain. At the time, when First World War broke out. Lord 
Kitchener was the British High Commissioner in Egypt. Soon after the 
occurrence of war, he was appointed Secretary of State for war.^ ** 
Kitchener was aware of the strong nationalist sentiments which were 
growing in the Arabs against their Turkish rulers since long. He started 
maneuvering through his agents^^ to find out the gravity of Arab 
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nationalism. The decision of Turkey to side the central powers and the 
subsequent Sultan's call of a jihad (holy war) by all Muslims against the 
Triple Entente was looked upon by Allied powers as a great challenge to 
their war strategy.^^ British war office quickly saw the advantage of an 
Arab revolt against Turkey and encouraged their struggle for 
independence. Bernard Lewis described the Arabs' ill feelings against 
their Turkish masters in the following words: 
"Arabs came to be generally accepted that Turks commanded 
while others obeyed, and a non-Turk in authority was 
regarded as an oddity." 
Antonious has also quoted a Frenchman who traveled a lot across 
the region: 
....Everywhere I came upon the same abiding and universal 
sentiment : hatred of Turks....the nation of concerted action to throw off 
C O 
the detested yoke is gradually shaping itself 
Nationalist movement of the Arabs was no longer confined to 
Syria. Egypt and Lebanon only; it had swept over the other parts of the 
region as well. Arabs were not satisfied with the reforms undertaken by 
the Ottoman Empire after 1908. They thought the reforms as "European 
in inspiration" and meant for 'Turkification' of Arab culture.^ *^ The end 
of Abdul Hamid's rule in 1909 brought new hopes to the Arabs for 
'greater autonomy'. But Arab people soon realized that Abdul Hamid's 
tyranny was replaced by another form of tyranny of young Turks.^ *' 
Moreover, the separatist forces at work in the Balkan region encouraged 
the nationalistic instincts of the Arab population to a great extent.^' With 
the decline of Turkish regime. Western economic, cultural and political 
penetration in the area also increased. 
During the period 1908 till the end of 1912, the Ottoman Empire 
lost most of its European territories, and as for the financial position, it 
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had reached the stage of bankruptcy. It was the time when the end of the 
'Sick Man of Europe'^^, or in the words of famous Indian poet of Urdu. 
Dr. Allama Iqbal, "Turkey Ka Marize Neem Jan'\ had become certain. 
Ahhough the main intellectual centers of Arab national awakenings 
were located in the major cities of the Levant, the practical shape to this 
movement was given by Sharif Hussein, a heir of Hashemite dynasty in 
Hejaz and thirty seven in direct descent from the prophet. ' 
C. Outbreak of World War i: British Contradictory 
Promises to Arabs and Jews: 
When the perceived threat of Turco - German alliance turned 
into realit)', most of the ground work for a proposed Arab revolt against 
the Turks was completed. It was done under the able guidance of Lord 
Kitchener, the Secretary of State for war. Since long, Arabs dreamed of 
a purely Arab state independent of the Turkish Empire.^ '* The Allied 
Governments lured the Arabs by promising their independence after the 
defeat of Turkey in return of their revolt against the Turks. In the 
promises made by the Allied, the Arabs saw their chance to emancipate 
themselves from Ottoman overlord-ship. British efforts to secure Arabs" 
help in her war strategy had been succeeded. After some hesitation. 
Arabs decided to join the Allied camp. Before joining the Allies they 
wanted British assurances in a concrete form. Finally, a secret deal took 
place between the British High Commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry Mc-
Mahon and Sharif Hussein of Mecca. 
Tenns and conditions of the deal had been concluded through a 
series of letters exchanged between them that came to be known as the 
Sharif Hussein-Mc- Mahon Correspondence.^^ 
Kitchener had often been criticized for his selection of Sharif as 
Britain's Arab ally against the Turks, in preference to the powerful Ibn-
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Saud of Nejd. But it was soon realized that the War Secretary chose the 
right person. About the contribution of the Arab leader Antonious 
remarked: 
For the great services which Husain rendered to the Allied 
cause in relation to the Holy War was one which no one else 
was in a position to render. 
The ensuing exchange of letters between July 1915 and March 
1916 resulted into a mutual agreement, which, beside other things, 
endorsed the major provisions of the deal. These were: Sharifs 
commitment to launch an Arab revolt against Turkey and an open 
denouncement to regard the Turks as enemies of Islam; British promise 
to recognize the Arab Caliphat if one were proclaimed; and a pledge to 
uphold Arab independence in a certain area after the defeat of Turkey.^ ^ 
In the subsequent years, Palestine became a subject of 
controversy, since Arabs claimed that Palestine was included within the 
area of promised Arab land, while British Government denied their 
claim. However, after the war it had been established that the Arabs 
were betrayed by the Allied powers. As for the Arab services during the 
World War 1. General Allenby, Commander in Chief of the 
Expeditionary Force once remarked: 'Arab help had been invaluable".^ ** 
The end of the World War I, brought the Allied Government 
victorious but their pledges to the Arabs remained unfulfilled. Instead, 
they divided the promised region among themselves. Ten months after 
Mc-Mahon's assurances regarding the Arab independence after the end 
of Turkish rule, followed the Sykes Picot Agreement,^^ which embodied 
mutual understanding as to the positions of the disintegrating Ottoman 
empire that each partner intended to claim at the end of the war. 
Sir Mark Sykes of the Foreign Office and Francois Georges Picot. the 
French official in Cairo, in charge of Syrian affairs, worked it out in a 
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series of exchanged notes. Officially the Sykes Picot Agreement was 
concluded on May 16, 1916. 
Behind this secret agreement Britain's feeling of insecurity with 
regard to her imperial interests in the region played a vital role, 
particularly after she found herself compelled "to cross swords with 
Turkey".^" Turkish Empire, before it's alliance with Germany served as 
a "bulwark"''' to defend the British lifeline to India. Aware of the fact 
that France saw Mc-Mahon's promises to Sharif with suspicion and 
regarded their mutual understanding "as a British maneuver to trick 
France out of her rightful legacy in Syria". British Government had to 
find out some remedy. At this juncture Britain had fully realized that 
without recognizing her Allies' claims over the areas of their interests, 
her own interests in the region would not be secured. The result was 
'Secret Partition Agreements' including Sykes Picot Agreement, which 
was described b\ Antonious as "a shocking document....a startling piece 
of double dealing". 
The contradictions in British wartime policies continued which 
were totally motivated to protect her imperialist interests in the region so 
vital for her future strategies. 
On November 2, 1917, Lord Balfour, the then British Secretary 
of State for Foreign affairs released the following policy statement in the 
form of a letter to Lord Rothschild, President of British Zionist 
Federation: 
Mis Majesty's Government views with favour the 
establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish 
people and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the 
achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that 
nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and 
religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in 
Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed b> Jews in 
any other country.^ '* 
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Regarding "Balfour Declaration' Henery Catlan gave his remari<: 
At the time that British Government made the Balfour 
Declaration, it possessed no sovereignty, dominion or other 
title in Palestine which empowered it to recognize any rights 
in favour of Jews in Palestine.^^ 
It is said that, "The Balfour Declaration came in the same year, 
one month before the capture of Jerusalem by General Allenby. This 
was the same Arthur Balfour whose Government in the Aliens Act of 
1906. had closed the doors of Britain to Russian Jews fleeing from the 
Pogroms. Only 11 years later, he was opening the doors of another 
country, to these same 'undesirable aliens' but at the expense of the 
people of Palestine." 
Balfour Declaration was, of course, the outcome of the mutual 
conspiracy between Britain and Zionist Jews for the realization of their 
ambitions in Palestine. Britain wanted its control over Palestine to 
maintain its traditional hold in the area and in case of receding British 
influence, permanent Zionists' presence in the 'promised land" would 
produce a reliable Western ally in the region. The Declaration 
deliberately ignored the mention of political rights of Palestinian Arabs 
whose ancestors had been in uninterrupted occupation of Palestine for 
1,300 years and who, in 1917, constituted more than 90 percent of the 
population and owned 97.5 percent of land.^' The area, which was called 
Palestine before the creation of Israel occupied a very important position 
in the West Asian region. Palestine is considered sacred to the Jews. 
Christians and Muslims alike. It is sacred to the Jews because they 
regarded it a "Promised Land' referring the Old Testament of Bible as 
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the basis of their claim. It is a different thing that the creation of Israel 
on the basis of religious belief of the Jews had no validity in terms of 
international law. Christians considered it a 'Holy Place' because it is 
the birthplace of Christianity. Jesus Christ was bom in Bethlehem and 
gave his religious preaching in many parts of the territor\' and took his 
last breath on the cross at Jerusalem/'^ 
Palestine has special meaning to Muslims too. because according 
to their belief Prophet Mohammad had made his ascent to heaven from 
the Dome of Rock, which was built by the Arabs in Jerusalem after the\ 
conquered Palestine. 
Apart from Palestine's religious importance, its geographical 
location provided it a unique position in the world. Geographically the 
land forms part of the Fertile Crescent, which lies between the 
Mediterranean in the West, Lebanon in the North, Syria and the Jordan 
River in the East and the Red Sea and Sinai in the South and South 
West. In the past it was often referred to as 'Southern Syria' because it 
forms a natural part of it. It occupies a central position in the Arab world 
for it connects its African and Asian segments. Palestine forms a main 
meeting and a take-off point on the bridge that stretches across the three 
o I 
continents- Asia. Africa and Europe. Among factors accounting its 
position at the Arab and international level, the opening of Suez Canal in 
1869 added a new dimension to its significance. The discovery of oil 
in the region in 1930's has always been a source of attraction for the 
West, which recognized its strategic value since long. Palestine's unique 
position in the West Asian region made it subject continually to 
ambitions and plans of imperialist powers from the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. At the time when World War I broke out, Palestine, 
as a political entity, had no separate existence of its own. It constituted a 
part of Syrian provinces of Turkish Empire until 1918, when Turkish 
rule ended as a result of the military occupation of Palestine by Allied 
forces. 
The Balfour Declaration, which recognized Zionist claim over 
Palestine was always considered as the 'original foundation stone' in the 
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process of formulation of state of Israel in Palestine by the Zionists 
Hussein's confidence in the British government was slightly shaken at 
the publication of the Balfour Declaration but later revived after he 
received assurance by Commander D.G. Hogarth, on behalf ot His 
Majesty's Government. Realizing the fact that such 'Declaration' was 
bound to create lots of political complications in the near future, which 
might endanger their mutual interest in Palestine, Zionist prominent 
leaders and top British officials started maneuvering to secure the 
approval of other Allied governments to the Balfour Declaration. 1 he\ 
succeeded in their efforts since France, Italy and United States ot 
America gave their consent in favour of the Declaration made by British 
Government. 
Lloyd George, the Prime Minister of Britain, justified his 
government's stand by presenting Balfour Declaration as an award given 
to scientist Weizmann for his solution of the acetone shortage during the 
war - a material necessary for making explosives. " Arab services for 
Allied cause were totally forgotten for which Captain Liddell Hart, the 
Chief Military commentator of the Allies remarked: 
It was the Arab almost entirely who wiped out the fourth 
(Turkish) Army, the still intact that might have barred the wa\ 
to final victory. 
Behind British promise to a Jewish national home in Palestine. 
humanitarian consideration was not involved, as asserted by many 
Western scholars. Menachem Begin, a staunch Zionist leader, in his 
book. The Revolt', seems to support this view: 
The peculiar genius of British statesmanship is- or was- to 
give to British interests the outward form of a general 
deal....In Eretz Israel, too, the same game was played....The 
British wanted Eretz Israel because it lies at the Eastern end 
of the Mediterranean, because it is at the crossroads of the 
continents, because it dominates one bank of the Suez canal. 
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because it lies athwart the road to India, because....there are 
many important reasons. Palestine has been desired by all the 
world's rulers since Nebuchadnezzar. But if a great power 
wants a country, does it just take it, 'annex' it? Not if it is a 
clever Power! The ideal was at hand....Britain would promise 
the Jews a home in Palestine....Britain would have Palestine, 
and the Jews would have a home in it..." 
British policy, therefore, was ready to back a great deal, which 
would enable Britain to take over control of Palestine without seeming 
to. 
According to this analysis, which is rather based on truth. British 
policy at the time of World War I did not favour either Arabs or Jews 
but it wanted to secure her own imperialistic interests in the Arab East 
by creating a pemianent cause of trouble in Palestine. 
Winston Churchill also denied humanitarian factor as the motive 
behind Balfour declaration: 
The Balfour Declaration must....not be regarded as a promise 
given from sentimental motive; it was a practical measure 
o n 
taken in the interests of common cause. 
Britain saw that her interests in the region coincided with the 
Zionists and not with the Arabs; so the Arabs were simply ignored 
without honouring British pledges to them. 
fwo events, which occurred in 1917, had gone in favour of the 
Zionists. The first was the Russian Revolution, the second, US entry into 
the World War I. In the Bolshevik Government, prominent revolutionar\ 
Jews occupied important posts and in US Congress, strong Jewish lobby 
had a great influence in decision making of the country.^ *^ Every US 
President had been affected by groups, advisors and events. US 
President Woodrow Wilson also came under the strong pressure and 
influence of his close friends, and advisors who happened to be staunch 
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Zionists in their approach as well as in their policies. Wilson \\a^ 
surrounded by many pro Zionist groups but two leading Zionists 
namely - Louis D. Brandis and Rabbi Stephens S. Wise had direc 
access to the President and they also had the support of US public 
behind them. Brandis was a lawyer by profession. He actively supportec; 
Wilson during his Presidential Election and was rewarded by being 
made a Judge of US Supreme Court.^ ^ Initially Wilson was hesitant u 
make a public statement in support of the Balfour Declaration but fmalK 
he acknowledged it publicly on the behest of British Government, w ho 
on the basis of an intelligence report hinted that the German 
Government might be considering a similar declaration.'^' During his 
visit to United States, Lord Balfour prepared a solid ground for securing 
the support of US President to British promise made in the 
'Declaration'. As for Soviet Union, presence of prominent Jews in 
revolutionary circle helped Britain's move to some extent but her long-
term traditional rivalry against the West dominated the scene in the Arab 
world. 
Balfour Declaration formed the basis of future developments, 
which ultimately resulted into the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine 
named Israel. 
In view of Steven, Wilson "was fascinated with the idea that a 
democratic Zionism might replace Ottoman despotism and create a 
heaven for oppressed Jews in Palestine. He was a firm opponent ot 
European imperialism, was suspicious of secret Franco-British treaties 
covering the Ottoman Empire."^" 
Nowhere in Europe was support for Zionism as widespread and 
popular over the years as in Britain. Britain was regarded as the breeding 
ground for political Zionism. In fact, some of the most enthusiastic and 
staunch supporters of political Zionism were Englishmen, who viewed 
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that the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine might be helpfui in 
extending and maintaining British hold in the area so vital for her 
imperialist design. The Zionists were in contact with European powers 
for long, particularly Britain, to acquire their help to achieve Zionist 
goals in Palestine. The outbreak of First World War in 1914 provided a 
golden opportunity to the Zionists. They declared their sympathy and 
support to the allied powers, which was very much needed during the 
critical years of war. Dr. Chaim Weizmann. the leader of Zionist 
movement, used his superb diplomatic skill coupled with his scientific 
contribution to impress the Allies. Weizmann secured the favour of a 
number of leading political figures in Britain. Balfour and Lloyd Oeorge 
were the self-confessed Zionists who played a key role in the 
establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. ' Lloyd George accepted 
that his conversion to Zionism was the resuh of Weizmann's influence 
over him. 
Ihere is no doubt, that Weizmann was the main Zionist leader 
who deserves the credh for the issuance of Balfour Declaration in 19 P . 
D. Palestine Under British Mandate: 
British interest in the Arab region was much older and based 
upon a well- calculated strategy. Throughout the nineteenth centur> 
Great Britain preserved her status quo in Ottoman Empire. 1 he outbreak 
of First World War in 1914 brought new challenges to Britain in which 
revision of tradhional British policy became eminent. British leadership. 
which realized very early the necessity of controlling Palestine, started 
paying increasing attention to the Zionist demand which matched with 
their own interests in the region. As the war preceded the acquisition of 
Palestine had become a vital strategic requirement for Britain. Lord 
Kitchener, one of the principle architects of New Eastern Policy, called 
upon his government to "secure Palestine or a part of it as a bulwark to 
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the British position in Egypt and overland link with the East'". Ilo\d 
(jeorge. the then Prime Minister of Britain, was well aware that mere 
militarv victory would not establish legitimate British claim user 
Palestine, since Wilsonian principles of non acquisition of conquered 
territorv' by war contradicted such privilege. Thus by ruling out the 
possibility of open annexation, British Government opted to link its own 
war aims with the principle of self-determination. Britain saw Zionist 
Jews as the most reliable partners in her plan.*^ ^ 
Until 1918, Palestine was a part of the Syrian Provinces of the 
Ottoman Empire. After the defeat of Turkey, Palestine came under the 
occupation of the Allied forces. Ottomans were destroyed and 
everything was decided in accordance with the wishes and plans of the 
major victorious powers through the newly created League of Nations. 
Treaty of 'Serves' in 1920 followed by Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 
finally decided the future status of Turkey after its defeat at the hands of 
the Allied forces.^^ The end of the war brought the question of the future 
of Palestine and the other Arab countries to a heed, which remained a 
subject of discussion at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. The concept 
of Mandate originally proposed by General Smuts was accepted by the 
Allies."^ ^ The basic aims and objectives of the Mandatory system were 
laid down in Article 22 of the League of Nations. The device of 
Mandatory system provided a remedy to the victorious Allies who could 
not violate Wilsonian principle of non-acquisition of conquered 
territories - the principle, which was generally accepted. By virtue of the 
Article 22 of the League of Nations the great powers succeeded in 
getting hold of the conquered Arab areas but still the question remained 
unsolved as to who should exercise the mandatory functions in specific 
areas. The report of the King-Crane Commission'^ ** dispatched b\ 
Woodrow Wilson, the US President, to find out the desires of the people 
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directly concerned, was deliberately neglected because "it was too hl.i i 
and too frank to please either France or Great Britain".'^ '^  
At Peace Conference both Arabs and Zionists seni the ' 
respective delegations to plead for their cases before the Suprem-
Council. The Arab delegation led by Amir Faisal son of Sharif Mussci!! 
was at a serious disadvantage because it lacked men of world staturt 
with experience in Western affairs, diplomacy and psyche.""' Beside thi-
drawback. Faisal's own problems created by France over the area of hi^ 
interest were a constant source of tension. He considered frencl 
inspirations in Syria more harmful than Zionist interest in Palestine. His 
father, Sharif Hussein dreamt of enlarging the Hashemite Kingdom for 
which he betrayed the Turks. He even tried to seek an alliance with 
Zionists against the French in 1919.'*'' The short-lived agreement 
between Faisal and Weizmann was grossly misinterpreted and used 
against Hashmi family by its enemies. As a result of such 
shortcomings, the Arab case was not presented effectively at the Peace 
Conference. In sharp contrast, the representatives in Zionist delegations 
were prominent and capable personalities living in advanced societies oi 
Europe - familiar with Western diplomacy and tactics. Dr. Chaim 
Weizmann, the leader of the delegation and a close friend of Lloyd 
George and Lord Balfour pleaded Zionist cause very tactfully with full 
devotion and determination before the Supreme Council. Zionists 
exerted all their efforts and used all their skills to acquire endorsement 
of the Balfour Declaration by the Peace Conference. However, the 
imperialists' and Zionists' dreams were realized when the Supreme 
Council of the Principal and Allied powers met at San Ramo on April 
25. 1920,'"'* and decided the future of the territories occupied by the 
Allied powers. France was given Syria and Lebanon while Great Britain 
was allotted a mandate over Transjordan and Palestine. The mandate for 
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Palestine incorporated the Balfour Declaration. Despite Arab rescntmcn 
and protest, the final draft over Palestine, which was discussed uith tfK 
Zionist delegation and not with genuine inhabitants of the land, wi^ 
approved by the Council of the League of Nations on July 24. 1922. Tht 
terms of mandate over Palestine, as remarked by Temperly. were settled 
by the British Government "in consultation with /ionisi 
representatives.'"' "^ It formally came into force in 1923.'"^ Iht, 
incorporation of Balfour Declaration in Palestine Mandate was a major 
victory of Zionists over the Arabs. 
Balfour Declaration was only a statement of British policy, which 
was given a legal cover by endorsing it into the British Mandate for 
Palestine by the League of Nations and got international recognition 
Wilsonian principle of self-determination was just ignored. It was more 
surprising that no American delegates were present when peace 
settlement was made. 
For tw o days the representatives of the United States sat in a 
hotel garden reading the newspapers while the British and 
French settled the most important matters affecting the 
Middle East.'^^ 
In view of Henry Cattan: 
The incorporation of the Balfour Declaration in the Palestine 
mandate was a denial of justice to the people of Palestine. 
The mandate system was conceived by Article 22 of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations as a means to implement 
the principle of self-determination of people. As a result of 
Zionist influence this objective was defeated in the case of 
Palestine mandate.'"'' 
With the establishment of British mandate over Palestine the 
process of creation of a Jewish State in the 'Promised Land" began. This 
time promise was not made by the Almighty God but by imperialist 
Britain. As a first step British Government appointed Sir Herbert 
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Samuel, a close friend of Chaim Weizmann as the first lix^i 
Commissioner of Palestine.'^^ Throughout his stay in Palestine, b -
policies favoured the Zionist cause. It was rightly said that, "the BrltI^ 
government opened the gates of Palestine to official and illegal Je\vi>n 
immigration. 
The year between 1918 and 1948 saw the growing Arah 
nationalism and political Zionism side by side. Initially, the Araf-
resentment was peaceful but they resorted to violent methods when then 
"appeals, protests, arguments, demonstrations and strikes failed.' 
British Government realized that Palestine belonged to the Arabs, ami 
Jewish settlement in their country was a grave injustice to the original 
inhabitants of Palestine. The Palestinians wanted to remind the British 
Government that few years ago it had made pledges to the Arabs uv 
British policy to grant more and more Jewish immigration and 
settlement in Palestine was against the interests of the people o 
Palestine who had inhabited the country since time immemorial 
Western apathy, particularly British indifference, was the main cause 
which encouraged terrorist instinct amongst the Arabs. 
The British thought of themselves as the liberators of the 
Arabs from the Turks, but the Arabs thought of them as the 
new Turks.'" 
The Arab nationalism which was directed against Turke\ during 
World War I, was diverted towards Britain and France after 1918 and 
finally towards the Jews. 
In Palestine the outbreak of violence became a permanent Ilxturt 
which subsequently turned into a rebellion in 1939."*^ Moreo\er thi 
Palestinian Arabs were inspired by the success of the nationalism in 
Egypt, Syria and Lebanon in winning concessions from Britain and 
France. As a resuH of partial attitude of Western powers against the 
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Palestinian Arabs, the question of Palestine became a matter of prestige 
for the neighbouring Arab states. It was the time when the clouds ot the 
Second World War were hovering upon the international horizon. In the 
emerging situation British Government could not afford to antagonize 
the Arabs further. 
E. Outbreak of World War II: Holocaust and Partition of 
Palestine: 
Between 1922 and 1938, Jews enjoyed a strong position in 
comparison to the Arabs in Palestine. The Palestinian Arabs had onK 
the moral support of the few independent Arab states, while Zionists, 
anned with backing of prominent and influential personalities in UK and 
USA were able to promote their interests effectively. The outbreak of 
World War II in September 1939 threatened British interests in the West 
Asian region. In order to retain Arab goodwill, British Government 
published the White Paper on May 17, 1939, withdrawing the anti Arab 
1 1 - 2 
recommendations of Peel Commission. White Paper, though not 
against the Jews, had reflected a visible change in British policy towards 
the Arabs."'* The White Paper, which came to be known as the 'Pacified 
Memorandum'"" was rejected by the Zionists because it restricted 
Jewish migration into Palestine. 
They regarded it as an attempt of Britain to betra> them. The\ 
stopped CO- operating with the Mandatory administration and launched a 
war of terror against British officials in Palestine. At political front this 
time Zionists chose Washington as their working ground to gain 
international support. It was believed, that in USA a well-knit and 
financially sound Jewish community had its say in press, public and 
parlies. The Jewish lobby was so strong that it could impose their 
preferences in making and unmaking the US governments."'' Regarding 
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the change of the center of Zionist activities David Ben Gurion ga\e hl^  
logic: 
I had no doubt that the center of gravity of our poHtical 
efforts had shifted from Great Britain to America who was 
making sure of being the world's leading power, and where 
the greatest number of Jews as well as the most influential 
were to be found. 
\ The majority of the Arabs and the Arab-Higher Committee also 
rejected the White Paper. Throughout the interwar period. British 
Government, after each new crisis, used to send an inquiry commission 
to Palestine to find out the causes of Arab grievances as these were not 
known. The recommendations of the Commissions had never been 
implemented due to various political considerations. 
Despite their outrage and anger against the change of British 
I 1 R 
policy, the Jews had no option but to stand with the West. The Arab 
policy towards the Allied powers was not as clear-cut as during the f irst 
World War. 
Up to World War II, Zionists never demanded a Jewish state in 
Palestine openly. It was done in May 11. 1942. when a Zionist 
conference was held at the Biltmore Hotel in New York."'' At this 
conference a programme was chalked out. in which the Zionist 
demanded the establishment of Palestine as a Jewish Commonwealth. It 
was commonly known as Biltmore Programme. Prior to World War II 
United States role in the West Asian affairs was minimal. About the pre-
war policy of America, William Hardy has commented: that "her 
diplomatic experience had been profoundly parochial.'"'^^ After 1939 
this role seemed to be enlarging. By the end of the Second World War. 
USA had become deeply involved in the West Asian region. Norman 
Bentwich, a Zionist Jew, had remarked: "Palestine was now not a purely 
British, but an Anglo American problem."'^' 
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Therefore, whatever Britain had done during World War I. US/ 
had repealed it during World War II. The President Rooseveh and hi'^ ^ 
successor President Harry Truman made a number ot" contradictor) 
promises to Arabs and Jews, which had a catalytic effect on the 
Palestine problem. At that time Britain was in a ver\ embarrassing 
position because she was surrounded by all sorts of pressures from their 
friends and foes as well. 
The end of the Second World War brought a conducive 
atmosphere for the success of Zionist movement. As the tale of Nazi 
atrocities and the dimensions of horror reached to public, a wave of 
sympathy towards the Jews swept over the entire world. There was a 
growing political support for a Jewish state throughout Europe and 
particularly in the United States. The commitment, which was made b\ 
the Liberal Democrat Woodrow Wilson, had been affirmed by ever) 
President after him to the Jews in one form or the other. " Zionist 
leaders took political advantage of Nazi Holocaust to achieve their 
desired goal. They were successful in their efforts. Hany S. Truman, the 
successor of Roosevelt expressed his sympathy to the Nazi victims in 
his memoirs in the following words: 
The fate of the Jewish victims of Hitlerism was matter of 
deep personal concern to me....The plight of the victims who 
had survived the mad genocide of Hitler's Germany was a 
challenge to Western civilization, and as President. 1 
undertook to do something about it. One of the solutions 
being proposed was a national Jewish home.'^' 
Truman"s immediate concern was not the question of Arabs* right 
over Palestine, but the future of the holocaust survivors who were being 
assembled in displaced person's camp - many of which under American 
military control. Truman's advisors and the important State Department 
officials advised him to handle the subject of Palestine with great care 
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since it involved the long range interest of the United States in thai are; 
depended upon the pursuit of friendly relations with the Arabs. 
Acting Secretary of the State, at the time. Joseph C. <ire\\ 
reminded him: 
Although President Roosevelt at times gave expressions t(* 
views sympathetic to certain Zionist aims, he also gave 
certain assurances to the Arabs which they regard as definite 
commitment on our part....He authorized the Department to 
assure the heads of the different Near Eastern Governments in 
his behalf that in the view of this Government there should be 
no decision altering the basic situation in Palestine without 
full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.'^'* 
Truman, on the basis of Harrison's report, made an appeal to the 
British Prime Minister, Attlee, for the immediate admission of 1 OO.OOO 
Jewish refugees to Palestine. The Arabs resented strongly against US 
pressure and "wanted to know why Americans were forcing open the 
gates of tiny Palestine to Jewish refugees when they were so unwilling 
to open the gates of their own spacious countries." " 
Attlee could not comply with the US request because of the fear 
that by antagonizing the Arabs at such a crucial time he would harm the 
war strategy of his own country. Fully aware of the changing political 
situation of the world in which traditional imperial powers were on the 
decline, British Government adopted a cautious policy in dealing with 
the Arabs. 
The end of the World War II, brought a gradual change in the US 
and Soviet foreign policies regarding the affairs of West Asia which 
resulted into creating a lot of political problems throughout the region. 
These two ideologically different countries emerged as the rival super 
powers in the world in Post Second World War era. 
With the beginning of the 'Coid War", the West Asia became .; 
battleground of super power rivalry. In the formulation of the new I'S 
policy to the West Asian region, creation of a Jewish state in Palestine 
was regarded an important objective. 
fhe growing interest of America in solving Jewish problems was 
the part of its future strategy in the most important region of the world. 
Instead of Britain's refusal to relax immigration policy. US government 
and world Jewry kept on pressurizing British mandatory administration 
to accommodate more and more Jewish refugees in Palestine. Under the 
prevailing circumstances, the flow of Jewish migrants to Palestine 
turned into tlood, totally beyond the control of British administration 
British Government wanted to solve the Palestine problem without 
damaging her prestige in the Arab world. It was not so easy because 
Britain had not only damaged her image with conflicting promises to 
Arabs and Jews but by continuous indecisions and vacillations in her 
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Palestine policy, she made the chances of maintaining her status-quo 
in the region very bleak. 
In 1945 a joint Anglo-American Committee of inquiry was 
appointed. Its recommendations satisfied none. Morrison Grady Plan of 
1946 was rejected by President Truman himself.'^ ** The London 
Conference that was conducted in two phases, also failed to produce an> 
positive result. Both the Arabs and Jews were adamant to accept nothing 
less than they had demanded for.'^ ^ As for the Arabs, they were justified 
for their claim but the validity of the fantastic claim of the Zionists had 
remained doubtful even after the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine 
Hard liner Zionists, led by David Ben-Gurion adopted a tough attitude 
and declared that nothing less than a Jewish state in Palestine would he 
acceptable to Jews. Ben- Gurion did not regard admission of 100,000 
Jewish refugees in Palestine as a solution of their problem. After the 
genocide of the Jews by Hitler "almost all Jews accepted the basic tenc 
of Zionism: Jews needed a state of their own if only to ensure then 
physical survival." Britain had bore the brunt of her miscalculation-
regarding the extent and implications of the clash of two different 
nationalisms, in and over Palestine. Britain herself encouraged both, hut 
supported one, which created an ever-burning problem in West Asia 
S.A. Morrison had described the intensity of the Arab nationalism in the 
following words: 
The complexity of the situation was accentuated by the fact 
that nowhere in the world was nationalism more intense than 
in Middle East, and nowhere was it more deeply seated than 
in Palestine.'^' 
Therefore, disturbances from both sides continued in Palestine. 
which took an ugly turn when two Jewish infamous gangs, namely Irgun 
and Stem, launched their armed attacks against British officials in which 
many of them lost their lives. 
British resumption of repressive actions to stop violence 
aggravated the deteriorating situation in Palestine further. Throughout 
the war years and even after, smuggling of arms and illegal Jewish 
immigration in large scale created serious law and order problems m 
Palestine which British government was unable to deal with.' ' 
Eventually, on 18 February 1947, British Foreign Secretan,. 
Bevin, announced in the House of Commons, the inability of Britain to 
handle the deteriorating situation in Palestine on behalf of His Majesty's 
Government: 
"The Mandate has proved to be unworkable in practice that the 
obligations undertaken to the two communities had been shown to be 
irreconcilable." 
British intention to leave Palestine was also announced.'^' 
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On April 2, 1947, British Government referred the Palestine 
question to the newly created United Nations Organization. Regarding 
British move to refer the Palestine issue to UN. Anthony Nutting has 
remarked: "The British government handed its Mandate over Palestine 
back to the League of Nations' successor, the United Nations, to do their 
worst."'^'* In view of Dr. Khalid El-Sheikh, the author of the book The 
Palestine Catastrophe", Britain's surrender of her Palestine responsibilit\ 
to UN was ''yet another step in the direction of establishing a Jewish 
home", in the Arab land.'^^ On the basis of British request General 
Assembly of UN, after a prolonged discussion over the issue, appointed 
a Special Committee on Palestine in May 1947. The Committee came to 
be known as the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine 
(UNSCOP). UNSCOP submitted its report to the General AssembK in 
September 1947, which recommended that Mandate should end and that 
Palestine should be partitioned. Two plans were proposed by the 
Committee: A 'Majority Plan' endorsed by Canada, Czechoslovakia. 
Guatemala, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay, provided tor 
the partitioning of Palestine into an Arab state, a Jewish state with 
economic union, while Jerusalem was placed under UN administration 
as an 'International City'. The 'Minority Plan' favoured by India, Iran 
and Yugoslavia suggested a federal state of Palestine into a Arab state 
and a Jewish state, each enjoying local autonomy. Jerusalem was to be 
the capital of both. The members of Arab and Jewish states were put 
under single Palestinian nationality and citizenship.'^^ 
F. Creation of Israel: First Arab-Israeli War: 
The Majority Plan was received with quite satisfaction by the 
Zionists since it was in accordance with their demands. Both the Plans 
were unacceptable to the Arab states and Palestinians for obvious 
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reasons. To them, any sort of partition of tiie territory was meiint u 
destroy the territorial integrity of Palestine. 
Having a doubt over the competence of the United Nations ic 
recommend or to enforce any plan of Partition of Palestine contrary lo 
the wishes of its inhabitants, Arabs repeatedly requested to refer the 
whole of the Palestine issue, including the legality of the Zionist claim, 
to International Court of Justice for its advisor\' opinion. Their requests 
were turned down by the forces, which wanted to secure a favourable 
vote on partition by hook or crook. 
Despite Arab opposition, UN General Assembly passed a 
resolution on November 29. 1947 recommending a modified scheme ot 
Partition by a vote of 33 to 13 with 10 abstentions. Jews regarded 
General Assembly Resolution 181(11) as a major victor)' conferrmg 
international legitimacy and recognition to their demand. It was a 
historical opportunity, which Jewish leadership accepted even without 
arguing over the status of Jerusalem. 
Neither the Palestinians nor the Arab states had accepted the 
Partition resolution of General Assembly. They did not considered 
Resolution 181(11) as a binding force since under Article (10) of the I N 
Charter; the General Assembly was empowered to recommend, but not 
to enforce its decisions. The principle on the basis of which partition 
was planned and the manner of its division created doubts in the Arabs 
regarding the competence of the world body to deal with such problems 
without partiality. Partition Plan allotted to the Arab state 42.88% of the 
area of Palestine while giving the Jewish state 56.47% of the territorx 
At that time Arabs constituted two thirds of the total population and 
Jewish ownership of land was not over than 5.6% of the area of 
Palestine.'^ "^ 
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However, neither the Jewish population nor Jewish ownership of 
land justified the Principle of Partition. Arabs were very bitter over this 
grave injustice. As a result fighting had intensified between Arabs and 
Jews in Palestine, accompanied by protest acts against British and 
American installations in Lebanon and Syria. Arab states were showing 
increasing signs of their determination to resist partition by force, if it 
was imposed upon Palestinians. According to a UN report, between 
December 1, 1947, and February 1, 1948, there were 2,778 casualties, 
including 1,462 Arabs, 1,106 Jews and 181 British."*" 
It is a known fact that the UN vote in favour of Partition was the 
result of Zionist pressure and power politics, particularly in USA. Prior 
to the vote over Palestine resolution it was generally believed that it 
might not obtain necessary two-thirds majority, but repeated 
postponements in voting turned the situation in favour of the Zionists. 
Arabs knew it well that many delegations, which had not supported 
partition were under great pressure to change their votes. It was often 
alleged that postponements were aimed at utilizing all tactics to change 
the opinions of those countries, which intended to vote against 
partition.' ' Jews intensified their efforts to influence votes through 
lobbying, bribing, even threatening delegates in New York and their 
governments back home. Arther Hayes Sulzberger, publisher of the New 
York Times, describing the situation, said publicly: 
1 dislike the coercive methods of Zionists who in this country 
have not hesitated to use economic means to silence persons 
who have different views. 1 object to the attempt at character 
assassination of those who do not agree with them.'^^ 
Arabs also used coercive methods against Jews and their 
supporters who provided backing to Zionists, but failed at political and 
diplomatic fronts. They were no match with the Zionist Jews who had 
solid grounds in USA and Britain. 
Steven L. Spiegel has described the Zionists' pressure on While 
House in the following terms: 
The Zionists and their supporters bombarded the White 
House with letters and telegrams to seek explicit American 
backing of a Jewish state within Palestine, hoping to 
influence UNSCOP.'''^ 
Throughout the UN proceedings regarding the Arab-Jewish 
settlement over Palestine, Jews in USA had been urging a more active 
role of the US President who wanted a favourable vote but not to take 
specific action to achieve it. This contradiction in US policy was the 
result of the differing opinions of high rank officials over the question of 
partition of Palestine who tried to make President Truman, understand 
their respective points of view.''*'* Those opposing partition, gave 
arguments that: 
1. A Jewish state would seriously - perhaps permanently - damage 
American relations with the Arabs, and the Muslim world as 
well. 
2. US could not afford to alienate the Arabs because American 
firms - especially oil companies - active in the area would be 
hurt. An energy crisis in America might occur. 
3. 3.US needed military access to the region and the base at Dharan 
in Saudi Arabia. 
4. 4. If partition of Palestine was instituted, the Palestine problem 
will become permanent feature of international politics. 
5. 5. Partition of Palestine would lead to the growth of extremism in 
the Arab world. 
6. The idea of a Jewish state in Palestine against the will of the 
original inhabitants of the territory was contradictory to the UN 
Charter and American principles of self-determination. 
7. It would increase tensions between Jews and Gentiles in the 
United States. 
8. The chaos in Palestine, in case of its partition, would be exploited 
by the Russians against their Western rivals. 
9. Western support for the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine 
would push the Arabs towards Russia. 
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10. There was also a fear that the new Jewish state would become a 
Soviet ally. 
The increasing confrontation with the Soviet Russia in Europe 
strengthened the arguments of US bureaucracy that partition was against 
the national interests in the Arab region. Two factors were the main 
cause of their worries - Russians and oil. An ahemative to the Partition 
of Palestine was proposed. The idea was to create a temporan. 
trusteeship in Palestine when the British finally left Palestine. Moreover, 
trusteeship would keep the Russians out of the scene because they w ere 
not members of the UN.''*^ The proponent of this theory hoped that the 
Trusteeship Council, and trusteeship would prevent establishment oT a 
Jewish state - and so alienation of the Arabs and possible war would be 
avoided. The Zionists were aware of the negative trend in American 
policy. At this crucial time nothing was left to chance by the Jews and 
their sympathizers. They began to explore innovative routes of access to 
the President. They even did not hesitate to approach his mother and 
sister. In a confusing state of mind, when Truman refused to meet 
Chaim Weizmann who arrived in the United States in early March, a 
group of Zionist leaders contacted Eddie Jacobson, Truman's old 
haberdashery partner to help in arranging a meeting between Weizmann 
and the president. There also had been opportunity for those kc> 
officials, who favoured partition, to persuade the President. Ehey 
argued that since a Jewish state was going to come into existence in an\ 
case, the United State should take its credit before the Soviet Union 
utilized the opportunity. 
Beside the Zionist pressure, and power politics. Truman s 
biblically based background reinforced his sympathy towards the Jews. 
James Forrestal, the American Defense Secretary, who was against 
linking Palestine quesfion with domestic politics, described in his 
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memoirs, the manner in which US government forced the adoption o( 
the partition plan: 
The method that had been used to bring coercion and duress 
on other nations in the General Assembly bordered closely on 
scandal.""* 
Iruman himself noted in his memoirs: 
....some (extreme Zionist leaders) were even suggesting that 
we pressure sovereign nations into favourable votes in the 
General Assembly.''* 
Zionists were not disappointed by Truman who used his personal 
and official influence to secure a UN vote favouring partition oi' 
Palestine in and outside of World Body. 
Israel's chief Rabbi expressed his gratitude to Truman regarding 
his contribution in creating a Jewish state in Palestine in a \er\ 
emotional tone. He told the US President that: 
God put you in your mother's womb so that you would be the 
instrument to bring about the rebirth of Israel after two 
thousand years. "^  
The USSR played a limited role in international affairs during 
1917-1945. as it was preoccupied with the consolidation of its domestic 
political base, transformation of its economy on socialist pattern and 
substantial defense arrangement for the safety and security of the 
country. Located in the immediate vicinity of the Soviet Union, the West 
Asian region has always attracted Tsarist and Soviet interest. The end of 
World War II revived Russians interest in the region particular!} after 
increasing US involvement in the political affairs of the Arab world. 
Before 1947 the Soviet stand in Palestine question was just contrar\ tt) 
US stand. To the amazement of Washington, the Russians also 
supported partition, thereby placing themselves on the side of the 
Zionists. The Arabs were shocked by the unexpected change in the 
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Soviet attitude towards the Jews. Beside other factors. Soviet desire of 
ending British influence in the East Mediterranean played an important 
role in its backing of the creation of the state of Israel in 1948.'" '^ For the 
first time at the UN, the United States and the Soviet Union stood on the 
same side for the same cause against the British, despite the emerging 
Cold War. Originally Britain was not intended to surrender her entire 
power relating to Palestine to the UN body. The British wanted IN 
assistance and advice in finding out some workable solution to the 
Palestine problem. But the continuous escalation in the Jewish violence 
against the mandatory authorities compelled British government to leave 
the whole matter to UN to decide. Moreover, geostrategic value of 
Palestine was somewhat reduced as a result of departure of Britain from 
India in 1947. Exhausted by war efforts, and frustrated by the Arab 
Jewish criticism for her betrayal to both, British decided to give up. In a 
desperate effort to regain her shattered image in the Arab world it 
announced her non-participation in the enforcement of a solution not 
acceptable to one of the two parties involved. 
UNSCOP, which was responsible to implement the partition plan. 
was to work under guidance and with assistance of the Security Council. 
Neither the Palestine Commission nor the Security Council could find 
an\ clear way to enforce the UN partition scheme for Palestine. 
Regarding the deteriorating law and order situation in Palestine it was 
also alleged that while British asked UN not to intervene in Palestine' ' 
before its final departure, it did not make any serious efforts to stop 
violence. It was also assumed that since Britain was preparing to 
withdraw, Palestine problem was no more her primary interest. While 
the UN was still debating on the question of Palestine and final solution 
was yet to come, Britain officially announced the termination of its 
Mandate in Palestine and lifted the blockade on 14-15 may. 1948. The 
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Zionists simultaneously invoked the UN Partition Resolution and 
proclaimed a Jewish state under the name of Israel.' 
Coming back to the super powers support and their contribution 
in the establishment of the state of Israel, we find that the same powers 
without delay recognized Israel immediately after its foundation.'^' Hach 
for its own different reasons favoured the partition of Palestine and 
made the creation of state of Israel possible. Indeed, without their 
mutual support the favourable United Nations vote would not have been 
politically possible. After abandoning her traditional anti-Zionist policv. 
Soviet Union was so obsessed to seek friendship of Jews that beside her 
underground support, Soviet representative, Andree A. Gromyko. then 
Deputy Foreign Minister, defended the partition of Palestine and the 
establishment of independent Jewish state, at UN openly.''*' 
The United Nations partition resolution brought a wave of 
protests, demonstrations and destructions in Palestine. On Februar) 6. 
1948, the Arab higher committee gave a warning that any attempt by the 
Jews or any other power or group of powers to establish a Jewish state 
in the Arab territory would be met by force. Long before May 14 it had 
become certain that a war was going to occur in Palestine between Je\\ s 
and Arabs for the sake of their respective claims. There were atrocities 
and counter atrocities, which turned Palestine into a battleground of 
1 en , 
Arab - Zionist rivalry. The Zionist forces adopted a deterrent posture 
to terrorize the Arabs. The massacre of "'Deir Yasin" on April 9. 1948 
was the heinous one .It was described as the "darkest stain" on the 
Jevv^ i^sh record. ' Weizmann who had a mild approach in comparison to 
Ben-Gurion admitted that "violence was a necessary and inevitable 
means for the achievement of the Zionist aims.'"'^'' As the violence, 
confusion, and fear of war mounted, there were sizable movements of 
Palestinians in search of safer places hoping to return home when peace 
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was established. As expected, Arabs unanimously refused to accept the 
establishment of Israel and decided to declare a war against it. 
Before taking any such step. Secretary General of the Arab 
League cabled the Secretary General of the United Nations on 14 May 
1948. to inform him about the decision of the Arab states. The 
circumstances, which compelled Arab leaders to intervene in Palestine, 
were also explained.'^ *^ UN proved impotent to avoid such an ugh 
situation. The creation of the state of Israel was followed immediately 
by a general Arab attack. The joint forces of Egypt, Jordan. Iraq. S\ ria 
and Lebanon plunged into the war against Israel with the Palestinian 
Arabs. Individual volunteers from the surrounding countries had 
sneaked into Palestine even before the actual course of 1948 war.'^' The 
result of the war was very humiliating to the Arabs. The regular armies 
of the five Arab states were defeated miserably. Due to lack of coherent 
leadership, Arab states were incapable to integrate military and political 
elements into a comprehensive strategy. Arabs' intervention was the 
result of genuine sympathy for the Palestinian Arabs, who needed their 
support in the time of peril. But their decision was also promoted by 
particular interests and intra Arab rivalries.'^^ The Arab leaders sent 
their troops for reasons of their own. They could not agree either on a 
concerted military offensive against the enemy under a unified 
command or on an over all military strategy. British refusal to accept 
any more new request for Arab munitions to prevent their possible use 
against herself, and UN arms embargo'^^ to the Arab states and Israel 
resulted into shortage of war materials, which turned initial militan 
superiority of the Arab forces into their final retreat. The scandal of 
obsolete and defective military equipment was well known.'^ '"^  In 
comparison to Arabs, Israel's military capability was far better even in 
1948, just few days after its creation. The principle weakness of the 
Jewish forces was also lack of arms. 
But very soon with the generosity of Soviet Union and Western 
powers Israel was able to manage her problem.'^^ Israelis, realizing that 
the survival of their 'cherished state'"'^ was at stake, fought with full 
determination to win. Their able political and military leadership, their 
experience of fighting with various Western militar>' forces during 
World War II, a highly effective intelligence network, moral and 
material support provided by Jews in the United States and other 
Western powers were the major factors which helped Israel to achieve 
her success in the 1948 war. 
The newly created United Nations made a number of attempts to 
cease the Arab-Israeli armed hostilities, but failed to achieve that end in 
time. During the period of truce, both sides disregarded restrictions 
imposed by it. Count Folke Bemadotte, The United Nations Mediator, 
after exploratory discussions with Arab and Israeli representatives on the 
question of settlement of their dispute over Palestine submitted a 
tentative proposal to solve the problem. The following day Bemadotte 
was assassinated with United Nations observer Colonel Andre Serot at 
Jerusalem on September 17, 1948 by Jewish terrorists.'^^ It was 
generally believed that Count Bemadotte was assassinated because of 
his recommendations for the establishment of peace in Palestine, which 
did not fultlll all hopes of Zionists. Arabs also did not favour his 
proposal for various reasons, but as being a victorious party Jewish 
attitude had become stiffer. 
Open hostilities between Israel and the Arab states came to an 
end by virtue of Armistice Agreements of 1949. Ralph Bunche was 
appointed as acting UN mediator to complete the unfinished task of 
Bemadotte. Conciliation Commission composed of representatives of 
the United Slalcs. I'rancc and Turkey, helped llic new mediator in his 
peaec making elTorls. Ralph Bunche initiated armistice discussions 
between belhgercnts on the iskmd of Rhodes. I'our Armistice 
Agreements were concluded b) Israel with l^g>pl. Lebanon, .lordan and 
Syria separately between .January and .luK 1949. 
The result of the Arab-Israeli war of 1948 was hazardous lo the 
existence of Palestine. Israel occupied a greater area of territory allotted 
to the Arabs under UN Partition Plan. The remaining Palestine, known 
as West Bank and (jaza Strip came under the control of Trans-.lordan 
and b.gypl respectixely. 
Alter the annexation of West bank with Irans-.lordan. the name 
of the state was changed and called as the llashemile Kingdom v\ 
.fordan.' ' Arab states came to rescue iheir [Palestinian brothers but lhe\ 
did more harm than the Partition Resolution of (jcneral .Assembh 
Historical Palestine withered away from the map of West Asia. 1 he 
Palestinians no longer remained as a people entitled to a homeland, bn! 
onl_\ as refugees. Nearl} a million Palestinians left in Panic or were 
forced lo leave their homes, lands, livelihoods, villages, towns and 
country under condition of war. The war came to an end in 1949. but ii 
paxed the wa_\ for a scries oJ" wars, which had been fought between 
Arabs and Israelis and brought an endless catastrophe to the people ot 
Palestine. 
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Chapter - I I 
ARAB SCENE BETWEEN YEARS 1950-1956: SUEZ 
WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH 
A. Consequences of Arab Defeat in 1948-1949 War: Riots 
and Revolutions in Vanquished Arab States: 
What happened before and in subsequent years of tripartite 
aggression of 1956 is more pertinent and even more indispensable for an 
understanding of the events leading to the Arab-Israeli war of 196"^ . 
brief account of the developments resulting into a second round of Arab-
Israeli war is given in this chapter. 
The creation of a Jewish state in Palestine in 1948 was an unusual 
political phenomenon. In order to pay the price of European crimes, the 
so-called great powers hatched a conspiracy against the Palestinians in 
1917. It was Great Britain where the idea of Jewish restoration in 
Palestine came first. Beside many other considerations. Britain 
recognized that a Jewish state in Palestine might prove very useful for 
extending her influence in the area. Regarding injustice against the 
Palestinian Arabs at the hand of Britain Arnold J. Toynbee, an eminent 
British historian expressed his view in the following words; 
I am neither an Arab nor an Israeli. I am British, so 1 feel 
deeply my countries share in the responsibility for this tragic 
conflict between the two other peoples. Britain issued the 
Balfour Declaration in 1917 - Britain was in power in 
Palestine for 30 years ending in 1948 - and Britain's 
precipitate abdication in Palestine after World War II left the 
way open in 1948 for the first of the three Arab-Israeli wars.' 
No Arab-Israeli war brought the end of wars or war like 
situations between the Arabs and Israelis. Every war - far from deciding 
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the conflicting issues actually contributed to its exacerbation and 
perpetuation. 
It is true, of course, that British government took the initiative, 
but many other major powers also contributed to it, which led to the 
tragic chain of events that ultimately led to the creation of a Jewish stale 
in Palestine. "In fact, some of the most enthusiastic and ardent 
supporters of political Zionism were Englishmen who saw England s 
interests best served by the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine."" But 
the Zionist demand for the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine had the 
support of many countries, particularly United States and Soviet Union. 
The favourable United Nations vote would not have been politicalh 
possible without US and Soviet's concurrence.^ Each country for its own 
different reasons favoured the partition of Palestine and made the 
creation of Israel possible. The Palestinian Arabs were denied their 
rights for self-determination repeatedly by the defenders of Zionists" 
claim. After the World War II, USA joined hands with Britain for the 
establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. Under war compulsions 
British government was bound to keep herself in a low key regarding 
her support to Zionist cause. Britain did not want to antagonize the 
Arabs at this juncture due to various political considerations. 
United States, which had no prior commitments to the Arabs. 
could support the Zionist openly. 
According to Sami Hadavi: 
Had it not been for the active part played by the White House 
in 1947 and 1948, the 'Jewish state" would never have come 
into being; the Palestine tragedy, with all its human miseries, 
would not have occurred; the present tension and instability in 
the Middle East would not have arisen; and the Unhed States 
traditional position of respect and trust in the Arab world 
would not have been damaged."^ 
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However, the Jewish refugee problem had been solved b\ the 
Western countries by creating an Arab refugee problem. Arabs, in any 
way, were not responsible for persecution of Jews and their sufferings. 
but they were forced to pay for the European crimes. 
The support of the Arab countries to their Palestinian brothers 
also proved fatal for Palestine cause. Unfortunately, the Arab states 
instead of preventing partition of Palestine and "driving Israel into the 
sea" provided an opportunity to the Jews to occupy a larger area of 
Palestine that had been allotted to the Jewish state under the UNSCOP 
plan. The bulk of the originally proposed Palestinian Arab state had 
come under the authority of the neighbouring Arab countries as a result 
of 1948-49 war. The Arab-Palestinian state envisaged by the UN never 
came into existence. The involvement of Arab countries in the first 
Palestinian Arabs and Israeli war had transformed the conflict into an 
Arab-Israeli war. Palestine as a full-fledged political entity withered 
away from the world map. The Palestinians no longer remained as a 
people entitled to their homeland but only as refugees. Their existence 
from then on rested on the mercy of UN and the great powers of the 
world. The Arab countries due to various reasons did little to help the 
victims of Palestine tragedy. The intervention of Arab states in the 1948 
war was not totally based upon their genuine commitment to the cause 
of Palestine. The Arab kings and leaders were more interested in 
establishing their supremacy over each other than to manage a practical 
unified action against Israel. During the Palestine war the policies of 
Arab rulers were largely guided by their traditional rivalries among 
themselves. It is a known fact that King Farouk's decision to send 
Egyptian armv to the Palestine war was motivated to prevent the 
Hashemite states from expanding their territory and influence in the 
region. Elie Kedourie has written that "his decision was merelv a 
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response to that taken by King Abdullah of Trans Jordan. ". 
The humiliating defeat in the war had a far-reaching ef!ect in t^ikT entire 
Arab world. It exposed the weaknesses of the Arab regimes. The riots 
and revolutions occurred in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq m 
the subsequent years, which resulted in the destruction of their old 
regimes and in some cases assassinations of their rulers who had 
pro-Western tendencies. Amongst the Arab world more radical changes 
took place in Egypt, because in Palestine battle Egypt as a founder 
member of the League of Arab states was supposed to play a leading 
role to defend the cause of Palestinians. But the result of the war and the 
later developments greatly disappointed Egyptian public. 
Prior to the formation of Arab League, preoccupied with her own 
national problems, Egypt had shown little interest in the Palestine 
problem.*^ It is said that "International politics and the problem of getting 
rid of the British consumed energies and attention of Egyptian leaders 
between World War 1 and IL"^ The end of the Second World War and 
its later manifestations had changed the role of Egypt in West Asian 
region completely. Egypt could not escape the impact of Partition of 
Palestine. It got involved in the Palestine problem because of its own 
power and prestige in the Arab world. The result of the Palestine war 
proved to be very damaging for the existence of Egyptian Monarch). Its 
power and prestige both were ruined, not only in Egypt but also in the 
entire Arab world. Throughout the war, Egyptian public was misguided 
by their leaders providing them wrong information of their quick 
victory.'" When they came to know about the facts their humiliations 
and disappointments knew no bounds. It has been said that "a lost war 
and a national humiliation nearly always produce domestic upheaval.""' 
Egypt also faced the consequences of humiliating defeat. It hastened the 
revolutionary process which had already began in 1919 and subsided as 
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a result of 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the World War 11. Ann 
Williams has remarked that "Egyptian defeat in the Palestine war was 
the spark that ignited their movement, but behind it lay years of political 
planning."'^ From 1882 British government had controlled Egypt. Her 
foreign policies were guided and her army was controlled by the British 
Officials 'either directly or indirectly as advisors."'^ 
B. Rise of Nasser: The Dream of Arab Renaissance: 
Egyptian struggle to emancipate herself from the Western 
domination had a long history. Egypt was the first Arab country to react 
against the foreign domination but it did not succeed in freeing herself 
from Western control completely and unconditionally till 1956. It was 
done under the dynamic leadership of Gamal Abdul Nasser a 
revolutionary ruler of Egypt. Anti British feeling was intensified by the 
anti Israeli sentiments growing in Egyptians. "The loss of Palestine \ 
said Erskine B. Childers, "was a great disaster with far reaching results 
for the very existence of the Arab nations."'"* The impact of the defeat 
was ver>' quick in Egypt. The Egyptian public soon realized that in the 
war against Israel, their government's policies were faulty and militar\ 
strategy was wrong. They became increasingly hostile to the old regime. 
which had neither succeeded in getting rid of British completely, nor it 
had made an> progress in the socio-economic field. They had also 
become aware that it was King Farouk who in spite of Nokrashi Pasha" s 
opposition, decided to send Egyptian army to the Palestinian war.'' 
The tussle between King and Parliament created a condition of 
instability in the government. "Between the Palestine war and the 
outbreak of Revolution, Egypt hopped fi-om one political crisis to 
another; Prime Minister changed with a rapidity and fasity which 
bewildered the public."'^ Uncertainty and confusion in E g^ypt had 
provided a conducive atmosphere for the success of revolution 
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The stories of involvement of King Farouic in tiie anus scandal provoked 
the revolutionary thinking of young army officers (free officers) who 
were dreaming of a revolution to overthrow "imperialism, monarchy and 
I -7 
feudalism" since long. Egyptian army and public both "were 
1 O 
unanimous in fixing the blame on King Farouk." The cumulative effect 
of all these happenings resulted into a revolution by the Egyptian army 
against the existing regime. The success of revolution brought the end of 
150 years old Mohammad Ali dynasty in Egypt. The chief architect of 
the revolution remained in the background for some time for various 
reasons. General Naguib took the command of Egyptian government. 
But despite Naguib's enormous popularity, the people of Egypt began lo 
recognize Nasser as the actual hero of Egyptian revolution. A struggle 
for power developed soon between Naguib and Nasser who was 
appointed Deputy Prime Minister of interior. The tussle for power ended 
with the resignation of Naguib. Nasser was now the unopposed ruler of 
Egypt. "Nasser had been a revolutionary ever since, and his whole 
outlook and style, had been influenced by this fact.''*^ He adopted bold 
policies, which threatened the interests of Western countries as well as 
Israel in the region. Arab masses admired his boldness, which no other 
Arab leader had dared to show in the past. The hope of the Western 
powers that it might be easier to influence the soldiers than the 
experienced political leaders of Farouk's regime had been proved futile 
in future. 
C. Growing American-Soviet Interests in West Asia: 
Polarization of The Arab World: 
u s had no colonial past in the Middle East. Prior to the World 
War 11 United States considered the Middle East as an area of "primar} 
British interest and responsibility."^° USA took minimal interest in the 
Palestine problem since it did not consider the issue as an American 
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interest. Before the World War II American political and strategic 
interests in the Arab world were negligible. The Munro Doctrine had 
been the hallmark of American Foreign Policy till 1940. although 
successive presidents had modified it according to requirements of the 
existing situations. USA participated in the First World War under 
Wilson's leadership and took a leading role in the formation of League 
of Nations. Yet, after the war it returned to its traditional policy of 
isolationism, which continued till the outbreak of World War II. 
The development which occurred during and after the World War II 
expanded US interest beyond its educational, missionary and economic 
activities to its political and strategic involvements in the region. ' 
At the eve of war, USA started recognizing the value of a pro-Zionist 
stand for her future interests in the area particularly after the decline of 
traditional colonial powers in the world. Truman was the first American 
President who had shown his personal concern and adopted a clear-cut 
policy towards Zionist cause. His two predecessors - Wilson and 
Roosevelt confronted Palestine issue much earlier but their interest 
was not much more than to support the policies of their British ally. 
The growing American interests in the West Asian region had become 
manifest in the post Second World War period. A visible change in US 
policies and pronouncements brought Soviet Russia much closer to the 
Arab world. Initially USA tried to pose herself as an anti-colonial power 
and although, allied to Britain and France, did not share their imperialist 
ambitions. US attempt to withdraw her forces irom most of the West 
Asian region after the war and her efforts to force Britain and Soviet 
Union to leave Iran were appreciated by the Arab world. US role in 
Libya in 1950-51 and during the Suez crisis of 1956 and Algerian war of 
liberation with France was perpetuation of her policy of appeasement to 
the Arabs. But US pro-Zionist policies, which uUimately led to the 
creation of a Jewish state in Palestine, clearly exposed her intentions for 
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future course of action in the West Asian region." ^  Bolslie\il>v 
Government was not unaware of these developments, but at this juncture 
realizing its weaker position in the matter of nuclear arms, it did not 
think of confrontation with America. 
The Soviet support to the partition of Palestine, its de-jure 
recognition to the state of Israel immediately after its creation, and the 
Soviet-Israeli arms deal (indirect) '^* which decided the outcome of the 
Arab-Israeli war in 1948 in favour of the Jews was motivated to 
eliminate British influence from the area. Soviets realized that bv 
supporting the Zionist cause they could help an end to the British 
mandate in Palestine. Arich J. Kochavi in his article indirect pressure: 
Moscow and the End of the British Mandate in Palestine', has described 
the British fear regarding Soviet intentions expressed by Ernest Be\in. 
the then British Foreign secretary in the following words: 
Moscow actively sought the decline of the British Empire in 
order to fill the vacuum whenever the British might be forced 
to withdraw. 
Bevin's fear was not baseless because Soviet Union supported 
Zionist cause against her traditional anti-Jewish stand because of its 
rivalry with Britain. Golda Meir acknowledged Soviet contribution in 
the 'war of independence' as crucial, even decisive for Israel's survival 
and victory.^' 
About the significance of Soviet backing for the creation of Israel 
Alvin Z. Rubinsten had written that 'without the flow of arms, 
immigration and support from the Soviet bloc, Israel would not have 
survived beyond infancy.'^ ** 
Before the development of US political and strategic interests in 
West Asia. Soviet leadership regarded Britain as their main enemy in the 
region. Preoccupied with the domestic problems after Bolshevik 
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revolution. USSR played a limited role in international affairs. In 1941 
Soviet Union joined Western camp because of her own sur\'ival. 
The 'Strange Alliance', which came into force, remained effective till 
the end of World War II. But as soon as the war came to a halt, the 
East-West rivalrv' surfaced again. It was the beginning of the Cold War. 
which dominated the international politics. It intensified the Arab-Israeli 
conflict in West Asia. Western countries wanted to keep Russia avva} 
from West Asia but their own post war policies brought her closer to the 
Arab region. 
At the end of the decade, USA became more anxious to secure oil 
and bases in West Asia than to support the imperial interest of Eiritam 
and France. Even the US wanted quick departure of her Anglo-French 
allies from the region. Kochavi has written that Daniel S. Solod, who 
had served as counselor to the Soviet Mission in Egypt between 1943-
1944, and happened to be the Soviet Minister in Syria and Lebanon was 
certain that: 
The Americans would refrain from openly challenging 
current British privileges over Palestine, but that they would 
gradually try to displace the British economically, and then 
also politically, through supporting a Jewish state. '*' 
British interest in Palestine was well known. Britain supported 
Zionist demand for the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine because of 
her imperial interests in the region." Last moment change of British 
heart in favour of Arabs created doubts about the intentions of Britain in 
USA and USSR. Both the countries wanted the end of British hold from 
the region to fulfill their respective interests. The growing American 
involvement in the West Asian politics and her increasing economic and 
military linkages with Israel were the two main factors, which brought 
the Soviets in the Muslim world. With the change of circumstances there 
61 
appeared a complete diversion in the communist policy, of course. n(»\\ 
in favour of the Arabs. After the creation of Israel, Arab had lost faith in 
the bonafides of America. Aware of Arabs doubts about US sinceriu. 
President Eisenhower, who succeeded Harry Truman in Januar> 1953. 
declared his policy of 'Impartiality' in dealing with the "Middle Hast" 
problems. About the declaration Abu Jaber has remarked that 'this 
impartialit\' never came.' '' In this connection US President sent his 
Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, to the Middle East in May 19.53. 
on the fact-finding mission. The re-orientation of the United States 
policy towards the Arab countries was the result of its growing fear 
about the perpetuating threat of Soviet Union in the region. US concern 
over continuing Soviet threat to Western interests in West Asia was 
expressed by Dulles in his address to the American nation on Januar\ 
27, 1953. Soon after his resumption of office as a Secretary of State he 
stated: 
In the Middle East we find that the communists are trying to 
inspire the Arabs with a fanatical hatred of the British and 
ourselves. That area contains the greatest known oil reserves 
that there are in the world, and the Soviet interest is shown b\ 
the fact that Stalin, when he was negotiating with Hitler in 
1940 said that the area must be looked upon as the center of 
Soviet aspirations. If all of that passed into the hands of our 
potential enemies, that would make a tremendous shift in the 
balance of economic power and furthermore this area also has 
control of the Suez canal and that is the portion of the 
world....which has long been guarded and called the lifeline 
which made it possible for Europe to be in communication 
with Asia. There are difficulties at the present time between 
the question of the defense and control of the Suez canal.'^ 
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D. Rejection of American Defence Scheme by Nasser: 
US Efforts to Encourage Intra-Arab Rivalry: 
With the aim of containment of Soviet influence, which was 
growing fast in the Arab world, USA made various attempts to show its 
solidarity to the Arabs. The revolutionary regime of Egypt enjoyed US 
approval from the very beginning. Dulles also believed that he had made 
"a good deal with Nasser." He raised the rejected MEDO (Middle East 
Defense Organization) idea again with Colonel Nasser. But I S 
expectations went wrong because Nasser proved to be more adamant m 
his defiance to the very idea of Western defense alliance system than 
that of Monarchial regime of King Farouk. In 1951 Nahas Pasha 
rejected the MEDO Plan since it was considered "as a new form of 
colonialism." Nasser also rejected the scheme by saying that defense 
alliances '"would be political suicide for the new regime."^^ 
At that time America and her allies were so obsessed with their 
defense scheme against the potential Soviet threat in the region that they 
failed to realize that the Arabs in general and Nasser in particular 
"discounted the Soviet threat and considered Western dominance the 
greater danger."'' 
Soviet Government appreciated Egyptian move, which second 
time refused to join the proposed Western defense scheme aimed at 
safeguarding the area from Soviet menace. 
Walter Laquer has remarked that 'The young Arab nationalist of 
fifties was not likely to be impressed by the menace of communism. 
Russia was far away and Western imperialism still verv much ir 
evidence near home." 
Egypt" s rejection of MEDO plan antagonized US government oui 
of proportion. 
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Regarding the Soviet reaction to this move Faiz S. Abu Jaber has 
commented: 
Soviet favour began to shift in favour of the Arabs in general 
and Egypt in particular, since Egypt was the leader of Arab 
opposition to the Western defense system since 1951 .'^ 
Soviet-Israeli relations began to deteriorate because Russia's 
purpose coincided with the Arabs and not with the Israelis. Russia 
wanted the Arabs (at least majority of the Arabs) to side with her against 
the West in the region. 
Dulles, who had visited Egypt in May 1953, believed that in the 
way of US- Egyptian cordial relations, the presence of British troops in 
the Suez Canal zone was an obstacle. After this realization. 
Eisenhower administration started pressurizing Britain to accept the 
Egyptian demands for the evacuation of the British forces from the Suez 
Canal area and unity of Nile Valley. USA was less concerned about the 
Anglo-French interests than to achieve her desired goal in the region, it 
was against this background that agreement over the future of Sudan 
(1953) and evacuation of the British troops from the Suez Canal zone ' 
(1954) were signed between Britain and Egypt. In both these events 
United States not only offered its good offices but also laid a strong 
pressure on Britain to reach on final settlements. In order to soften the 
attitude of new revolutionary leader further the US government had 
granted $40 million in economic aid after the signing of the Anglo-
Egyptian agreement in 1954. Abba Eban, in his book 'My Countr)" 
criticized US stand by saying that the announcement of the 
Washington's new policy towards the Middle East, "consisted of 
avoiding the tradhional emphasis on fi-iendship with Israel"; was "an 
effort to win Arab smiles." 
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By the end of 1954, Egypt's relations with Western powers 
worsened over defense issue. The friendly gesture shown by America 
towards Egypt did not alter Nasser's decision to oppose regional 
security scheme proposed by the Western countries. After Egypt's 
rejection of MEDO plan, Dulles had persuaded the idea of a Northern 
Tier alliance, which was soon forwarded by Britain.'*^ Turkey, which 
was one of the four powers, along with Great Britain. France and USA. 
which projected a scheme for Middle East defense in 1951, again joined 
the same powers to reintroduce the same idea. Both USA and Britain 
knew that Iraq was the weakest link in the movement of the Arab 
unity.^ "^  They tried to persuade Iraq to join the pact. The United States 
awarded military and economic assistance to Iraq with a view of 
facilitating the effort of its government to bring the country in the 
alliance. On January 6, 1955, Turkish Prime Minister visited Baghdad 
on his way back from Cairo. On January 12, 1955, the Iraqi govemmeiU 
announced its decision to conclude a military treaty with Turkey. Fhe 
Turco-Iraqi alliance was finally signed on February 24. 1955 and came 
to be known as Baghdad Pact. It was later joined by Britain, Pakistan 
and Iran.^' The United States, which was the real originator of the 
project and supported it financially and militarily, never joined st 
fomially. Steven has quoted a piece of private communication between 
Dulles and British Prime Minister Anthony Eden in which US Secretarv 
of State tried to explain the reasons for not joining the Baghdad Pact. He 
told Eden that "Ihe United States could not get public support" for 
joining the Baghdad Pact until "we were able to offer a comparable 
security arrangement to Israel." Dulles gave the same arguments while 
attending a meeting at White House with President and his colleagues 
that "the US cannot join the Baghdad Pact without giving some securit} 
guarantee to Israel, and that if we were to do so, our action would 
quickly knock out Iraq.""^ ^ US Government was well informed about the 
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ill feeling, which was getting generated in the entire Arab world against 
the West because of its continuous support to Israel. In the prevailing 
circumstances, USA wanted to avoid Arab resentment, particularly the 
resentment of Egyptian Government. 
Nasser from the very beginning of his accession to power 
dreamed of Arab unity. After the Palestine war of 1948, he had become 
convinced that the main cause of Arab's defeat was the lack of unit) 
among the members of the Arab League. He decided to use "his new 
found popularity to draw the Arab world under his wing." Linking of 
Iraq with Northern Tier scheme threatened Nasser's aspirations for the 
unity of the Arab world. 
The credibility of four powers who invited Egypt again and agam 
for a regional security pact had been doubtful, since one of the four 
powers was occupying Egypt against her will from 1882, another 
reluctantly departed from Syria and Lebanon under British pressure. 
while the third was a country from whose domination the Egyptian had 
struggled for a century and a half. The fourth was USA, which had 
played a leading role in the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. Egypt 
had the deep and lasting scars of foreign domination and subjugation. 
By joining Western pacts, Nasser did not want to surrender to the same 
powers. He severely criticized Baghdad Pact and persuaded other Aran 
countries to denounce it as well. 'In opposition to pact both Syria and 
Saudi Arabia stood squarely behind Egypt.' As a result, a counter 
alliance was formed between Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia in 1955. In 
April. 1956. a similar military pact was signed between Egypt. Saudi 
Arabia and Yemen."**^  The empty handed return of the Templer mission 
from Jordan and later the fate of Nuri-Es-Said, who was considered tht 
main culprh to bring Iraq in the Western projected security pact, 
revealed Nasser's popularity and influence in the region.'" In this 
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charged situation when King Hussain of Jordan in a surprise move 
dismissed General Glubb from the Arab legion on March 1, 1956. 
British Government ignoring Hussain"s own reasons for the step held 
Nasser responsible for it. Glubb's dismissal was a great blow lor 
Eden's prestige in Britain. US reaction was similar to that of Britain for 
such move. 
The events, which were taking place in 1955 and in the 
subsequent years, brought Soviet Russia from the periphery to the heart 
of the West Asian region. Abu Jaber gave an account of the growing 
situation in the area in the following words: 
Whether the American backed Iraqi action was wise, or 
whether the persistent American policy of viewing the Middle 
East primarily in terms of defense against the Soviet Union 
was correct, was hard to foresee at the time. But the 
subsequent reaction of Egypt, aggravated by the perennial 
Egyptian and Arab dispute with Israel, and the Western role 
in the Palestine question, all helped to call up the ver\ Soviet 
"devil* the West was seeking to deter.^ ^ 
In April 1955, an Afro-Asian conference of non-aligned states 
was held in Java. Nasser attended this conference, and here he came into 
contact with stalwarts of the NAM policy.^ "' Before attending Bandung 
conference, Nasser had already been approached by Nehru^^ who was 
the champion of the movement. It was at this conference that Nasser 
enunciated 'positive neutralism' as the main principle of his foreign 
policy. Nehru and Nasser both were identical in opposition to Western 
defense alliance, although they had different reasons for their objection. 
The creation of military alliance by the Western powers involving Iraq 
and Pakistan was a matter of grave concern for both Egypt and India, 
Nasser's rejection of Western security proposal cemented Soviet-
Egyptian relationship, particularly after receiving reports that Israel was 
willing to join Western sponsored Middle East Command. 
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The Soviet leadership, regardless of the reasons tor Egypuan 
objection to aUgnment with the West, found in his pohcy of neutralism a 
most welcome and potent force, undermining the Western position in the 
Arab world.^ '^  
Ever since the revolutionary regime came into power, it devoted 
all its energies primarily in economic, social and political refonns in 
Egypt. It paid less attention to the Palestine question. Eric Roleau in his 
article 'The Palestinian Quest' had described the causes of Nassers 
indifference towards the Palestine issue until the Israeli raid on Ciaza m 
Februar>' 1955 in the following words: 
During his first years in power, the leader of the Egyptian 
revolution showed little interest in the Palestinian problem. 
Until the Israeli raid on Gaza in February 1955 - which shook 
him profoundly - he was principally preoccupied with purely 
internal questions: the destruction of the monarchy and the 
feudal class it had fostered, agrarian reform, the expulsion of 
British from the canal zone, and the fight for power.'^ 
Nasser considered Israel as Egypt's worst enemy, but he did not 
want confrontation at this time. In 1955 he shifted his attention from 
domestic reform to a militant Pan-Arab policy. Conclusions of Baghdad 
Pact arose suspicions among the Israelis too. Israel had no concern with 
US worries to erect barrier against Soviet penetration in West Asia, f he 
knowledge of US economic and military assistance to Iraq for Turing' 
her to join the Western security alliance developed a sense of insecurit\ 
and grave concern in Israeli circle. They had become anxious after 
realizing that USA and Britain refrained to sign a mutual defense treat> 
with Israel in order to woo the Arabs.^^ In a provocative attempt, jusi 
after three days of formation of Baghdad Pact, Israeli army attacked 
Egyptian military installations in Gaza Strip. In this armed attack thirty 
eight people lost their lives and thirty-one were wounded."'^ It was a 
provocative act. The Gaza raid was the first invasion of Egyptian 
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controlled territory, which had serious and lasting consequences in ihe 
region. It was considered the "most fateful"^*' incident in "Middle hast 
history." At this moment Nasser decided "to give defense priority o\er 
development." 
Since long, Nasser had been trying to acquire arms from the 
West. He had achieved very little success in this regard. Western 
countries provided economic aids and technical assistance to Egypt, but 
were unwilling to fulfill Egyptian demand for the arms. 'The Gaza raid 
revealed that Israel was freely acquiring arms from the West regardless 
of the 1950 Tripartite Declaration." " After the creation of Israel 
neighbouring Arab countries never reconciled with its existence. Despite 
the Armistice agreements of 1949, incidents of violence and bloodshed 
along the demarcated lines occurred. The growing problems of the Arab 
refugees and the stubborn attitude of Israel to accept their genuine 
demands intensified the Arab hatred against the Jews. As a result. 
violations of armistice agreements were being committed from both 
sides frequently. Israel's reprisal raids soon took the form of organized 
military actions against the Arab states. The gravity of incidents was 
such that UN Security Council severely condemned Israel and expressed 
its serious concern over it. In contrast, at that time, none of the attacks 
upon Israel in breach of Armistice Agreements was ever condemned b\ 
the Security Council. It is no secret that Israel wanted to terrorize the 
Arabs in order to capture their territory, which was the main objective of 
the Zionist movement. 
E. Nasser's Leaning Towards Communists: US Reaction 
and Egypt's Response: 
Prior to the Gaza raid there had been fewer incidents between 
Israel and Egypt than between Israel and Syria and Israel and Jordan. 
The Gaza episode brought Egypt and Israel on a collision course. 
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Realizing Egypt's weakness in defense field, Nasser decided to train riis 
commandos, called fedayeen for the guerilla type reprisal against Israel. 
Nasser claimed that the Egyptian Government was in possession of the 
secret British and French military intelligence documents, which 
confirmed that three Western powers, namely, USA. France and UK had 
been arming Israel for months.^ "* It was also alleged that they had a prior 
knowledge of Israel's intentions to invade Gaza Strip, an Egyptian 
controlled territory.^^ Nasser's allegations were soon confirmed by other 
sources. Nasser was aware that the main cause of Western indifference 
towards Egypt was his refusal to join Western defense programme in 
West Asia. 
The United States, conscious of Arab resentment, agreed to sell 
Israel only a limited amount of small arms. At the same time, however. 
American Government quietly encouraged other countries, especiallv 
Canada and France to sell Israel the latest warplanes and other heaw 
equipment. France became the main supplier of advanced arms to Israel 
by 1956.'" 
The Gaza raid, no doubt, exposed the weakness of the Egyptian 
army. After this it had become a question of Nasser's pride to obtain 
sophisticated weapons and train his army to face Israeli challenges. 
Unable to obtain arms from the Western countries, Nasser secret!) 
approached Soviet Union. Robert R. Bowie has remarked: The (iaza 
raid of Februarv' 1955 opened the way for Soviet entry into the area." 
On September 27, 1955 a barter deal was concluded between 
F^ gypt and Czechoslovakia for the recovery of military equipments. 
Egypt exchanged its cotton with the Czech arms, which were urgently 
needed to satisfy the wounded ego of Egyptians."*^ It was later admitted 
by Nasser himself that the deal was in fact with Russia, because without 
the agreement with Soviet Union, Egypt-Czech arms deal could not have 
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been possible. Soon after this, Soviet Government promised ligxpi 
economic and technical assistance. In view of Robert Stephens "Soviet 
arms deal ensured that hence forward the Middle East could no longer 
be regarded as a purely Western sphere of influence."*''^  
There is no doubt that the entr)' of the Soviet Union in the West 
Asian region provided a new alternative to the Arab world, (ieorge 
Lenczowski has written that "'Russia's advances in the Arab world were 
greatly aided by the fact that historically the Arabs have never been 
exposed to continuous Russian imperialism." 
On October 2, 1955, Nasser made a major speech before an 
armed forces exhibition in Cairo. In his speech he explained the 
circumstances that compelled him to go eastward. He said that Egyptian 
Government had taken this step after its repeated failure to obtain arms 
from all the three Western powers - UK, France and USA. 
Nasser went on to say: 
France always bargained with us. She bargained with us over 
North Africa. She says to us, we will give you arms on the 
conditions that you should not criticize our position in North 
Africa, and on condition that you relinquish your "Arabism\ 
that you relinquish your humanitarianism and on condition 
that you should keep silent and close your eyes when you see 
the massacres in North Africa. 
He continued: 
This is the story of France and now I'll tell you the stor\' of 
America. From the time of Revolution we asked for arms and 
we promised arms ~ and what was the result? The promise 
was promise circumscribed with conditions. We would get 
arms if we signed a mutual security pact. We would get arms 
if we would sign some form of alliance. We refused to sign a 
mutual security pact. We refused to sign any form of alliance. 
And my brothers, we could never get a single weapon from 
America. 
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As for Britain he said: 
England told us that she was ready to supply us arms. We 
accepted gratefully. What was the result? England provided 
us with a quantity of arms which was not sufficient to achieve 
the goals of this Revolution. 
The announcement of the Egyptian-Czech arms deal had a 
magical effect on the entire Arab world. It enhanced Nasser's prestige 
and popularit) not only in Egypt, but also in the entire Arab world. Even 
Nasser's critics among the Arab rulers appreciated his move. The} 
admired Nasser's decision, which as a result ended their dependence on 
the Western countries for their military requirements. Israel on the other 
hand saw Czech arms deal with Egypt as a great challenge to its militarv 
supremacy and an obstacle in her expansionist programme. Israeli 
government started pressurizing her Western supporters to provide Israel 
more arms claiming that Egypt had in possession huge amount of 
modem militar>' equipments. Jewish lobby in America adopted its old 
strategy of putting domestic pressure on the government to fulfill Israeli 
demands for arms. However, the US government openly declared that its 
foreign policy includes the preservation of the state of Israel and hinted 
a positive response to Israel's request.''^ 
Although bitter to Egypt's arms deal with the communists, the 
US regional strategy of bringing the Arabs into a mutual securit\ 
arrangement against the Soviet was not changed. It was viewed that 
continuation of Arab-Israeli conflict was the major cause of blocking 
American influence and its designs to contain the USSR in the area. 
Eisenhower and Dulles were fully convinced that if only the Arab Israeli 
conflict could be resolved, the chances of military alignments with the 
Arabs against the Russians would be possible. 
Egypt was the main country to be pacified. For this purpose I S 
President appointed a trusted man, Robert Anderson, former Deputy 
Secretary' of Defense to mediate between Nasser and Ben Ciurion. But 
the atmosphere was not conducive for the success of Anderson mission. 
With the failure of Anderson mission, US hope to achieve a 
breakthrough in global and regional policies by resolving the Arab-
Israeli conflict came to an end. " 
Eisenhower considered Nasser as "a complete stumbling 
block." '^* Nasser could not make any friendly move toward Israel at the 
cost of his popularity and prestige in the Arab world. He was regarded 
as the champion of Arab nationalism and Pan-Arabism by the Arab 
masses. In order to achieve closer ties with Libya and Saudi Arabia. 
USA and Britain provided various concessions and economic aid to 
these countries. They thought that "if Saudi Arabia and Libya were at 
their side, Egypt would scarcely continue intimate association with the 
Soviets, and certainly Egypt would no longer be regarded as a leader of 
the Arab world." ^ 
The revolutionary regime, which came into power after the end of 
heredit\' system of monarchy in Egypt, had three main objectives to be 
achieved; to get the British out of the country; to solve the problem of 
Sudan and to reform the Egyptian shattering economy. After securing 
first two objectives, Nasser paid full attention to undertake land reform 
and industrialization. He made various efforts to bring Egypt under the 
categorv of modem nation states. Colonel Nasser was ver>' much 
interested in the construction of the Aswan High Dam - a project, which 
Farouk's government failed to materialize. It was a grand project and 
beyond the capacit>' of the Egyptian financial resources. Nasser wanted 
the High Dam aid to come from the West so as to avoid a further heavy 
dependence on the communist block, which might endanger his policy 
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of non-involvement in the scourge of Cold War between East and West. 
The Egyptian propaganda that Soviet Government was going to provide 
finances for the project "undoubtedly helped precipitate the Western 
decision to make offer to Egypt."^^ However, in December 1955. the 
United States with Britain, together with World Bank offered financial 
aid for the construction of Aswan Dam. Nasser accepted financial deal 
but objected to the terms and conditions attached to it by the financers. 
US and Britain, though not happy with the anti-Western attitude of the 
Egyptian government, promised to relax some conditions. 
Steven gave the following reason for the US generosity towards 
Egypt: 
Dulles saw the dam as a means of limiting Egypt's ability to 
undertake military adventures with the new Russian anns. 
because its scarce resources would be committed to a 
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constructive enterprise. 
F. Prelude to The Suez Crisis: 
By mid March a reversed atmosphere in US government 
developed because of internal and external influences, which greatly 
affected US policy to Egypt. On Nasser's part, his own actions in 
dealing with Moscow, in blocking negofiafions with Israel, in refusing 
the initial offer, and finally recognizing the People's Republic of China 
on 16 May 1956, undermined the chances of Western financial help for 
the construction of High Dam. 
The news about the refusal of the loan reached Nasser when he 
had just arrived at the Cairo airport on July 20*, 1956 accompanied with 
Nehru on his way back from Brioni, after holding a meeting with the 
NAM leaders. Calvocoressi has written that, "by its timing and its 
manner, as much as by its content, this was a stinging public rebuff to 
Nasser." '^* 
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Another famous author expressed the same view: 
Nasser objected not to the withdrawal of aid but the insulting 
manner in which the refusal was conveyed and especially to 
the explanatory slur upon Egypt's economic reputation. 
It was a great blow to Nasser's strategy for the economic 
development of Egypt. 'People began to place bets on the name of 
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Nasser s successor. 
Some remarks made by Dmitri Shepilov, the new Soviet Foreign 
Minister, in Moscow made Nasser's position embarrassing further 
Pandit Nehru, who was with Nasser at the time the news was given, 
might be an important factor for Nasser's courageous decision to 
nationalize Suez Canal before the end of concession agreement, which 
was to come in 1968. 
In a memorial speech at Alexandria on July 26, 1956 at the 
occasion of fourth anniversary of the Egyptian revolution. President 
Nasser dramatically announced that Egyptian government had 
nationalized the Suez Canal Company. In the same announcement he 
had declared that the revenues from the canal would go toward financing 
the Aswan Dam project. He also made it clear that Company's share 
holders (Britain and France) would be paid fully in accordance with the 
last closing prices on the Paris Bourse on July 25, 1956.**^  It was one of 
the memorable speeches of Nasser's life. The nationalization of the Sue/ 
Canal Company, twelve years before the actual date of expiry of the 
Canal's concession provided Britain and France an opportunity to take 
forcible action against Nasser for which, they were waiting for years 
Israel had its own reasons to make war with Egypt. The US Government 
strongly disapproved Nasser's action but its attitude was indeed different 
from those of Britain and France. Unlike Britain and France, neither ol 
US holdings nor her prestige was directly involved in the Suez Canal 
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Issue.**"^  Reaction of the Arab and Afro-Asian countries was favourable 
to Egypt. King Hussein of Jordan, in a letter of congratulations to 
President Nasser, said: "The shadow of imperialistic exploitation was 
beginning to disappear from the Arab world." ^ The Lebanese 
Parliament passed a resolution welcoming Egypt"s move and declaring 
Lebanon's full support to Egypt. The Libyan Prime Minister, Mustafa 
Bin Halim. described the nationalization of the Suez Canal Compan\ as 
a strong step towards safeguarding Egypt's interests. 
According to him it was a purely internal matter of Egypt and no 
outside power was entitled to interfere. Even Nasser's opponents m the 
Arab world praised his bold decision. As for Egyptians, their enthusiasm 
knew no bounds. India and USSR justified Nasser's action for which 
they regarded Western powers responsible, particularly USA. 
Throughout the Suez crisis they strongly supported Egypt in and outside 
of the United Nations. 
Despite bitter opposition to the neutralist policy of President 
Nasser, and his growing ties with Communist bloc, the State Department 
was not in favour of using force against Egypt. Eisenhower and Dulles 
both were hopeful for a peaceful solution of the Suez crisis. rhe\ 
believed that in the prevailing circumstances the use of force might 
facilitate Soviet entry in the area, which would ultimately hamper 
American interests. Anglo-French hostile attitude was a grave concern 
to LISA. Dulles made various efforts to resolve the dispute by peaceful 
means through the agency of the United Nations. But the outcome of the 
Security Council's proceedings disappointed angry Anglo-French 
Governments.**'^  US effort to take the issue to the General Assembly 
made no effect. Britain and France wanted war with Egypt so 
passionately that they could not wait for a final verdict of the world 
body of powers. Moreover, Britain and France lost hope for world's 
support of military action against Egypt. An impatient France, tlierelbrc. 
''generated a new causes-belli out of a problem hitherto unrelated to the 
crisis - the Arab-Israeli connection."'^" 
France was least concerned about her position among the Arabs 
as Algeria had already eroded it. But this was not true in case of Britain. 
Britain needed the friendship of Iraq and Jordan to maintain her 
remaining influence in the region. British government knew this fact 
very well that "Nasser's enemies condone a direct British-French attack 
on him, but they could hardly forgive Britain for joining forces with 
Israel."* '^ France and Israel were both aware of British sensitivities 
regarding her image in the Arab world. In British parliament the Labour 
Party also disapproved the idea of using force against Egypt. Moreover. 
Britain found it difficult to move without US backing and approval, 
which still believed in the possibilities of peaceful solution. 
From the beginning of the Suez crisis, France was trying to 
persuade Britain to act independently ignoring opposition either of USA 
or Labour Party. Ultimately, France succeeded in her efforts. British 
government hinted her cooperation to France and Israel in their secret 
collusion against Egypt. In fact, Eden could not resist his desire to 
punish Nasser whose name was never uttered by him without emotions. 
France and Israel both had a vital interest in giving Nasser a big 
jolt, Vk^ho became a permanent menace for them in the region. Behind the 
Algerian revolt France saw the hand of Egypt. French leadership had 
become convinced that the only way to defeat the Algerian rebellion was 
to liquidate Nasser. Nasser's challenging attitude towards Western 
powers, his close liaison with the communists, and his programme to 
train Egyptian commandos called fedayeens to destroy Israel were the 
constant cause of irritation to Israeli government. Moreover, economic 
boycott, blockade of the Suez Canal and the Straiti^f T^ratthit-isfaelJ 
economy badly. "^ 
British hostility against the Egyptian President was not less than 
France and Israel, since Britain too regarded him responsible for her loss 
of power and prestige in the region. The nationalization of the Sue/ 
Canal Company not only ended Anglo-French imperial legacy with 
Egypt but it jeopardized their economic interests as well. The result of 
Jordanian election, which tool place in October 1956, brought the pro-
Nasser forces in power. The newly elected Government of Jordan signed 
a defense agreement with Syria and Egypt, "placing an Egyptian in 
command of their armies in case of war with Israel." ~ These 
developments created anxiety among England, France and Israel. United 
States policy was not very clear. Anglo-French and Israeli governments 
were waiting for a right moment to strike against Egypt. Meanwhile. 
Soviet Union got involved with Hungary and Poland. 
G. Tripartite Aggression of 1956: Receding Anglo-French 
Influence - Soviet-American Intrusion: 
The diversion of Soviet attention from the Arab world to the 
Eastern Europe and the announcement of Presidential election in 
America provided a golden opportunity to the triple powers. Israeli 
leadership assumed that President Eisenhower, a candidate in the 
forthcoming elections would not dare to take a risk to antagonize Jewish 
voters by opposing Israel's actions on Egypt. In order to divert I S 
attention from its real target to the subsidiary one, Israel had launched a 
severe attack on Jordan at Qalqilya. As planned earlier. Israel invaded 
Sinai on Monday October 29, eight days before the Presidential election 
in USA. At first Egyptians did not realize the gravity of the situation 
but soon they came to know what was happening. According to their 
pre-decided plan, France and Britain tried to express their concern ovei 
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the outbreak of hostility between Israel and Egypt by issuing their 
ultimatum on October 30, 1956. It gave Egypt and Israel twelve hours to 
withdraw 10 miles from the Suez Canal. Regarding the actual motive of 
the ultimatum George Lenczowski has commented: 
In realit\', their, ultimatum if successful, would have rewarded 
the aggressor by conceding to him the still - unoccupied areas 
of the Sinai Peninsula up to ten miles from the canal while 
penalizing the victim of aggression by demanding total 
evacuation of Egyptian troops to the Western side of the 
Canal. 
Britain and France had calculated that Egypt's rejection of the 
ultimatum was obvious, and they could utilize it as a pretext for their 
inter\'ention in the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
The US Government denied any foreknowledge of Anglo-French 
ultimatum. On October 31, while speaking in the House of Commons. 
Eden claimed the right for Britain to discharge its "national duty"*^  
without unnecessarily waiting for US consent. Sensing the gravity of the 
crisis. USA immediately called for an emergency meeting of the 
Security Council. The Security Council met on October 30, 1956 to 
consider the US resolution calling upon Israel and Egypt to an 
immediate ceasefire. ^ ^ 
Following the US lead, the Soviet representative presented a 
simple ceasefire resolution in the Security Council. Both the resolutions 
were vetoed b\ Britain and France. The case was then referred to an 
emergency session of the General assembly "which was capable of 
dealing with it without the hindrance of veto.'"*^ ^ As expected, at the 
expiration of the deadline on October 31, Anglo-French bombings on 
Egyptian targets was started. Pfowever, by November 7. 1956. the 
tripartite aggression against Egypt came to a halt. England and France 
wanted to proceed further but, meanwhile, the world opinion against the 
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aggressors mounted up and they had to accept the UN resolution vC 
ceasefire. London and Paris were badly defeated in their game. Ihey 
could no longer resist the quantitative effect of the world's forces, who 
criticized their action against Egypt bitterly. Throughout 1956 crisis, the 
Soviet Union and India vigorously supported Egypt by defending the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of it. The support of the Arab and the 
Afro-Asian nations was also valuable. Their sharp reaction to the Anglo-
French-Israeli invasion against Egypt had boosted Nasser's morale. 
Even/ Arab government, even that of Iraq had been willing to declare its 
support for Egypt. 
In British parliament the opposition leaders and even ruling part\ 
members criticized Eden for his policies, which defamed his 
government. Eden's two close associates. Sir Anthony-Nutting, Minister 
of state in Foreign Affairs, and Sir Edward Boyle, Economic Secretan. 
to the Treasur>', had resigned from their posts in protest between 
November 3 and 5 respectively. Nutting who was representing Britain 
in UN, in his letter to Eden, justified his action by saying that it had 
become impossible for him to defend the Government's position at all. 
as the Israeli invasion and the Anglo-French attack were parts of 
the same "nefarious plan"'**** to destroy Egypt's growing strength and 
newly won independence. US President, Eisenhower, was also stunneci 
at allied actions, revealing as "they did both betrayal and 
incompetence.""" 
Egyptians had been taken by surprise. As a matter of fact, for 
man\ hours after the initial assault Egypt was unable to comprehend its 
true nature and extent. Nasser was aware of the Anglo-French threat, but 
was totally ignorant of their collusion with Israel. He realized the 
seriousness of the Israeli invasion only when Anglo-French air 
operations began against Egypt. 
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Unacceptably, Israeli forces achieved its goal ver\' quicklx. 
Israelis were not primarily concerned with the canal. They wanted to 
gain control over Sharmel-Sheik and the Straits of Tiran before 
international pressure would force Israel to accept a ceasefire. By 
November 3 they accomplished their most desired goal after which thev 
could accept the ceasefire order of UN at any moment. Disturbed by the 
speedy victor>' of Israel, Anglo-French governments kept on 
pressurizing the Jewish state not to accept the ceasefire till their own 
motive was achieved. 
USA, who rejected soviet proposal, to a joint US-Soviet action to 
end the hostility, cooperated its rival in the peace making efforts through 
the agency of the United Nations. For Soviet Union, it was a rare 
opportunity to let down Britain and France with their closest ally - the 
United Slates. 
Under US pressure and Soviet threats, Britain and France agreed 
to a ceasefire before establishing their complete control over Sue/ 
Canal. Finally, in December 1956 Britain and France bowed to world 
forces and began evacuating their forces from the Egyptian soil. 
Israel was also compelled to withdraw its troops from Egyptian 
areas. During the months of December, January and February, General 
Assembly adopted a series of revolutions demanding immediate anci 
unconditional Israeli withdrawal. Thinking of its important position in 
the US West-Asian strategy, Israel adopted a bargaining attitude. Israeli 
leadership knew it well that USA could not stop pressurizing Israel to 
withdraw, in order to save her own position in the Arab world but was 
sure that it would protect Israel's strategic gains as well.'"'* Israel 
withdrew its forces from Sinai Peninsula in stages - after stationing 
United Nations Emergency Force in the vacated areas. 
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About Sharam el Shaikh and Gaza Strip, IsraeH Prime Minister 
Ben Gurion, declared that Israel was not going to withdraw from either 
of the two '"until Israeli government received assurances that neither 
Egyptian military nor civilian control would be restored in the Gaza 
Strip and the UNEF would takeover and stay at Sharam el-Shaikh." " 
After having satisfied with the assurances given by Eisenhower and 
Dulles regarding the rights of Israeli shipping in Gulf of Aqaba and 
protection against attack from Gaza, Israeli Foreign Minister. Golda 
Mier, announced Israeli withdrawal in General Assembly in March 
1957.'^ *' 
There's no denying the fact, that whatever the gains Israel had 
achieved from the tripartite war against Egypt, there was no doubt that 
Britain and France failed to acquire any diplomatic or strategic gains 
from it. The outcome of the Suez war was very humiliating and 
discouraging for both the Western powers which dominated the West 
Asian region since long. They failed in their mission to liquidate Nasser: 
instead their action transformed him into a world figure, a leader of 
international stature. Their desire to break Arab unity was not achieved. 
Suez crisis brought Egypt and other Arab countries closer to each othei. 
The war did not weaken Arab nationalism and Pan-Arabism in the Arab 
world; rather it intensified these movements. It united Asia and Africa in 
sharp opposition to Europe, which resulted into existence of third world. 
Britain keenly desired to establish international control over Suez Canal 
The end of Suez war lost every possibility of it. 
France wanted to suppress Algerian rebellion by destroying its 
main source of encouragement. It not only failed to achieve this end but 
its own emotionally oriented decision to join hand with Israel to destnn 
Nasser's reputation, hastened the process of Algerian independence 
Anglo-British secret collusion with Israel lost their respect in the entire 
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Arab world. Their lame excuse that by intervening in the Israeli-
Egyptian hostility they intended to protect Suez Canal, had lost iis 
validity when they jointly vetoed the Security Council resolutions 
calling upon an immediate ceasefire. An analysis of Anglo-French 
activities, which they performed in the month of October 1956. revealed 
that the tripartite action against Egypt was pre-planned, although Britain 
and France denied this allegation. US confusing attitude. Nasser s 
rapprochement with Soviet bloc, his keen interest in Arab unity, his 
support for independence of subjugated countries and moreover his 
revolutionary style created a sense of insecurity and indignity in Britain 
and France. Egypt's demand for full freedom from Brhain and his bold 
step to nationalize Suez Canal Company directly hit the Anglo-French 
interest in the region. Britain felt more humiliated because she 
dominated Egypt from 1882 and the Arab world since the closure of 
World War I. Evacuation of the British forces from the Suez Canal zone 
was celebrated by Egypt with Soviet Foreign Minister, Shepilov, who 
visited Egypt at the time, and in turn intensified Eden's humiliation. In 
his sheer frustration, he undermined the gravity of British-Israeli 
collusion against Egypt. He also misjudged the possible American 
reaction in case of his defiance to Eisenhower and Dulles' advice not to 
use force when the hope for peaceful solution of the crisis was still ali\c 
France was collaborating with Israel as early as 1954 when a Franco-
Israeli arms deal was concluded. A second big arms deal was concluded 
in November 1955, in which France provided Israel highly modernized 
and sophisticated war equipments. It was an irony that their closest all\. 
America, joined their greatest rival Russia in suppressing their action 
against Egypt. Throughout the Suez crisis, US attitude and policies were 
mainly guided by her desire to enhance its power and prestige in the oil 
rich region which she had lost due to her own actions. Settlement of the 
dispute was not the primary goal, but a step in the process of American 
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policy formulation for its future programmes in West Asia, in which 
USSR was an important factor. 
Soon after nationalization of Suez Canal, Dulles assured tden. 
that. ''What Nasser had attempted to swallow was to be disgorged"'" . 
but it was Dulles, (America) who instead of Nasser, forced Britain and 
France, to disgorge what they had swallowed in the war with Egypt. 
During nineteen fifties, inconsistency remained an important feature c^ f 
US foreign policy in West Asia. Michael E. Jansen described this 
1 OK 
tendency as a "love-hate, fascination-repulsion attitude'" of America 
which dominated its relations with the Arab world. However disastrous 
in terms of world peace, US Presidents, particularly Eisenhower 
continued this policy. The Czech-Egyptian arms deal, which was 
obviously with Soviet Russia, was concluded in 1955, and was the result 
of US double-dealings. US offer to provide arms to Egypt after the 
conclusion of deal with the communists, weakened the moral position of 
America in the eyes of the Arabs fiirther. 
During the Suez war, US policies were largely motivated by her 
selfish desire to achieve her goals in the region at any cost. But luckilv 
some of her actions helped Nasser in restoring her power and prestige in 
the Arab world, particularly in his own country. ''He remained in power 
and had no great difficulty to turn military defeat into a political 
victoiy.-'"'^ 
In the >ears between November 1956 and April 1967 Anglo 
French influence in the area declined sharply. US political influence 
increased despite its weak moral position in the Arab world. This 
situation was overshadowed by Soviet Union, which gradually gained a 
stronger hold on both Egypt and Syria."" In the subsequent years tht 
intensity of Cold War between the two rival powers for the sake of their 
political and strategic interests in the West Asian region intensified 
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They used to exploit hostile Arab-Israeli relations by providing them 
moral, material and military support for their favourite countries. It 
resulted into the tragic events leading to the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 
and 1973. 
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Chapter - I I I 
THE US ROLE IN THE 1967 WAR AND ITS 
CONSEQUENCES IN WEST ASIA 
A. Growing East-West Rivalry in The Arab World -
Emergence of Cold War: 
The faulty Western policies, which eventually brought about the 
Suez war of 1956 benefited two countries the most ~ Soviet Union and 
Israel. The immediate result of the Suez invasion was a sharp 
deterioration of American and Western prestige in the Arab world, 
particularly in revolutionary Egypt. Although Britain, France and Israel 
were the main accused of tripartite aggression against Egypt, there \\ as 
no doubt that it was the United States, which took the first step in the 
chain of events leading to the war of 1956. Regardless of the fact that 
US President, Eisenhower, took a very bold step to declare his 
goveimment's stand during the Suez crisis in favour of Egypt and put a 
strong pressure on the aggressors to withdraw from the Egyptian soil, he 
could not secure the confidence of the revolutionary leader. Gamal-
Abdul-Nasser. 
After the emergence of the US as the leading power in the world. 
Arabs looked toward it and the newly created United Nations with greai 
hopes. At this time Soviet influence in the Arab world was extreme!} 
nebulous. Russian attempts to step in the area had not succeeded 
because of the Anglo-French presence in the region. The outcomes ol 
the Suez war were disastrous to both Britain and France. It marked the 
eclipse of the colonial powers in West Asia, which was regarded as an 
exclusive area of their hold for more than a century. The most prominent 
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was perhaps the blow to Great Britain, which had lost all ground in Sue/ 
debacle. 
British dominated Egypt from 1882' and the Arab world since the 
end of the First World War. Anglo ~ French decision to attack Egypt 
was largely dominated by their desire to punish Nasser who was da\ b\ 
day becoming a menace to their imperialist policies in West Asia and 
North Africa respectively. The irrational and ill timed military action 
against Egypt with the collaboration of Arabs' worst enemy brought the 
end of Eden and MoUet's political career. With the final withdrawal of 
Israeli troops from the Egyptian territory in March 1957.^ the Suez war 
was over but its consequences were grave which added new and 
complicated issues to the existing Arab - Israeli conflict. In comparison 
to France and Britain, Israel's decision to go to war with Egypt was not 
emotionally oriented. It was well calculated and its aims were clearly 
defined. With the help of USA, Israel succeeded in achieving all her 
immediate objectives, if not her long-term goals. 
Cairo Government alleged that '"although Washington had 
insisted on Israel's withdrawal from Egypt, in reality it took upon itself 
to secure the war aims of Israel, which included the opening of the Gulf 
of Aqaba."^ Once again her military superiority over Egypt was 
established. By attacking Egyptian territory, Israeli Prime Minister Ben 
Gurion wanted to destroy her military strength because a strong Egypt 
posed a constant threat to his Zionist aspirations. Since Israel is a 
product of immorality and bad faith, it never judged her actions in terms 
of morality or legality. The Anglo - French debacle had created a kind 
of power vacuum in the region,'' which was gradually filled by the two 
competing rival powers - USA and USSR. Soon after the World War 11. 
the primary objective of the US foreign policy was the protection of her 
growing strategic, political and economic interests in the West Asian 
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region which had now become exposed to the communist influences as a 
result of declining power and position of Britain and France. President 
HaiTv Truman's declaration of his policy on March 12, 1947,^  reflected 
US concern about the danger of Communism, which was both real and 
perceived at that time. This was the first major step in recognizing the 
Soviet threat and responding to it. The USA, as hitherto the dominant 
regional power in succession to Great Britain, took the responsibilit} of 
safeguarding the area from Soviet penetration.^ In his declaration 
Truman stated: 
One of the primary objective of the foreign policy of the 
United States is the creation of conditions in which we and 
other nations will be able to workout a way of life free from 
coercion....The United Nations is designated to make 
possible lasting freedom and independence for all its 
members. We shall not realize our objectives, however, 
unless, we are willing to help free people to maintain their 
free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive 
movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian 
regimes. 
He continued: 
This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian 
regimes impose upon free people, by direct and indirect 
aggression, undermine the foundation of international peace 
and hence the security of the United States.... That integrity is 
essential to the preservation of order in the Middle East.^ 
The statement of policy, known as Truman Doctrine had both "a 
specific intent and a larger purpose." In the subsequent years, for the 
purpose of achieving that end, USA with her Western Allies made 
various efforts to create security arrangements in West Asia. Ihe 
success of US defense scheme to meet Soviet threat was not uniform in 
the area of its application. While it proved effective in non-Arab states, 
like Greece, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, it was bitterly opposed by the 
Arab v '^orld. Iraq was an exception, which had to pay a heavy price for 
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her pro- Western policies. The Arabs, particularly Egyptian leaders 
repeatedly rejected Western defense proposals because they had an 
unpleasant experience of Western domination and regarded these 
powers, including USA, responsible for the creation of Israel. 
The United States, which had no colonial past, was compelled by the 
circumstances to perform the traditional British role in the West Asian 
region. Britain could no longer maintain her earlier position as a self-
appointed protector of the area from foreign aggression. 
The responsibility was shifted towards America, which emerged as the 
sole powerful Western state after the World War II. However, after Suez 
episode all western initiatives were taken by USA and other Western 
powers just supported her initiatives. Since America protected Israel's 
major objectives of 1956 Suez war despite of world wide criticism 
against her unprovoked attack on Egypt, US-Israeli understanding 
became more intense. In the creation of state of Israel in the Arabs" 
territory. United States played a very important role. Soon after the 
creation of Israel, protection of its 'alien existence' " in the Arab world 
and backing for every wrong done by it against the Arab population 
became the primary objective of US policy in West Asia. America 
wanted to establish her relations with the Arab states on her own terms 
and conditions. But Western policy of use and throw toward the Arabs 
was no more acceptable to the younger Arab generation who started 
thinking in tenns of their own identity and independence, free from 
Western influence. Western propaganda against the evils of communism 
did not alter the decision of the progressive Arab states to depend upon 
the communists rather than believing in false promises of the West who 
cheated them time and again. 
Western powers, particularly, Britain and USA, because of their 
own guilt could not rely on the Arabs whole-heartedly." The Arabs did 
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not really have much in common with the West. In the words of Michael 
E. Jansen, "there is no American Arab or no American-Palestinian 
equation comparable to the American Jewish or American-Israeli 
equation; there is no free exchange of ideas and views, there is no 
apparent common interest." The fundamental basis of US-Israeli 
relationship is quite sound. Both have a similar attitude and approach 
towards the Arabs. Their similarity in thought as well as in deed brought 
them closer to each other. America considered Israel as a dependable 
ally in her attempt to extract every possible benefit out of the crisis 
situation prevailing in West Asia. Egypt being the largest and the most 
important of the Arab countries always remained the focus of I S 
attention from the very beginning of her involvement in the West Asian 
region. ' 
The United States initial hope to develop a close liaison with the 
revolutionary leader of Egypt was gone into vain to which contradiction 
in American policies toward Arabs was one of the underlying causes. 
This trend was not a new one, it goes back to the contradiction between 
President Wilson's Fourteen Points and his endorsement of the Balfour 
Declaration.''^ This was the time when USA sought to remain friendl\ 
with both Israel and the Arab states. Soon after Suez war US 
Government realized that it could no longer woo the whole Arab world 
particularly Egypt, to gain Allies in the conflict with the Soviet Union.' 
As a result, there was a visible change in Washington's policy, which 
was obviously in favour of Israel. In this situation it had become very 
natural on the part of the Soviets to support the cause of the Arabs in the 
battle of dispute between Israel and its Arab neighbours. In November 
1947. Soviet Union backed the Western sponsored proposal for the 
partition of Palestine and the creation of an independent Jewish state. 
When the state of Israel was proclaimed on May 14. 1948.'*' the last da\ 
94 
of British mandate, USSR was the first to give it de-jure reeognitiiM. 
Soviet Union extended her military and diplomatic support to Israel, 
which turned some of its initial disadvantages into advantages during 
first Arab- Israeli war. The Soviet speculations that - Jewish state 
might respond more readily to the communist anti imperialist 
propaganda and Marxist dogma than the conservative Arab leaders and 
people, went wrong. Israeli alliance with the West in the East-West 
rivalry brought a radical change in Soviet policy in the Arab East. 
Ihe Soviet-Israeli rapprochement, which was initiated in 1948. 
proved short lived. From the early 1950s Soviet Russia adopted a 
friendly posture to the Arabs. This turnout was not accidental but part of 
a well-calculated strategy that aimed at exploiting the tide of Arab 
nationalism against her Western rivals, particularly United States.'*^ fhe 
overriding cause of Soviet popularity amongst the Arab states was its 
anti Western approach. Arabs had bitter experience of Western 
domination and subjugation. Arabs' hatred to the West had become the 
most important part of their psyche, which reflected in their unmindful 
rejection of every move initiated by Western powers to establish peace 
in the area and solve Arab-Israeli problem, without considering its 
merits and demerits. Soviet Union achieved every possible gain out of 
this situation. 
In the years that followed the Suez war, Eisenhower and Dulles 
adopted a polic\ of exploiting intra-Arab rivalries and affairs to weaken 
Nasser's efforts for unifying the Arab world. The new US policy was 
aimed at backing those individuals and forces that were anti-Soviet. The 
old US scheme to co-opt Arab governments into the programme meant 
for containing Soviet penetration in West Asia was replaced by a nev\ 
doctrine which projected the international hunt for communists in Arab 
politics. The Eisenhower Doctrine, as it came to be known, expressed 
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the American fear of growing Soviet influence in the world and W est 
Asia particularly. President Eisenhower proposed his doctrine on 
Januar) 5. 1957." The main purpose of the "Doctrine" was to arouse ihe 
American people and Congress against the danger of communism, 
which had become apparent in the West Asian region. The President 
stated in his proposed doctrine: 
Russia's rulers have long sought to dominate the Middle East. 
That was true of the Czars and it is true of the 
Bolsheviks....The reason for Russia's interest in the Middle 
East is solely that of power politics. Considering her 
announced purpose of Communizing the world, it is easy to 
understand her hope of dominating the Middle 
East....International Communism, of course, seek to mask its 
purposes of domination by expressing of good will by 
superficially attractive offers of political, economic and 
militar\ aid. By any free nation, which is subject of Soviet 
enticement, ought, in elementary wisdom, to look behind the 
mask. 
He explained the US position in these words: 
There is general recognition in the Middle East, as elsewhere, 
that the United States does not seek either political or 
economic domination over any other people. Our desire is a 
world environment of freedom, not servitude. On the other 
hand many, if not all, of the nations of the Middle East are 
aware of the danger that stems from international communism 
and welcome closer cooperation with the United States to 
realize for themselves the United Nations goals of 
independence, economic well being and spiritual growth. 
President requested Congressional approval for deployment ol 
armed forces of the United States to help victims of aggression. He 
assured the Congress: 
....US forces would not be exercised except at the desire ol' 
the nation attacked. 
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Hxplaining the need for such programme, Eisenhower told 
Congress that: 
The United Nations can always be helpful, but it cannot be a 
wholiv dependable protector of freedom when the ambitions 
of the Soviet Union are involved. 
The President's presentation to Congress triggered a general 
discussion with much criticism of State Department's policy in West 
Asia.^ '^  But finally it was approved by joint session of US Congress on 
March 9. 1957." 
fhe Eisenhower Doctrine was based on the assumption that after 
the Anglo- French debacle in the Arab world the security and defense of 
the region from the threat of Communism became the responsibility of 
US alone. The Israel initially suspected the Doctrine but eventuallv 
announced its acceptance. Egypt and Syria, like the Baghdad Paci. 
opposed the doctrine vehemently, but Nasser's rivals approved it with 
appreciation. "^"Although the Eisenhower Doctrine was designed to 
combat international Communism, it rapidly became an instrument 
against Nasserist Arab nationalism." Throughout his political careet 
Nasser remained a nuisance in the eyes of the American administration 
"The clash between the vision of Dulles and the ambition of President 
Nasser"" was also responsible for worsening US-Egyptian relations. 
B, Eisenhower Doctrine Invoked (1957): Intra-Arab 
Rivalries Intensified: 
During its first year, the doctrine was invoked toward two 
countries ~ Jordan and Syria.^'' In the early months of 1957. young King 
Hussein, (a pro Western Jordan ruler) developed a conflict with the 
popularly elected Prime Minister Suleiman Nebulsi. He was a staunch 
Arab nationalist and a great admirer of President Nasser. His 
nationalistic overtone threatened King's position. The ideological 
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ditTerences between King and Prime Minister turned into a political 
crisis. US suspected the hand of communists behind this turmoil. On 
24"' April, the White House Press Secretary, James Hagerty expressed 
the US concern over this development. He declared that "President 
Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles regarded the independence 
and integrity of Jordan as vital.'" By invoking Eisenhower Doctrine tor 
the first time, the following day the United States' Sixth Fleet received 
orders to proceed. The King finally managed to win over nafionalistic 
factions. 
Secretary Dulles while talking with the press on 23 April 1957 
declared his government's faith in King Hussein in the following words: 
....We have great confidence in the regard for King Hussein, 
because we really believe that he is striving to maintain the 
independence of his country in the face of very great 
difficulties and he does want to see Jordan fall under the 
domination of other countries which have indicated a desire 
to work contrary to what the King considers to be best for his 
countrv. It is our desire to hold up the land of King Hussein in 
these matters to the extent that he thinks that we can be 
helpful.^" 
Soon after this, Washington rewarded Jordan with $10 million lo 
support her military and badly hit economy. ' Syria was the next 
American target to apply Eisenhower Doctrine. The presence of pro-
Soviet members in El- Azem's Cabinet, the reports of Russian arms 
shipment, Syrian journalists boycott to US press reception and rejection 
of American technical aid were enough reasons for Eisenhower and 
Dulles to suspect that Damascus government might be succumbing 10 
international Communism. They regarded Nasser as the major 
inspiring force behind Syria's anti American activities. In a confidential 
memo to the President, Dulles bluntly accused Soviets for their 
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generosit) to provide military and economic assistance to Arab countries 
in order to make them Soviet Satellite: 
There is evidence in Syria of the development of a dangerous 
and classic patterns. The Soviets first promise and extend aid, 
militar\ or economic. With this aid they promote the control 
of any positions by pro Soviet persons. The end result sought 
it that the country will fall under the control of International 
Communism and become a Soviet Satellite, whose destinies 
are directed from Moscow. 
President Eisenhower expressed his fear that if not checked "the 
other Arab nations could scarcely avoid a similar fate."^^ 
The Syrian crisis of August and September 1957 provided United 
States another chance to actualize the national policy expressed in the 
'Doctrine'. US Government gave orders for quick arms deliveries to 
Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Saudi Arabia and for Sixth Fleet to maneuver 
off the Syrian coast. ^ In the latter part of 1957, leading Syrian Ba"ath 
leaders began pressurizing for a speedy union with Egypt. The Syro-
Egyptian Union came at a time when desire for Arab Unity influenced 
by Pan Arab overtures had reached its peak, especially among the 
national elites in Fertile Crescent.^^ Nuri-Es-Said, the pro Western Prime 
Minister of Iraq, saw the formation of the United Arab Republic (UAR) 
as a challenge for his anti Nasser policies. In order to counter the Syrian-
Egyptian Union, he arranged a Federation with Jordan.^ The formation 
of the United Arab Republic had the support of all the Arab countries it 
not backing of the pro Western leaders of the Arab states. Nasserite 
opposition to the new US arrangement generated domestic turmoil in the 
pro Western Arab states. On July 1958 a revolution broke out in Iraq. 
King Faisal of Iraq and Nuri-Es-Said were murdered. The monarchy was 
overthrown and a republic under General Kassem was established in 
Iraq. The fate of Faisal and Nuri alarmed the President Chamoun ot 
Lebanon who had close relations with the West.^ ** 
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Nasser's charisma had a great appeal to a large section of the 
Lebanese population. President of Lebanon wanted to make amendment 
in the present constitution so he could stay in office. Muslim population 
of the country opposed his move vehemently. Despite of popular 
demand he did not break off relation with Britain and France after Sue/ 
war of 1956. He was bitterly criticized for his 'subservient policy" to the 
West. In earh May 1958 a civil war in Lebanon broke out. As the 
fighting between the government forces and the rebels intensified. 
President Chamoun appealed to the United States for help. Desphe of 
Congressional protests President's request received a positive response. 
The United States* Sixth Fleet landed troops on the beaches of Beirut 
where there presence brought a rapid calm without engaging in anv 
serious combat. Foreign Minister of Lebanon alleged that Egypt and 
Syria were encouraging the trouble in his country. 
The US policy to keep the Arab world fragmented had become 
disturbed for a while, but soon it succeeded to get the support of the 
Arab countries, which had a traditional rivalry with Egypt. US continued 
its involvements in inter-Arab disputes by means of economic, technical 
and military aids to the pro Western countries of the Arab world. The til? 
of radical Arab states toward Russia also kept the Arab world divided. In 
the Yemen civil war the United States supported the stand of Saudi 
Arabia while Egypt's revolutionary activities in Yemen was backed b} 
the Soviet Union. 
Before September 1962 revolution, Yemen was one of the mosi 
backward country in the Arab East. It was closely aligned uith 
conservative Saudi Arabia on most major international issues for about 
two decades.'^' 
Beginning in 1956, Yemen ceased to be guided by Saudi Arabia 
in international affairs. It adopted an independent posture and developed 
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an international policy of its own. It developed iriendly relations with 
Soviet Union and established close ties with Cairo. Britain's relations 
with Yemen became sour over the question of Aden Protectorate. It s 
leaning towards non-alignment brought a visible change in its relations 
with USA. It criticized Iraq for joining MEDO. Yemen not only warmi\ 
welcomed the Syro-Egyptian union of February 1, 1958, but also joined 
it in an act of federation on March 8, 1958."*^  This union was proved 
short lived. With the break of Egyptian-Syrian union in 1961, there 
came disassociation of Yemen with Egypt, which was looseK federated 
with the UAR. 
Egyptian intervention in Yemen civil war had intensified the 
rivalry between the progressive states led by Egypt and the reactionary 
regimes led by Saudi Kingdom. The Yemen war went on despite 
'Jeddah Agreement' and 'Haradh Conference'. Saudi-Egyptian 
intervention came to an end after 1967 Arab-Israeli war. ' However, the 
contradiction in ideologies adopted by rival Arab regimes to deal with 
domestic and foreign affairs and their competitive desire for leadership 
in the region kept the Arabs divided. The breakup of UAR turned 
Damascus and Cairo into two rival camps of ideolog\ of Arab 
renaissance. 
In the Arab Cold War the chief weapon with two contestants was 
anli Israeli propaganda and mutual recrimination. Despite the dissolution 
of the Egyptian-Syrian union, Egypt continued to use the name United 
Arab Republic. 
The development of rivalry and competition between the 
progressive states themselves with continuation of their traditional 
enmity with the conservative pro-Western regimes of the Arab world 
weakened the Arab position in fighting the Israeli challenges in future. 
During these >ears United States continued to provide economic. 
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military and technical assistance to retain its leverage in pro-wesiem 
Arab countries. Nasser's denouncement of American attempts to enslave 
the Arabs by means of help, military and otherwise, resulted inio 
banning all US aid to Egypt. The pro-Israeli orientation of USA was one 
of the major causes of its failure to maintain its respectability in the 
Arab world. By contrast the Soviet Union got its prestige developed m 
Arab eyes by supporting their nationalism, assuring them of respect of 
their neutralism, selling a huge amount of arms and ammunitions, 
urgently needed to face the Israeli threat without associating conditions. 
and granting unconditional loans at a very low percent long term 
interest. The United States' opposition to its Allies and Israel was not 
the outcome of its sincere desire to help the victim of tripartite 
aggression, but it was largely governed by a strong urge to dissociate 
herself from the whole drama, which was staged by Israel with the 
collaboration of two Western powers. 
Dulles and Eisenhower sensed the global and regional 
repercussions of this secret collusion against Egypt even before the 
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closure of 1956 Suez war. The two leaders were forced by the 
circumstances to cooperate with their rival in the peacekeeping efforts 
The Arabs gave the credit to Soviet alone. Israel's faith over US' intense 
support to Zionist cause was slightly shaken for a while but revived ven, 
soon following flow of American aid to it as soon as its forces withdrew 
from the Gaza Strip. After Suez episode US openly adopted a policv 
favouring Israel, which obviously coincided with her own."*^  Egypt and 
Syria due to their anti-Western attitude and their encouragement to 
Palestinian guerillas in their terrorist activities against Israel became the 
main target of Israeli-American hostility. It is often argued that America 
supported Israel because it is a democratic, progressive state, but 
contrary to this theory. United States always supported the backward. 
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conservative and reactionary Arab regimes and opposed those who 
wanted to bring Arab renaissance.'*^ In fact, following the Suez war and 
Jordanian crisis of July 1958, Israel was increasingly perceived in 
Washington as a strategic asset to US by virtue of its ability to deter 
effectively the anti-Western forces emerging in West Asia. Israel was 
regarded as a bulwark against the recalcitrant forces of radicalism and 
militancy, particularly after Iraqi revolution of July 1958 in which pro-
Western monarchial regime was overthrown. The groundwork of the 
alliance between Washington and Jerusalem was well prepared even 
before the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. 
As the American hope of achieving a defense pact with the Arabs 
to contain Soviet penetration in the region faded in the face of incessant 
inter- Arab rivalries and unabated hostility towards the West, USA 
abandoned her policy of securing Arab goodwill at the cost of her 
relations with Israel. 
During his second term in White House, Eisenhower seemed to 
be more concerned about the survival and well being of Israel. It was 
no more seen as a liability and an impediment to Washington's regional 
security programme. The short-lived Kennedy era (1961-1964), in mam 
respects opened new and positive prospects to Israel because Kenned} 
had been more dependent on the American-Jewish community for his 
success in US Presidential election than his predecessors - Truman and 
Eisenhower. 
During electoral campaign he played the card of Israeli issue, 
which obviously helped. President Kennedy's decision to sell to Israel 
the Hawk short range, anti-aircraft missile and huge amount ot 
economic assistance was the major part of his commitments to 
American Jewish lobby.^ 
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Kennedy's interest in Israel went beyond foreign affairs. He was 
very much worried about his personal image in the eyes of Jewish 
people in Israel as well as in America. It was evident from his reaction 
when he came to know that Ambassador Stevenson criticized Israeli 
government for a raid into Syria in 1962. Before expressing his concern 
over the incident he nervously inquired, "Who are they blaming?" After 
knowing that Stevenson was being blamed, he seemed relaxed 
muttering, "'Better him than me."^^ 
As the President of America, Kennedy was bound to oppose 
Israel's stand on certain issues, which contradicted the basic ethos of the 
US foreign policy and its national interest in the region. He opposed 
Israel's policy on Egypt, Jerusalem, refugee question, UN votes, 
recognition of Yemen etc., but his sincere support remained with the 
Jewish slate.^ During his meeting with Israeli Foreign Minister Golda 
Meir on 27 December 1962 on Palm Beach, Kennedy assured Meir; 
"We are interested that Israel should keep up its sensitive, tremendous, 
historic task. What we want from Israel arises because our relationship 
is a two way street. Israel's security in the long run depends in part on 
what it does with the Arabs, but also on us.'" 
In short, since external constraints decreased under Kennedy, 
domestic pressure dominated US policies towards West Asia.^ 
Eisenhower in the process of supporting pro-Western conservative Arab 
regimes alienated both Egypt and Israel, while Kennedy had sought to 
embrace the nationalist Arab leader - Nasser, and Jewish leader Ben-
Gurion. Like most new US Presidents, Kennedy also believed that the 
Arab-Israeli conflict could be solved by solving the refugee problem 
since the Palestinian dimension of the conflict receded into background 
after 1948 Arab-Israeli war. The President had been particularly 
concerned with the Arab refugees who had been living in the sub-human 
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conditions in the hurriedly prepared camps to accommodate them. 
Conclusion of Armistice Agreements between Israel and the Arab 
countries did not change their refugee status: since Israel disregarded 
UN resolutions 194(111) of 11 December 1948 (on refugees) and 394(V) 
of 14 December 1950 (on rights, property and interests of refugees). 
Lausanne Protocol which was signed by Israel with Arab states on 21 
May 1948 meant for settling their dispute on the basis of the I N 
Resolution 181(11) of 29 November 1947 (on partition) and Resolution 
194(111) of 11 December (on refugees) was not abide by it after 
achieving UN membership. As for compliance of provisions of these 
two Resolutions Israel gave various arguments which had become a 
permanent feature of Israel's attitude towards UN resolutions in future. 
Johnson Plan also proved unsuccessful due to non-cooperation of Israel. 
A disappointed Dr. Johnson resigned from his United Nations work in 
January 1963. 
With the coming of Lyndon B. Johnson to American presidenc>. 
the prelude to the events of June 1967 war had become apparent. During 
Johnson era US policy gradually tilted more openly to Israel without an\ 
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pretense of its impartiality in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Johnson's 
known pro-Israeli past played a very vital role in encouraging Jewish 
ambitions to annex more Arab territories by means of war. When 
Johnson was the majority Senate leader he bluntly supported Israeli 
cause in February 1957, against Eisenhower initiatives to pressurize 
Israel to withdraw from Egyptian territory after Suez war."^ *^  His pro-
Israeli tone continued which cemented a more intimate relation between 
Jerusalem and Washington. 
"Johnson saw Israelis as sharing a common heritage with the 
United States/' By contrast he saw "the Arabs as culturally different and 
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their experiences as alien to his own." Furthermore, "Johnson saw the 
IsraeUs as loyal to him, a crucial factor to this President."*'" 
Unlike Nasser who delivered "insulting speeches, supported anti-
American causes from the Congo to Puerto Rico, and flirted with the 
Vietcong, Israelis were reliable and never attacked him.'" '^ The author s 
recollection of Johnson's ideas and approach and his strong belief on 
Israel's sincerity towards him could easily be indicated by his share of 
responsibility to the events leading to the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 and 
future developments. 
Events had soon shown the hollowness of US claim of supporting 
the securit)' and integrity of both Israel and the Arab states. Regarding 
US double-dealings Fred D. Khouri has commented: 
When Israel appeared to be threatened, American officials 
kept repeating that the United States was firmly committed to 
protect the territorial integrity of 'all' nations in the Middle 
East. But when the territorial integrity of the Arab nations 
was endangered by the Israelis the United States made no 
attempt to carry out this commitment and, thereby gave cause 
to the Arabs to accuse her of applying a double standard. 
C. Events and Incidents Leading to The June 1967 War: 
Syria was the center of events, which led into a series of clashes 
with Israel, finally followed by Arab-Israeli war of 1967, often called 
the Six Day war. The major causes of friction between Syria and Israel 
were Syrian opposition to an Israeli plan to divert the Jordan River to 
irrigate Negev, Syrian calls for a war of liberation against Israel, an 
Egyptian-Syrian defense pact of 1966, and above all Syrian sponsorship 
of Palestinian guerilla raids into Israel. The emergence of Palestinian 
guerilla organizations added a new factor in the existing Arab-Israeli 
conflict. Their militant groups operated their armed attacks against Israel 
from bases inside the Arab states. Syria was regarded as the breeding 
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ground for such militancy, which was aimed at regaining Palestinian s 
rights and their political identity, who were living under pathetic 
conditions in refugee camps totally dependent upon UNARWA and on 
mercy of host countries providing them shelter. 
Even after Palestine catastrophe they kept their national 
consciousness alive. Since Syria supported guerilla organizations in their 
violent activities it remained the main target of Israel's hostility 
throughout the years following the end of Suez war in \951.^' Moreover 
the growing Soviet ties with leftist regime in Syria posed a constant 
threat to Israel. 
Among the guerilla organizations Al-Fatah was ver> active and 
radical in his approach. The exact date of establishment of Fatah is not 
known but it is believed that it was established towards the end of 
1950"s by Yasser Arafat and other like-minded Palestinian Arabs.*''* Al-
Fatah comrades were highly inspired by guerilla war launched b> 
Algerian 'National Liberation Front' (NLF) against France in 1954.The> 
tried to apply Algerian method to Israel expecting the same result in thai 
case also.**^  
The slogan "Arab Unity' as the way to Palestine did not attract 
younger**^  generation of Palestine any more. The hollowness of this 
slogan became more apparent after the break up of IJAR in 1961. The 
young Palestinians started thinking in terms of liberation through an 
independent Palestinian action. After the break-up of Syrian-Egyptian 
Union (1958-1961) repeated Syrian accusations that Nasser was 
neglecting Arab problems, particularly Palestine problem, forced him to 
find out some remedies to silence his critics and rivals. His future course 
of actions was the result of strong pressure exerted by Syria and So\ iet 
Union who wanted to drag Nasser in the Syrian-Israeli conflict. 
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Hmergence of Nasser as the undisputed leader of the Arab 
masses generated inter-Arab rivalry, as each Arab state wanted to 
prove to the Arab public that it had the most extreme attitude towards 
the struggle against Israel. In 1964 Nasser called for the first Arab 
Summit Conference in Cairo where a resolution to divert Jordan River 
was adopted. With the active support of Egypt a decision was taken by 
the members of the Conference in favour of establishment of Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO). 
Ahmad Shukairy, was elected as the head of PLO. "The PIO 
which was largely under Egyptian control stressed political activity that 
fitted Egypt's policy of that time." It was often commented that 
"Shukairy was the nominal head of PLO, but President Nasser was its 
real head."^^ PLO had a little army of its own - the Palestine Liberation 
Anny (PLA) "to serve as a vanguard for the liberation of the usurped 
part of Palestine."^ However, neither PLO nor PLA could act 
independently. Syria had a reserved attitude toward PLO while Al-
Fatah was given full support in its assault against Israel. Till 1965. the 
Syrian Government was not officially associated with the organization. 
The result of 1966 coup in Syria was in favour of Fatah. It brought lett 
wing of Ba'ath party into power, which decided to support Al- Fatah in 
a much higher way than before. After this Fatah came entirely under 
Syrian control. The Fatah was not the only guerilla organization 
operating in Syria - there were various other militant groups such as the 
'Heroes of the return to the homeland', the 'Abd el Kader al Hussaini 
commando unit' etc. Initially, PLO under the leadership of Ahmad 
Shukairy, kept itself aloof from Fatah activities, though it had closer 
liaison with other small groups. Al-Asifa was the military branch of Al-
Fatah, The Syrians had an interest in provoking clashes between Jordan 
and Israel and used Fatah for this purpose. They were infiltrated to 
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Jordan and from there to Israel. Jordan and Lebanon were unwilling lo 
pennit Fatah to use their territory from which its commandos could 
attack and get into Israel easily. Both the governments accused Al-Asifa 
for damaging the cause of Palestine by adopting such militant posture 
against Israel. Towards the end of 1966, the initial inhibition of Egypt lo 
Al-Fatah faded away. In December 1966 Shukairy visited Damascus and 
extended Egypt's cooperation to Al-Fatah. At the same time PLC) head 
had developed enmity with Jordanian authorities. '^^  
Although Egypt appreciated Fatah for mounting its assaults on 
Israel from Syria, Lebanon or Jordan, but it strictly opposed the 
establishment of Fatah bases in Egyptian territory. By supporting 
militancy of Fatah against Israel, President Nasser wanted to achieve 
two objectives: Firstly, Nasser wanted to show his sincerity and concern 
in Palestinians' cause which received a jolt after Syria's accusations 
against him.^' Secondly, he wanted to keep Israel busy with these 
countries and Fatah since Egypt's direct involvement might lead to a 
militar>' showdown for which neither the Arab world nor his own 
country were prepared. 
With the passage of time PLO and Al-Fatah "'became weapons in 
the hands of revolutionary Arab states in their offensive against the 
reactionaries." ' Both these organizations played their roles in 
accordance with their sponsors' directions at least until the merger ol 
Fatah into PLO under the leadership of Yasser Arafat in the following 
years of 1967 Arab- Israeli war. 
The Fidayeen (as Palestinian guerillas were called for) raids, 
despite their limited effect, created a sense of insecurity in Israel, 
especially among the Israelis living in remote areas in the North. Israel 
adopted a policy to retaliate by attacking Fidayeen bases, as well as 
public propert>' in Arab villages and towns across the border.'^' 
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Along the Syrian border, violence occurred with alarming 
regularity since Lebanon and Jordan prevented Al-Fatah from using 
their territor) as bases of operation. As a result, tldayeen found Syria as 
the available base to initiate their raids against their enemy. The Israeii-
Syrian situation became critical, on August 15, 1966 when conflict 
broke out on Lake Tiberias where both the countries fought a fierce 
battle with planes, artillery and patrol boats. Israeli leadership knew that 
Syria was deadly opposed to an Israeli plan to divert the Jordan River 
water to Israel for irrigation and industry. It was Syria, which put strong 
pressure and forced Arab governments to act. It also accused Nasser for 
his inaction and neglecting such an important problem which if n(>t 
tackled in time would hit Arabs' economy badly. Taking into 
consideration the main objective behind Syria's concern over Jordan 
water, Nasser called for the first Arab Summits Conference in Cairo in 
January 1964. In the same year, in September 1964, the second Summu 
Conference was held. Syrian pressure was the main force behind Arab 
initiatives taken in both the Conferences against Israeli plans. 
It was an open secret that by pressurizing Nasser to take a firm 
action against Israeli project, Syrians' desire to embarrass Egyptiar; 
President was more prominent than its anxiety over Arabs substantial 
loss. 
Regarding Israel's reprisal raids Lacquer has written that, "the 
targets were sometimes ill-chosen" and damage caused by such actions 
was beyond repair.^^ Before UN could succeed to subside Syro-Israeli 
tension '' a grave crisis developed between Israel and Jordan. In 
November 1966, Israel launched a full-scale attack against Jordanian 
village of As-Samu, suspecting Jordan the most suitable base for 
Guerilla activities. It was totally an unprovoked raid in which a number 
of unarmed Jordanian civilians had lost their lives and many others were 
no 
wounded/^ Israeli attack arose sharp reaction in both Arab world and 
UN. The Jordan tragedy undermined the position of King Hussein both 
within Jordan and within Arab world. Internal disturbances occurred 
which threatened Jordanian Monarchy. King Hussein accused Russians 
and Arab communists for such domestic trouble. Egypt and Syria 
criticized the king for his moderate attitude towards Israel and asked him 
to assume a much tougher stand. He was called a 'traitor" and a person 
"who had betrayed God, the Prophet and Palestine", by Ahmad Shukain.. 
the head of PLO. It was also alleged that his soft attitude to Arabs" 
enemy was the result of Western influence over him. The Soviet 
Union's harsh condemnation brought USA in a very embarrassing 
position. Israel's action did not receive much needed positive response 
from his people. A number of Israelis and even members of Mapai parl\ 
charged that Israeli premier; Levi Eshkol had ordered the assault maink 
to strengthen his own political position to hide the faulty economic 
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policies of his government. Despite Israel's warnings and her reprisal 
attacks neither border incidents nor infiltrations of Palestinians guerillas 
into Israel were stopped - an excuse given by Israeli government of its 
actions against Syria and Jordan. In continuation of its efforts to bring 
war with the Arabs, particularly with Egypt, Israel launched a massive 
attack on Syria on April 7, 1967. Syria suffered a heavy loss of lives and 
property because of the Israeli air assaults on Syrian villages. Israel 
claimed that it had destroyed six Syrian MIGs (Russian made) in this 
attack. Eshkol knew that if Syria was attacked with such an intensity 
Egypt's involvement was inevitable since Syria had concluded a mutual 
defense pact with Israel in 1966 at the persuasion of Soviet leaders.**' 
From the beginning of 1966 the Soviet Union developed an obsession of 
Israeli threat to the leftist regime in Syria and its preservation assumed 
highest priority in Soviet administration. 
After realizing that mere conclusion of defense pact in 1966 was 
not enough to deter Israel, Soviet Russia managed through its 
propaganda machinery to compel Egypt to perform more active role in 
Syrian-Israeli conflict. Syria under militant Ba'athist leadership was 
ver>' impatient to take revenge. But the Syrian knew that they could not 
fight Israel alone since Syria was too small and weak. Therefore, their 
strategy consisted in provoking Egypt to invade Israel. Although Jordan 
was the victim of Israeli assaults, it was reluctant to support Syria in her 
conflict with Israel. The reason behind Jordan's indifference was 
Ba'athists' encouragement of the forces that wanted to overthrow 
Hussein's regime. Egypt also came in Syrian category. The Israeli 
officials were continuously giving the Soviet Union and the Arab states 
the impression that an attack was imminent. The statement given b> 
Major General Yitzhak Rabin, ex-Chief of Defense Staff, on 10 Ma> 
1967 that his forces might attack Damascus and topple the Syrian 
regime, reinforced Soviet propaganda about Israel's intention. In this 
crisis situation the threatening statements given by Soviet leaders against 
Israel provided a chance to Israeli Foreign Minister Eban to persuade the 
United States "to make some fitting reply'" to Soviet moves. But the 
latter development proved that while trying to preserve and promote 
their own interests in the region both USA and USSR adopted a ver\ 
cautious attitude to avoid direct confrontation on behalf of their 
respective clients. 
However, their verbal assaults sparked the already hostile 
situation in the Arab world, which ultimately turned into a third round of 
Arab-Israeli war with dangerous repercussions for the years to come. In 
short it is very difficult and rather impossible to pin-point the forces that 
acted to ignite the June 1967 war because not only the Arab-Israeli 
factors but external pressures and influences contributed a lot in making 
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the relationship between the contenders more complicated particular!} 
East- West Cold war strategy, aimed at holding over the resources of 
West-Asian region and the mind of hs people. 
D. Egypt's Reaction, Involvement and Outcome: 
Inhially Nasser's reaction to Israeli harassment to Jordan and 
later to Syria in the years between November 1966 and April 1967 was 
definitely defensive in nature because he was not in favour of war with 
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Israel at this juncture. Egypt's economy was in a very poor shape and 
go 
about sevent>' thousand of its finest soldiers were involved in the v\ ar 
with Yemen, which was still going on. Nasser believed that despite his 
own country and Syria, had been receiving large amount of militarv 
equipments from the communist block, they were far behind as 
compared to Israeli military might. For years the Egyptian President 
cautioned the other Arab states not to be indulged with Israel in any such 
war. at least until they were fully prepared. He also anticipated United 
States' intervention in case Israel was attacked by Arab states. Nasser's 
prestige and position of leadership in the Arab world required Egypt's 
firm stand in favour of Arab victims of Israeli aggression, especiallv 
Syrians, with whom Cairo signed a defense pact in 1966. Israel's 
continuing threats and exaggerated Russian and Syrian reports through 
diplomatic and various other channels that Israel was building up her 
forces for a military attack on Syria on May 17, particularly to unseat 
Ba'athist regime in Damascus, changed the mood of the Egyptian 
President. Moreover, Nasser's Arab rivals, especially from Oman. 
Riyadh and Damascus made sarcastic remarks on him. He was branded 
as "a coward afraid of the Israelis"^^, unwilling to honour his pledges to 
Syrians in time of peril. In order to drag him into action. Israeli 
leadership also began to taunt that "he preferred to hide behind the skirts 
of the UN Emergency Force"*^ *^ , stationed in the Gaza Strip and Sharm-
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el-Sheikh. As a cumulative effect of such happenings Nasser's initial 
fear and reluctance faded away. For Nasser enough was enough. ()n 
May 15, he put his armed forces on alert and, on May 16, Egyptian arni) 
started its mobilization into the Sinai area. It was obvious that m 
presence of UNEF troops as a buffer between the Egyptians and Israelis. 
Egypt's armed forces could not act in support of Syria. Consequently, 
on May 18. Nasser formally called upon the United Nations to withdraw 
the entire UN emergency force from Egyptian territory. Following the 
withdrawal of UNEF, Nasser under pressure of Arab states, took another 
step, which hastened the likelihood of the third Arab-Israeli war. Nasser 
could hardly leave the straits open in the absence of UNEF for Israeli 
shipping. On May 22 Nasser announced that the state of Tiran and the 
Gulf of Aqaba would be henceforth closed to Israeli flag vessels, and to 
vessels of other countries carrying strategic goods to Israeli port of 
Eilat.'^ ' The Israeli's had fought for free passage through the straits in 
1957 and succeeded to achieve their aim with the help of United 
States.'^ '^  They regarded it as vital to their national survival. It had been 
one of the reasons for the Israeli attack on Egypt in 1956. Mohammad 
Heikal, F^ditor of the Al-Ahram, the semi official Cairo daily, wrote in 
his column that after the closure of the straits the war had become 
"inevitable.'"'*•' Anwar Sadat in his autobiography. In Search of Identit\. 
expressed the same view, with "the Tiran Strait closed, war became 
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certamty. 
Nasser was aware that Israel could not tolerate such a step, and 
might retaliate with military force. Nasser was confident enough of 
Soviet support if Egypt was attacked by Israel and especially in case of 
US intervention on her behalf. "He had seriously miscalculated and that 
his gamble would be costly."^^ Nasser was perhaps carried away by the 
general enthusiasm for war with Israel. President Nasser was very much 
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conscious about his image in the Arab world which he did not want to 
tarnish at any cost. Thus to help Syria in its predicament, to save his 
declining prestige and influence in the Arab region, to refute the charges 
that he was afraid of Israelis, Nasser was left with no choice but to take 
a high risk. For years Nasser had refused to come to the help of the 
Syrians, who used to provoke Israelis and invited trouble for themselves 
with regularity. After Samu and the raid of 7 April Nasser was getting 
irritated by repeated insulting taunts by his Arab rivals that Egypt was 
finished with the war in Yemen and economic crisis. Nasser's decision 
was not based on a rational calculation of the risks. "He acted in a fit of 
anger and annoyance." Nasser asked for a partial withdrawal of UNHf . 
U Thant's reply "All or nothing" made it impossible for him to retreat. 
Nasser's next move made the war a certainty. Laqueur has remarked 
that, "emotions has usually played a big part in his major policy 
decisions....often his improvisation had worked, but sometimes it 
didn't."'^ ^ 
Nasser had taken the first step; there was a very strong temptation 
to advance further, which he did not resist. In his strong urge, he forgot 
his own warnings, that the mistake of 1948 should not be repeated again, 
that war should be waged only when the Arabs would be prepared for it 
Nasser was over confident of Soviet backing and Egypt"s capability to 
defeat Israel, if not to destroy the Jewish state completely. Over 
confidence always created illusions. He also became a victim of his o\\ n 
illusions. 
Nasser miscalculated that Israel "was afraid because, in contrast 
to 1956, it could not count on Britain and France, while America was 
totally absorbed in Vietnam."^^ 
As the time rolled on, propaganda campaign for both sides 
intensified. It was a part of Arab psyche that they wanted to hear the 
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propaganda, which appealed to their emotions and desires most, contrar\ 
to the Israeli unemotional approach to accept even unpleasant realities. 
Until the closure of the Gulf, the Arab world had remained 
divided, but the news of blockade had the almost magical effect of 
uniting it. at least temporarily on the immediate issue. Nasser s 
leadership was at once re- established. As a result of optimism about 
eventual Arab victory Arab leaders had forgotten their rivalries. lhe\ 
expressed their willingness to fight a new battle with Israel under the 
leadership of Nasser. The most surprising and the most important was 
the visit of King Hussain of Jordan to Cairo - lately Cairo Radio's 
"Hashemite whore", "the CIA dwarf from Amman."^ *^  On May 28. 196" 
a defense agreement was signed between Egypt and Jordan and was 
announced on the same day. 
Shortly before the Suez war there had been a similar pact 
between Cairo and Amman, which was one of the reason of 1956 Israeli 
campaign against Egypt."" The defense agreement of May 28. 1967 also 
deepened Israefs fear for her security. A few days later. Iraq joined the 
alliance.'*^2 
Delegations began to arrive in Cairo from Syria, Algeria. Kuwait. 
Iraq and other countries. Offers of military support also came from 
Morocco, Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia. " 
The closure of straits of Tiran by Nasser provided a long awaited 
pretext to Israel to avoid worldwide condemnation for its decision to 
launch a war against the Arabs."''' Israel regarded the Tiran straits as 
vital for its national survival and hs closure as tantamount to a 
declaration of war. 
The sequence of events had shown that USA and Soviet Union in 
their competitive drive adopted policies which implied the conflicting 
states in West Asia to armed conflicts.'"^ Between 1964 and \9bl. 
America increased military and economic aids to the opponents of the 
Soviet Union and the adversaries of Soviet clients in the region. On the 
other hand Soviet Russia provided substantial war materials and loans to 
anti-Western Arab regimes particularly those of communist bent of 
minds. Their policies divided the Arab world into anti-Western and pro-
Western camps. Thus there had been antagonisms and rivalries between 
the Arabs and Arabs, and Arabs and Israel. For months signs warned 
that the West Asia was drifting towards crisis that might be converted 
into a major armed clash between the Arabs and Israel, but no serious 
effort was made by super powers to diffuse the tension. Regarding 
Western indifference to the rising Arab-Israeli hostility Kamal S. Abu 
Jaber quoted the observations of Rabbi Elmer Berger that, "both the 
British and the United States wanted Egyptian forces out of Yemen.""'^ 
They wanted to divert the attention of Nasser toward Israel whose 
military capacity and potential to beat the Arabs was proved twice. 
Although USA did not declare its overt support, its commitment 
to Israel's security and survival was not a hidden fact. Despite President 
Johnson's full sympathy with Israel, he intended to be neutral because of 
differing opinions in the Congress and, moreover, "the Pentagon was 
totally opposed to a second Vietnam in the Middle East.""*^ All 
opposing parties were of the view that "it would be more favourable to 
American relations with the Arabs and Russians for the Israelis to act on 
their own, therefore United States should not participate in a 
confrontation with Egypt."'°'* 
Eevi Eshkol, remembering the lessons of Sinai war of 1956, "was 
not only anxious to consult with the US before any major hosti]it\ but 
equally to acquire its prior approval."'***^ It was obvious to believe that 
Israel could not afford to repeat "the 1956 error of acting without an 
understanding with the American Government.""*^ 
The first official American reaction to the closure of the Gulf ot 
Aqaba came on 23"^  May, when President Johnson made his speech, in 
his address he reaffirmed the long-held American position that "the 
Gulf was "an international waterway" and said that "a blockade of 
Israeli shipping" was therefore "illegal." He further said that the "United 
States" would strongly oppose "aggression by anyone in the area, in an> 
fonn. overt or clandestine." President Johnson in his statement criticized 
the UN Secretary General, U Thant for his hasty decision to withdraw 
the UNEF even without consulting "either the General assembly or the 
Security Council." 
The Soviet government's statement of 23 May 1967 did not refer 
to Sharm el-Sheikh and the renewed blockade of Straits of Tiran at all. It 
merely criticized the Israeli statesman for their initiated threats to attack 
Syria and justified reactions of the Arab states against anticipated Israeli 
aggression. The statement also made it clear that: 
....let no one have any doubts about the fact that should 
anyone try to unleash aggression in the Near EasU he would 
be met not only with the united strength of the Arab countries 
but also with strong opposition to aggression from the Soviet 
Union and all peace loving states."' 
In view of Laqueur, "Perhaps the Egyptian in their eagerness 
misunderstood the nature of the Soviet undertakings.""^ 
Nasser in Press statement of 28 May 1967 justified his decision to 
make a request to Secretary General for the withdrawal of UNEF. 
He said: 
The UNEF came to our territory in the circumstances of the 
tripartite aggression, the disgraceful collusion which 
destroyed the moral and material reputation of all the 
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perpetrators....UNEF came to our territory- with our approval. 
and its continued existence here depend on this approval. We 
have now withdrawn our approval and the UN Secretar\' 
General responded faithfully, honestly, honourably to our 
request. 
Regarding the closure of Straits of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba he 
claimed that there are: 
....Egyptian territorial waters, and Egypt has the right of 
sovereignty over them.. ..every side will know its position. 
On 29 May, Nasser declared before the members of the UAR 
National Assembly that: 
....we are not only confronting Israel but also those who 
created Israel and who are behind Israel....The issue now at 
hand is not the Gulf of Aqabah, the Straits of Tiran, or the 
withdrawal of the UNEF, but the rights of the Palestine 
people. It is the aggression, which took place in Palestine in 
1948 with the collaboration of Britain and the United States. 
It is the expulsion of the Arabs from Palestine, the usurpation 
of their rights, and their property. It is the disavowal of all the 
UN resolutions in favour of the Palestine people.... 
He continued: 
we are not afraid of United States and its threats, of Britain 
and her threats, or of the entire Western world. The United 
States and Britain are partial to Israel and give no 
consideration to the Arabs....we must say that our enemy is 
not only Israel but also the United States and Britain. 
He pretended that Egypt was not alone: 
....the States that champion freedom and peace have 
supported us. 
He named India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, Malaysia, 
the Chinese People's Republic and the Asians and African states as 
Egypt's friendly countries, which supported it in time of crisis. 
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He mentioned War Minister, Shams Badran's visit to Moscow 
and Soviet premier Kosygin's pledge to Egypt in the following words: 
....the USSR supported us in this battle and would not allow 
any power to intervene until matters were restored to what 
they were in 1956. 
Whatever Nasser had said or done after 13 May 1967. it is 
evident that Syria and Soviet Union bore a large part of responsibilit) 
for his actions. Nasser's initial moves, "as many Western and even 
Israeli officials conceded""'* were meant to deter Israel and not to wage 
a war against Israel. 
He did not want his country's involvement in Syrian-Israeli 
contlict and was totally against war without prior planning and 
preparations. The Syrian- Soviet propaganda and constant bickering ot 
Arab leaders ignited the mind of revolutionary leader, which led him to 
act emotionally. 
After Nasser's announcement of the closure of the Gulf of Aqaba 
on May 22, 1967, US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. 
Eugene V. Rostow met with Ephrain Evron, a senior official of Israeli 
Embassy, and informed him about US stand which was obviously 
against the use of force as the first option. Rostow had previousK 
directed the US Ambassador in Tel-Aviv, Walworth Barbour, to ask 
Israeli Government to wait forty-eight hours before taking any action 
against Egypt. The Egyptian Government was also advised to show 
restraint in the arising situation by Rostow through diplomatic 
channel."" 
Like Nasser, Israeli Prime Minister, Levi Eshkol, was also facing 
a very tough time. There was a strong public outcry against the new 
blockade and hard liner political figures demanded a quick action. 
Before taking any action against Egypt, Eshkol wanted to be sure about 
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the cooperation of the Western powers, particularly United States. In 
order to achieve this end, Eshkol, sent his Foreign Minister Abba Fban 
to Paris, London, and Washington. The meeting with President de 
Gaulle and. Prime Minister Harold Wilson was less encouraging. He 
noticed a basic change in French policy and no help could be expected 
from that quarter. British stand was largely dependent upon US decision 
since it was no more in a position to act alone."^ In this sense, Ebbans 
meetings with US officials and finally with US President Lyndon B 
Johnson had a great significance as for as the future course of Israeli 
actions against the Arabs was concerned. Ebban was supposed to discuss 
the problem arising out of closure of the Gulf of Aqaba with President 
Johnson and US stand in this regard. As soon as Israeli Foreign Minister 
arrived in Washington he realized that Israel could not get what she 
wanted to get regarding the issue of closure of Straits of Tiran. After this 
realization the main thrust of his conversation with US high ranked 
officials remained the offensive build up of the Egyptian army on the 
Israeli border. Meanwhile, Israeli Ambassador Harman and Minister 
Evron informed Eban about the cable they had just received from the 
Prime Minister's office in Jerusalem. The message in cable indicated the 
danger of an imminent Egyptian attack on Israel. He soon conveyed the 
information to the US Secretary of State Dean Rusk who did not take it 
seriously by saying that "Egypt was not prepared to strike a quick 
blow.""^ "US military and intelligence official also made it clear that 
they did not expect the Egyptians to attack and that, even if they did, the 
Israelis would win."' Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad 
accused that: 'The CIA also played a major role opting for war; it 
assured Johnson that Egypt lacked any plans or preparations to attack 
Israel, and confirmed that Israeli forces could win the war.""*^ Perhaps 
President Johnson by receiving such reports from ver>' authentic sources 
had become relieved of his tension of suspected Congressional 
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opposition to any US action fearing it might create a "Second Vietnam" 
in west Asia.'^ *^ US secretary of State Dean Rusk and Robert Mc 
Namara. Secretary of Defense were also not in favour of the US taking 
any unilateral action. United States in cooperation with Britain tried to 
seek international support to meet Israeli demand by using United 
Nations platform. The US diplomatic efforts to find a solution failed 
because a lack of interest of majority of maritime powers and Israel"s 
uncompromising attitude, that "'nothing less than complete non-
interference" with Israeli shipping would be acceptable "to her." " 
Regarding this. Israel rejected all proposals presented by U Thant. UN 
Secretary General, Britain and others. At the time Eban arrived in 
Washington, President Johnson was in Montreal. When the President 
finally met Israeli Foreign Minister, he had shown his personal concern 
for Israel's interests. He emphasized several times that Israel could 
depend on him. "' In his conversation with Eban, Johnson did not sho\^ 
any sign that he took his advisors view seriously, that United States 
should not participate in Israeli-Egyptian confrontation. 
US President told Eban that Israel ''not be the one to bear the 
responsibility for any outbreak of war." "Israel will not be alone unless 
it decides to go alone."' 
The later events had shown that the unclear words used by 
Johnson were clearer to Israel than the clear words of the Pentagon. 
Congress and high ranked American officials of their opposition to US 
involvement in the present crisis of West Asia. Egyptian Foreign 
Minister Riad had reported that on 23 May, in a message to Premiere 
Kosygin, Johnson proposed the cooperation of the two countries in 
solving the dispute. He viewed that, '"Soviet Union actually played the 
role demanded of it by Johnson, and requested Egypt to refrain from any 
militar>' action. The Soviet Union, however, did not ask for a similar 
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commitment by the US that Israel would not undertake any militan 
action."'^" Johnson's appeal to Israel to refrain from any military action 
for a period of eighty-four hours was abided by Eshkol. It was alleged 
that "Johnson's maneuvers was aimed at freezing an Egyptian initiative 
as well as Soviet support." US President sent Charles Yost a Senior 
State Department official to Cairo, as his special envoy, to discuss the 
matter with Egyptian government. When Charles met Foreign Minister 
Riad. he was assured that Egypt "shall never begin an armed attack." " 
President Nasser accepted Anderson's proposal to send Vice-President 
Zakaria Mohieddin to hold talks with President Johnson on the Ciulf 
issue.'^^ Before Mohieddin's visit to Washington, which was scheduled 
for June 7.'^ *^  Israel initiated warfare on the morning of June 5. After the 
June war Egyptian government blamed that for its defeat, Soviet Unior 
was largely responsible which tied the hands of President Nasser b\ 
pressurizing him that Egypt should "not be the first to open fire" on the 
behest of America. It was alleged that while asking Egypt to exercise 
"self- restraint". USA did not with full sincerity put pressure on Israel to 
do the same.'^ *' 
However Arabs accusation were not totally baseless because it 
America did not help Israel directly, it indirectly encouraged Israel in 
her military adventure against the Arabs. 
E. The Outbreak of The Six-Day War: 
As the time went by, Israel became more and more impatient to 
strike since diplomatic efforts to diffuse the crisis on Israeli dictated 
terms were on the verge of collapse. With the news of Moshe Dayan"s 
appointment as the new Defense Minister, the chances of the Arab-
Israeli war had become certain. In the eyes of Israeli public, "he was a 
man of exceptional fighting spirit and great personal charm - the victor 
1^1 
of Sinai." Despite Nasser's private and public "bellicose 
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statements"'"'" and military moves, his decision to remove IJNEF from 
Egyptian territory and closure of Straits of Tiran, the doors were still left 
open for diplomatic solution for the existing crisis. 
However, it was Israel, not Egypt, who initiated war in the early 
hours of June 5. 1967 when its armoured forces moved into Sinai. The 
war was rapid and decisive; within six days Israel achieved a complete 
military victor\ over its Arab opponents. Israel made the first strike b\ 
attacking the airfields of Egypt, Jordan, Iraq and Syria, destroying large 
numbers of aircraft on the ground within a few hours and absolute 
command of the air was gained by Israeli Air Force from Sinai to 
Galilie. Thus effectively depriving the Egyptian and Jordanian ground 
forces of air cover, they proceeded quickly to take over the Sinai 
Peninsula and Gaza Strip. There were reports of fierce armoured battles 
in Sinai but Israeli forces were in position along the Suez Canal on 8 
June: they reconquered Sharm-el-Sheikh without armed opposition. On 
the morning of 5'*^  June, the Israelis sent a diplomatic message to King 
Hussein that if his forces kept peace, Jordan would be immuned from 
attack. Hussein refused to abide and as a resuh Jordan lost Old (Arab) 
Jerusalem and the West bank on 7'^  June. Their main forces destroyed. 
President Nasser and King Hussein accepted a ceasefire on 8 June. 
Having destroyed the Syrian air force, Israel did not attack that countn, 
on land. The condition of Northern front remained relatively calm until 
9'^  June. Syria, which had played a prominent role in creating the crisis. 
had not shown such valour when the war erupted in reality.'^^ Defense 
Minister Dayan was reluctant to go further in case of Syria since it had 
special meaning to Russia. He did not want to provoke Soviet Union by 
the advancement of Israeli forces in her favourite Arab state. Syria had 
not thrown its army in the war except shelling the Israeli Kibbutizm 
from the hea\7 Syrian fortified positions on the Golan Heights: A 
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powerful lobby in Israeli government opposed Dayan"s view and 
favoured an offensive against Syria. Moreover, Israel received hints that 
some US officials also would not mind punishing Syria for its role sn 
instigating the war. They did not want Syria let go undefeated. On the 
night of 8/9, Defense Minister changed his opinion and ordered an 
offensive against the Golan Heights. 
After the lost of heights Syria accepted a ceasefire on 9 June but 
Israel ignored it until 10 June, by which time its forces were in 
possession of Quneitra on the road to Damascus. The 'Six Day War', a^  
it came to be known, was over by 11 June 1967, but it did not bring an> 
political solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and therefore, added man} 
new explosive issues to it. 
The June war of 1967 was a watershed in the histor> of Arab 
Israeli conflict. Within six days, the Israeli army conquered all Palestine 
(including the West Bank of Jordan and the Gaza Strip), the Sinai 
Peninsula in Egypt and the Golan Heights in Syria. One major territorial 
gain for Israel was the capture of the old Arab city of Jerusalem. Israel 
took no time to make efforts to annex and integrate the former Jordanian 
sector into Israeli Jerusalem, and Israeli leaders repeatedly announced 
they v/ould never give up this territory. With the occupation of the 
remaining part of Palestine by Israel, Palestinians' issue v^as no more an 
issue since Palestine ceased to exist. The Arab states that were never 
serious to solve the Palestine question and used it merely as a pawn on 
the chessboard of Arab politics, became more indifferent. After the 
fateful June war. they regarded the restoration of the lost territories as 
their primary objective rather than to serve the cause of Palestinians in 
the subsequent peace process initiated by the world body. Palestinian 
started to realize that they could not regain their lost political identity 
through '"proxy armies and states."'^*' This was the turning point, which 
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brought about a radical change in PLO in terms of its composition, 
strategy and tactics. 
The result of June war stunned Nasser for a while but ver\ soon 
he recovered his balance. He realized that he had over-played his hand, 
trusting in the promises of the United States and Soviet Union. 
Accepting his responsibility for the outcome of 1967 war. President 
Nasser in a broadcast to the Egyptian people on June 9 announced his 
decision to step down. His emotional speech had a profound effect on 
Egyptians; it touched their hearts. Their faith in Nasser's leadership 
remained intact and he continued as a President with full support ot~ 
Egyptian People. 
F. The Role of The West During And After 1967 Arab-
Israeli War: 
It has already been emphasized that after the Suez war of 1956 
the power and position of Britain and France declined to a great extent 
and they were no more in a position to act independently in the major 
crisis of the world except to stand with the side of their powerful 
Western ally - United States of America. However, USA has been our 
main point of reference as far as the role of the Western powers in June 
war of 1967 and October war of 1973 is concerned. Britain and France 
had played a very limited role in the Arab-Israeli conflict after their 
departure from the West- Asian region particularly after Suez debacle. 
As important members of the Western block their role has been 
minimized up to the limit of the United Nations Organization. US policy 
before and initial stage of June war was extremely cautious. For years 
United States had tried not to be too close, at least apparently, with 
Israel because "its national interest requires decent relations with the 
Arab world."'^'' USA knew it well that Palestine question had remained 
very sensitive and emotional to all the Arabs, irrespective of their 
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mutual differences and rivalries. Besides injustice, which was done lo 
the Palestinians in 1948, Arabs had not forgotten the humiliation they 
themselves had suffered at the hands of Israelis. They never reconciled 
themselves to the existence of Israel. US-Egyptian relations deteriorated 
because of Nasser's Soviet backed intervention in Yemen, fhe 
importance of a friendly relationship with Saudi Kingdom and access to 
Saudi oil led US to oppose Nasser's military involvement in the Yemen 
civil war. The United States misjudged the extent of Egyptian bitterness 
of her refusal, to continue the wheat shipments, which Egypt needed 
most. The US had chosen a very harder course. It intended to be friendly 
to both the Arabs as well as Israelis. The events following Israel's attack 
on her neighbours on June 5 1967 had clearly shown US partial attitude 
towards the Arabs. The American official statement committing to 
protect the territorial integrity of "all" nations in the Middle East, in 
reality worked only to the advantage of Israel not to the Arabs. Aftet 
Nasser's declaration of closure of Straits of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba for 
Israeli shipping. United States and Britain emphatically condemned him 
and supported Israeli claim over those waterways. They even advocated 
the taking of international action to uphold the right of free passage 
through the Straits without bothering to consult the International Court 
of Justice on such an important legal issue. In contrast, the grave 
injustice done to the people of Palestine never prompted any such 
emphatic protests or calls for international action. Their conscience 
remained silent over the plight of a million Palestinian Arabs 
dispossessed of their homes, their towns and their country. 
Although the immediate American official reaction to the 
outbreak of war was a declaration of "neutrality"'^ **, which was 
obviously in order to "neutralize" the Soviet Union. On the basis of 
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authentic reports, US President was confident enough that Israel could 
readily defeat the Arabs. 
His main concern was the Soviet Union, which he managed ver\ 
tactfully. As for Soviet Union, Arabs' defeat as well as their victory both 
would serve her interests in the region. Assured of American non-
intervention, the Soviet Russia proceeded to stop the war. Soviet vital 
interest in Damascus forced her to give few warnings to' '^  Israel but it 
never intended to invite confrontations with USA by attacking Jewish 
State. Soon after the outbreak of hostilities on 5 June USSR and USA 
made use of the "hot line" link to assure each other of their non-
involvement in the war. They used hot line on several occasions 
throughout the week. State Department quickly expressed its surprise at 
the Israeli action and denied its prior knowledge of such extreme 
decision. It had often been said that the war of 1967 was the result of 
Soviet miscalculations but it was not true in case of America. It wa;-
hard to believe that after the lesson of 1956, Israel could dare to launch a 
massive attack on Arab countries without the prior knowledge and 
consent of its greatest Western supporter.'"*' 
According to Itamar Rabinovich, "without formally endorsing 
such action, the Johnson administration communicated its views to 
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Israeli government through informal channels." Before attacking 
neighbouring Arab countries, it is believed that two things must had 
been cleared to Israelis. Firstly, they would not be the victims of their 
own act, as in the Suez war. Secondly, the Soviet Union would not 
intenene from the side of Arabs. Probably, Israel was assured that these 
two things would not happen in any case. The statement given by Robert 
J. McC loskey.'"*' US Department press officer that the United States was 
"neutral in thought, word and deed" disturbed the President Johnson so 
much that he ordered Secretary of State Rusk, to make a statement 
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distinguishing between neutrality and indifference. Dean Rusk made tiie 
following statement: 
I want to emphasize that any use of this word "neutral", which 
is a great concept of international law, is not an expression of 
indifference and, indeed, indifference is not permitted to us 
because we have a great heavy obligation under the United 
Nations Charter, and especially as one of the permanent 
members of the Security Council, to do everything we can to 
maintain internal peace and security.''*^ 
US hypocrisy in showing her anxiety over the developments 
which led to the June war was soon exposed when the American 
delegates at UN took the lead in supporting many of Israeli stands and 
working to defeat those resolutions which were not compatible to her 
objectives.'^^ Johnson was speaking of "territorial integrity" again and 
again during and after the June war. "In the Security Council debates, 
the American delegation proved neither neutral, nor supporting the 
integrity of those who lost." America wrongly assumed that she could 
fool all the Arabs all the time. Arabs suspicion that United States and 
Britain were backing Israel in her nefarious act, converted into a finn 
belief. Although, these allegations were denied by London and 
Washington. Their direct involvement was not proved, but US 
reluctance was of course the result of its engagement with Vietnam, and 
Britain could not act alone. The Arabs humiliating defeat had 
repercussions directly affecting their relations with the West. In 
retaliation certain Arab states shunned all ties with United States. Britain 
and West Germany and several also stopped oil shipments to them.'**^  
But an Arab embargo on oil exports was soon withdrawn by decision of 
the Arab Summit Conference at Khartoum in August-September. 
1967. It is evident that United States, which was seen with respect in 
West Asia, since it had no colonial past, never regained that reputation 
after June war of 1967. The remarks of high ranked US officials like 
129 
Secretan' of State Dean Rusk quoted in newspapers that Americans 
were "quite happy" and "pleased" to see Israel to win the war and that 
her victory was also "quite a victory of the West", proved that USA was 
not neutral in word or thought.''*^ The sailing of powerful US Sixth Fleet 
and British war ships closer toward the scene of battle was an enough 
guarantee to reduce the likelihood of Soviet military intervention in the 
war.'"^ ** On June 8, 1967, clearly marked US ship Liberty, torpedoed b\ 
the Israelis was only 15 miles away from Sinai Peninsula. It was later 
admitted that the ship was spying and if so, surely it was in a position lo 
know what was going on.'^' Even thirty-four Americans lost their lives 
and seventy-five were wounded, but it did not affect the US pro Israeli 
policy. Moreover, US maneuvering in the United Nations to delay ihe 
proceedings in the Security Council to secure a ceasefire resolution ga\ e 
Israel the few additional hours to complete its objectives. Regarding 
tactics applied to delay the ceasefire resolution Kemal S. Abu-Jaber had 
quoted Syrian ambassador that "he wondered aloud whether Mr. 
Goldberg worked for the United States or for Israel" in the UN.'^" 
However, the confusion regarding the exact nature of I'S 
commitment to Israel had become quite clear to the world and 
particularly to the Arab world in the subsequent years of the 1967 war. 
United States' role during and after the war in and outside of United 
Nations exposed the hollowness of its slogan of "impartiality" in case of 
the Arabs. 
G. United States Pro-Israeli Stand in The United Nations: 
Soon after the outbreak of war on the morning of June 5. the 
United Nations Security Council was convened which remained in 
almost constant session till June 14*, 1967. Inifially. Israel misguided 
the President of the Security Council, Hans R. Tabor (Denmark), about 
the facts. "In plain disregard of the truth", Israeli delegation informed 
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Tabor that an Egyptian land and air attack had been launched against 
Israel, whose armed forces were engaged in repelling it. Twenty minutes 
later, the President of the Security Council was informed b\ the 
Egyptian Permanent Representative to the UN, el Kony, that an Israeli 
attack had been launched against Egypt, which was defending itself ' 
But Israel could not fool the world for long. The reality had become 
known to the world very soon. 
Hurriedly convened UN Security Council could not get the 
"ceasefire' resolution passed immediately because of divergent 
approaches adopted by the delegates of the United States and the Soviet 
Union. Beside 'ceasefire', Soviet Russia wanted condemnation of Israel 
as an "aggressor" and demanded withdrawal of its forces behind the 4 
June borders. While United States supported Israel's demand that an\ 
request for a ceasefire must be unconditional, it also did not allow the 
world body to hold Israel as an aggressor. After about thirty-six hours 
hectic diplomatic activity, the United States prevailed upon the Security 
Council to secure a simple ceasefire resolution, submitted by President 
1 abor, on June 6 without fixing the time limit for its implementation. 
Realizing the hopeless military position of the Arabs, and Israeli air 
victory in the war, Soviet Union later agreed to support the resolution 
S/7935 that called upon the "governments concerned", as a "first step", 
to take "forthwith" all rneasures for an immediate "ceasefire""^ 
Initially Arab refused to accept 'ceasefire' resolutions of the Secunt} 
Council because their demands for unconditional withdrawal of the 
conquered land by Israel and to brand her as an "aggressor" were not 
met. But eventually, realizing their desperate military position, first 
Jordan and then Egypt on June 7"" and June 8^ '' respectively accepted 
ceasefire. Israel who had consented to it on June 7"" on the condition that 
all Arab belligerents also accepted and abide by it agreed to halt. 
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Although Syria agreed to a ceasefire on June 9, fighting between Israel 
and Syria continued. It came to close by the evening of June 11 when 
both sides agreed to and abide by the fourth ceasefire resolutions passed 
by the Security Council.'^^ Soviet Union took serious efforts in the I N 
to stop Israeli advances in Syria. It convened a hasty summit conference 
of the Warsaw Pact member states on June 9 to consider the dangerous 
situation in West Asia. The representatives of the member countries 
issued threatening statements against Israel and gave warnings of grave 
consequences in case it did not stop her militarv operations. Moreover, 
on June 11. USSR and her allies broke off their diplomatic relations 
with Israel. It also introduced a draft resolution in which Israel was 
again condemned for her aggressive activities. On the same day 
Premiere Kosygin used the "hot-line" again and accused Israel for non-
obedience of Security Council resolutions for a cease-fire. United States, 
knowing the special concern of USSR to its favourable client in W est 
Asia, pressurized Israel to stop "before the Russians felt it necessar> to 
intei'vene. 
The Arabs, with Russian backing were trying hard to regain at 
the United Nations what they had lost on the battlefield. Soviet Union's 
decision to support the resolution S/7935 on June 6 had extremely 
disappointed the Arabs. Aware of their resentment, Soviet Russia 
repeated its demands in the Security Council to achieve the Arabs' cause 
when the war came to a halt on all fronts. These demands were rejected 
on 14 June by the Security Council. Soon after capturing Jordanian Old 
city of Jerusalem General Dayan declared that "We have returned to the 
holiest of our holy places, never to depart from it again."'^ *^ Having 
strongly believed on US backing, Israeli Premiere Levi Eshkol made a 
detailed statement on the question of returning to pre-June 5^ ^ position 
on 12 June. He said: 
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We cannot return to 1949-armistice agreement and 
boundaries determined by those agreements. Those 
agreements and boundaries had given Israel no real security 
in the past, and most Israelis obviously felt that by winning 
the war they had earned the right to new and more secure 
frontiers. Be under no illusion that the slate of Israel is 
prepared to return to the situation that reigned to a week 
ago The position that existed until now shall never again 
return. The land of Israel shall no longer be a no man's land 
wide open to act of sabotage and murder.'''' 
Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban, was also reported to express 
the same view that Israel would not return to the armistice lines even if 
the General Assembly demanded it by a vote of 121 to 1.'^ ^ On June 5. 
the day the war began the same Israeli officials (both Prime Minister 
Eshkol and Defense Minister Dayan) declared on the Israeli radio that 
Israel's war aims did not include territorial aggrandizement.'^' Israel's 
change of war aims should be seen in the light of President Johnson "s 
television address in Washington on 19 June making it clear that 
"United States would not press Israel to retreat from her territorial gains 
without Arab diplomatic concessions." Johnson's pro-Israeli 
statements and US draft resolutions representing the Zionists point of 
views encouraged the aggressor to adopt an arrogant and non-
compromising posture to the UN peace efforts. After Israeli conquest in 
June war of 1967, American attitude was viewed by the Zionists "as a 
simple rectification of that Eisenhower mistake."'^^ However, neither 
the American nor the Soviet draft resolutions could be approved by the 
Security Council because both powers were pursuing contradictor} 
objectives. The position of the Soviet Union was very embarrassing 
since it stood on the side of the vanquished party. After having failed to 
obtain Security Council approval for Soviet resolutions, the Kremhn 
called for a special emergency session of the General Assembly, hoping 
of a favourable vote from the majority of Afro-Asian and East European 
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members of the world body. Despite United States and Israeli opposition 
Soviet Union succeeded in convening the Fifth Special Session of the 
General Assembly on 17* June. On 19* June the Soviet Premiere. 
Alexei Kosygin, personally moved a draft resolution, which beside other 
things demanded that Israel "make good in full" all damages inflicted, 
and appeal to the Security Council to take "immediate and effective 
measures in order to eliminate all consequences of the aggression." 
This resolution was rejected by the General Assembly on 4^  July. 
During his visit to New York to participate in special session of General 
Assembly, Premiere Kosygin met President Johnson and presented the 
Soviet and Arabs views on the present situation of West Asia in two 
separate sessions on 23 June and 25 June at Glassboro, New Jersey.' 
Since both the leaders "were interested in different subjects""''' 
Glassboro Summit did not produce any encouraging results. 
A "compromise draft" introduced by Yugoslavia on behalf of 
seventeen non-aligned states and herself, which, insisted on full 
withdrawal by Israel, but refrained from condemning the latter as an 
aggressor, also failed to receive the required two-thirds majority. The 
Latin American draft proposal'^^ called for Israeli withdrawal, the 
solution of refugee problem, and internationalization of Jerusalem and 
suggested various political proposals relating to the freedom of passage 
through the international waterways was also defeated. Israel was happy 
that neither proposal calling for her withdrawal succeeded in recei\ ing 
the required majority support. The US chief delegate Arthur Goldberg, 
fimily opposed Soviet and Yugoslav proposals. In his counter draft 
resolution against Russia, he repeated the idea of "negotiated 
arrangement with appropriate third party assistance."'^'^ 
America wanted peace but on Israel's dictated terms, which were 
unacceptable to the Arabs and opposed by their sympathizers. 
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The Johnson administration through Ambassador Arthur (ioldberg at 
first supported the basis of Israeli position, but the President and key 
administration officials were disappointed by the virtual Israeli 
annexation of East Jerusalem in July. Annexation of the Old City of 
Jerusalem by Israel was a matter of grave concern for the White House 
and the State Department because Jerusalem's special status as a city 
equally sacred to Christians, Jews and Muslims was recognized by ihe 
whole world. The resolufion [A/RES/2253/(ES-V)] which called upon 
Israel to resend her annexation of Jordanian Old City of Jerusalem v\ as 
passed with overwhelming majority of 99 in favour and none against it 
in General Assembly, had shown the seriousness of the question. The 
other resolution, which was passed by the General Assembly dealt with 
various humanitarian and refugee problems.''^ *' 
After having failed to obtain a successful withdrawal resolution 
either in Security Council or in General Assembly Special Session. 
summoned by Soviet Union herself, Soviet Foreign Minister Mr. Anderi 
Gromyko desperately decided to seek a compromise proposal w ith the 
cooperation of the United States. To achieve this end, various secret 
meetings took place between Arthur Goldberg, the US ambassador to 
UN and Gromyko, between 12-21 July. The two representafives of the 
rival powers had reached virtual agreement on a compromise resolution 
Such a resolution involved Arab acceptance of the existence of Israel 
besides other proposed demands. Obviously it was rejected b} the 
Arabs. As a result of deadlock in the General Assembly session due to 
divergent positions, Soviet Union joined the United States in voting for 
a resolution, which adjourned the Assembly and requested the Security 
Council to take up the issue.'^' 
The US wanted that the Israel should withdraw but only on the 
fulfillment of certain conditions. Britain and Canada by adopting a 
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rather non-committed approach toward Israel recommended enlarged 
role of the UN in solving the current problem.'^ 
Britain asserted the view that according to the UN Charter, '"nar 
should not lead to territorial aggrandizement." It also warned Israel that 
if she annexed the Old City of Jerusalem, she would "not only isolate" 
herself from "world opinion" but would make it more difficulf to 
achieve final peace with the Arabs.'^"' Prior to the outbreak of war. 
France's President Charles de-Gaulle had declared that his countrv 
would firmly oppose the aggressive party. He "stood fast by his pledge" 
after the war.'^ '* "Together with India, France sponsored a draft 
resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal ot 
Israeli forces to 4* June positions while "the US stood alone in opposing 
any reference to Israeli withdrawal, and employing all the pressure and 
delaying tactics at its disposal to secure the end." Nasser appreciated de-
Gaulle's firm stand "against Israeli intransigence" and wished thai 
perhaps more Western countries could do the same. 
The strenuous efforts made by the Arabs and Soviet delegates t(> 
seek the UN support for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal o\ 
Israeli forces from the occupied territories in the June war of 196"' 
failed. They also failed to hold Israel responsible for the outbreak of war 
by the UN Organization. Their demand of compensation for damage^ 
inflicted on Arab countries had also been dismissed. But after months oi 
behind the scene diplomafic wrangling, in Assembly and Council, the 
Permanent Representative of Britain, Lord Caradon, who had better 
relations with Cairo than did the United States, and because of hi 
previous experience in the West Asia, succeeded in producing the final 
document known as Resolution 242. After the last minute hectic 
negotiations, when the Security Council met for its crucial session on 
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November 22, 1967, British resolution was passed unanimously. 1 he 
substantial points of the Resolution 242 are given below: 
1. Withdrawal of the Israeli troops from occupied Arab territories in 
the current war. 
2. End of state of belligerency among the disputants in order to 
establish a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. 
3. Guarantees of freedom of navigation through international 
w aterways in the area. 
4. Progress towards settlement of refugee problem. 
5. Guarantees of freedom of navigation through international 
waterways in the region. 
6. Acknowledgement of Sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
political independence of every state in the area through measures 
including the establishment of demilitarized zone. 
7. Appointment of a United Nations Special Representative to 
render his good offices in bringing the protagonists closer to a 
peaceful settlement in accordance to Resolution 242. 
The resolution was largely based on five-point peace plan 
proposed by President Johnson on 19 June 1967. 
On November 23, UN Secretary General, U. Thant appomted 
Swedish ambassador to Moscow, Dr. Gunner Jarring, a diplomat with 
Middle East experience, as special representative to supenist the 
implementation of resolution 242 agenda. He began his mission in 
December 1967 but despite his considerable talents and experience w. 
various capacities he achieved very little success in the direction o! 
peaceful settlement of current Arab-Israeli dispute.'^^ Jarring spent hi-
time and energy to break the deadlock but Israel continued to insist or 
direct talks with individual Arab countries and on the necessit\ Uv 
boundary alteration. Despite flexible attitude adopted by Jordan, and to 
some extent by Egypt, Israel did not relax her terms and conditions to-
peaceful settlement of the crisis. The only country that could apph. 
considerable pressure on Israel was the United States. There were sign'^ . 
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however, of some change in US attitude, which indicated ner 
willingness to improve relations with the Arab world. In November 
1968, Secretary of State, Dean Rusk took few initiatives to achiexe this 
end, but since Johnson Administration was going to complete its term 
very soon. Rusk interest in pressing his diplomatic efforts faded awa\ 
United States wanted to prevent the escalation of Soviet influence, 
which had become more imminent after June war. Behind the adoption 
and its approval by all the 15 members of the Security Council of the 
draft resolution submitted by Lord Caradon, US permanent ambassador 
at UN Arthur Goldberg played a leading role. He met separately with the 
Egyptian, Jordanian and Israeli delegates and gave indication that his 
country would not leave the Arabs on the mercy of communist alone. It 
was the time when Washington realized that it would lose the chance in 
the Arab world forever if some sort of compromising formula was not 
found, sooner or later. According to Steven, "Whatever the final 
sponsorship. Resolution 242, was the Johnson administration's finest 
achievement in Arab-Israeli diplomacy."'^" Despite the ambiguous 
language of the resolution, which lent itself to varying interpretations b} 
the Israelis and Arabs, it remained the key document settling forth the 
basis for "Just and lasting peace in the Middle East'' in future. 
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Chapter - IV 
THE PRE-1973 WAR PHASE: UNSUCCESSFUL 
EFFORTS OF THE MAJOR POWERS TO 
ESTABLISH PEACE IN WEST ASIA. 
A. Failure of UN Peace Mission: US Deception and 
Hypocrisy: 
Although international efforts to resolve the issues of 1967 war 
were both numerous and persistent, they could not achieve "'a just and 
lasting peace between Israel and the Arab states.'" Resolution 242, which 
was the product of hard bargaining and compromises among the 
permanent members of the Security Council, provided the basis for a 
peaceful settlement of the dispute between the combatants of June war, 
however failed to achieve that end in time. The result was the outbreak 
of 1973 war. which was started by the Arabs themselves. Beginning in 
December 1967, Gunner Jarrings peace mission failed to secure 
implementation of Resolution 242 because of non-compromising 
attitude adopted by both sides, particularly by Israel who refused to 
accept the principle of withdrawal.' As a result of this impasse, Jarrings 
could not continue his mediation efforts and returned to Moscow, which 
led to a resumption of hostilities between Israel and Egypt in March 
1969. This was the beginning of what came to be known as the "War o1 
Attrition" by Egypt. Realizing the inability of UN to act effectively 
without the co-operation and support of the major powers. U. Thant 
turned to 'Big Four' (the United states, Russia, France and Britain) to 
seek their active involvement. Originally this idea was proposed b\ 
French President General de-Gaulle. By requesting the 'Big Four'. U. 
Thant wanted practical application of de-Gaulle's idea who emphasized 
the necessity to reach a clear cut agreement on peace in the West Asian 
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region among the four major powers on the basis of which the '• IN 
representative would act/ Although, At the end of war it was proved 
that the United Nations succeeded in bringing military hostility to an 
end, it could not play an effective role in the establishment of peace in 
the region, largely because of the serious split between Russia and the 
United States over the issues under discussion. They often used their 
veto power against each other's draft proposals in the Security Council. 
Ihis practice rendered the Council defunct. It is true that before, during, 
and immediately after the war there was no change whatsoever in the 
basic commitments of the US to the preservation of Israeli integrity' and 
its interests in the region. As a result US prestige had suffered a lot in 
the Arab world. 'Unlike Eisenhower, Johnson did not pressurize the 
Israelis to withdraw unconditionally.'^ US rapprochement with the 
Arabs, which developed after the Suez war of 1956 proved short-lived. 
In Johnson's administration, many key officials, including the President 
himself, were greatly supportive to Israel. Yet, they were also interested 
in preserving relations with the Arab countries and in maintaining peace 
or at least stability in the region. USA faced a great dilemma in its 
'Middle East' policy that how to reconcile the conflicting demands of 
the two people. One for which it had self interested commitment and the 
other for which it. as a champion of human rights and liberties had 
moral international obligation. The Johnson administration had been 
much criticized in the Arab world for its three prominent Jews: Arthur 
Goldberg - US Ambassador to UN, Eugene V. Rostow - Under 
Secretar}' of US and Walt Rostow - US National Securit>' Advisor.'' 
When Richard Nixon assumed office on 20 January 1969, American 
relations with the Arab world were at a very low ebb and he was 
determined to improve them. Nixon and his national security advisor. 
Henr\ A. Kissinger despite his being a Jew, seriously realized the need 
to formulate a 'balanced' policy to deal with problems in West Asia. 
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Contrary to the passive foreign policy of Johnson's administration 
towards West Asia and his dependence on the UN special representative. 
Gunner Jarring, in dealing with Arab-Israeli conflict, Nixon favoured an 
active policy and an independent role of America in this regard. After 
1967 US involvement in West Asia increased but global considerations 
and problems elsewhere distracted Nixon and Kissinger. The dichotomy 
between perceived importance and time available for attention remained 
a major problem throughout Nixon's first term.^ No President can ignore 
domestic politics. Nixon, however, was also influenced b\ domestic 
pressures. The Democratic Congress repeatedly criticized administration 
policies toward Israel and pro-Israeli congressional forces emerged as a 
domestic constraint that could not be ignored in the policy process. 
Nixon's delay in selling Jerusalem increased number of Phantom jets 
and other military aid in 1969 and 1970, and Secretary of State Roger's 
Plan (which did not satisfy Jewish aspirations) to settle the Arab-Israeli 
dispute led to much public criticism. Nixon often pretended that he was 
free of domestic constraints but in reality he did not seem to justify his 
claim. From the outset of his administration Nixon "plarmed to direct 
foreign policy from the White House." Nixon's "president-centered 
approach"^ was responsible for giving an upper hand to his security 
adviser in foreign affairs. Kissinger often acted as a second secretary of 
state, the role that he performed in Nixon's first term. The appointment 
of William P. Rogers as the actual Secretary of State was specially based 
on his negotiating skills - but neither Rogers nor Kissinger assumed 
office with experience in the Middle East problems. Both had different 
policy approaches in the area. The Secretary of State's strategy was 
regional. Rogers regarded Israelis as the major impediment and was 
prepared to withhold arms' shipments to extract concessions from Israel. 
His concern with Russia was secondary to the immediate goal of an 
Arab-Israeli settlement. Contrary to his approach, Kissinger saw foreign 
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affairs in global perspective, viewing the Middle East in light of the 
conflict with the USSR and other continuing problems, such as Vietnam 
and relations with the Third World. Central to Kissinger's polic\ were 
reducing Soviet support for Arab ambitions and expelling the Russians 
from primary involvement with key states. He shared Israeli view that 
only through strength in Washington and Jerusalem could the Western 
position improve in the area. Kissinger's Jewish background was less 
responsible for his determination to serve Israel's interest than his 
rivalry with Rogers who due to his legal training was bound to see the 
Arab case on the basis of justice rather than other considerations. During 
Nixon's tlrst term, professional rivalry between Kissinger and Rogers 
remained a dominant factor in US dealing with Arab-Israeli conflict.' 
Nixon appointed Charles Yost, a professional diplomat with previous 
experience in the Middle East, as the American Ambassador to UN. 
Yost and Rogers, both favoured a conciliatory and accommodative 
attitude toward Soviet Union and countries aligned with the Kremlin. 
Kissinger had different perspectives for the solution of Arab-Israeli 
problems in which reduction of Soviet influence was the primar> 
condition. Nixon wanted to revive relations with the Arab countries but 
also sought the cooperation of Israel in his effort to eliminate Soviet 
influences throughout the region. In order to achieve this end he took 
Israel to be more central to American interests and more seriously 
expected Israeli cooperation in return for its generous support. Nixon 
justified his leaning toward Israel by saying that, "our interests are 
basically pro-freedom and not just pro-Israel because of the Jewish vote. 
We are for Israel because Israel in our view is the only state in the 
Middle East which is pro-freedom and an effective opponent to Soviet 
expansion.""^ Israel was regarded as an asset rather than a liability to the 
West. During Nixon's first term Jerusalem sought to deal directly with 
the administration and was less dependent upon Jewish lobby for the 
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fulfillment of Israeli demands by America. For every concession, which 
US asked to Israel to give to the Arabs, Israelis wanted arms in return 
Nixon was the first President to develop close relationship with several 
Israeli leaders. There was a thorough understanding between Golda 
Meir. Israeli Prime Minister and US President. The other important 
figure in this category was Israeli ambassador in US Yitzhak Rabin who 
happened to be a personal friend of Nixon. In Nixon's view, that was 
obviously Kissinger's view that conditions for promoting an Arab-
Israeli agreement demanded American and Israeli demonstrated strength 
against Russia ands Arab states. His concern over the Soviet Union as a 
key challenge to American interests, combined with growing intense 
relations with Israel and an urge for new overtures to individual Arab 
states led to a more complex strategy than those pursued by Johnson's 
administration. The containment and elimination of Soviet influence had 
been, despite the progress towards detente and two powers and four 
powers talks for a regional settlement during 1969-1972, an implicit 
tenet of American policy. Nixon and Kissinger both had common 
perspectives. Nixon regarded Soviet Union as the victor in the Six-Dav 
war since communists became Arabs' friends and the Americans their 
enemy." The United States wanted peace in the area but Arabs were 
supposed to pa\ the price for it. It wanted a settlement but on its own 
dictated terms and conditions which obviously favoured Israeli interests. 
Although various efforts were taken by Rogers, Yost and Joseph Sisco. 
US Assistant Secretary of State, for Near-Eastern and South Asian 
affairs.'' Nixon and Kissinger were apparently reluctant to press a 
settlement until Russia had been weakened. Moreover, Kissinger did not 
want to let Rogers take the credit for establishing peace in the region. 
Nixon's decision to send a senior republican politician William 
Scranton. former Governor of Pennsylvania, on a fact finding mission to 
the Middle East was motivated, beside other things, to introduce the 
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people of the region with his new "evenhanded" policy. After visilinii 
various countries of the area he got the view that the situation was 
"extremely explosive." He gave this report to the President elect in the 
presence of his Secretary of State designate, William Rogers and 
National Security Advisor designate, Henry Kissinger. His emphasis on 
more "evenhanded'" policy than before in the area and his suggestion 
that the United States should '"take into consideration the feeling of all 
persons and all countries in the Middle East and not necessarily espouse 
one nation over some other" was interpreted by the people of the region. 
particularly by Israelis, as a new pro-Arab approach adopted b\ 
America. ' Later, talking to media Scranton made it clear that the US 
would continue its strong commitment to Israeli security, while taking 
better accounts of Arab needs in order to avoid further Soviet progress 
in the Arab world. Israeli leadership and pro-Israeli lobby in USA had 
shown their concerns over former governor's remarks, which led 
Nixon's aide Ronald Ziegler, to declare dissociation of the President 
elect from Scranton's statements.''* Whatever Nixon intended b\ 
dissociating himself from the ex-governor's remarks, it gave a clear 
message to the Arabs that United States' pro-Israeli approach was not 
going to change even after the change of Johnson's administration. Tht 
Americans in moving the Rogers' proposals for the settlement of th(. 
Arab-Israeli disputes after 1967 war, were largely motivated b> thesr 
own self interest. Rogers plan was a political move aimed at softenmg 
the Arab attitude towards the United States. Nixon, in his memoir^ 
himself admitted that: 
I knew that the Roger plan could never be implemented but ' 
believe that it was important to let the Arab world know that V.K 
United States did not automatically dismiss its care regarding tht 
occupied territories or rule out a compromise settlement of thi 
conflicting claims. With the Roger's plan on record 1 thought i 
would be easier for the Arab leaders to propose reopening with ir i 
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United States without coming under direct attack from tiie iiavvl<^  
and the pro-Soviet elements in their countries. 15 
B. Arab Diplomatic Offensive: Khartoum Summit and 
Outcomes: 
During the month of July 1967 a number of Arab Heads of State 
arrived in Cairo in order to fmd out a common strategy to deal with the 
consequences of their military defeat.'^ Algerian President 
Boumedienne also arrived to participate in the discussion. Differences 
occurred among them regarding the future plan of action, which the\ 
were bound to take in the prevailing situation. King Hussain of Jordan 
was the first Arab leader who showed increasing sign of realism in his 
approach. He took initiative to call an early summit meeting of all Arab 
leaders and urged upon them more rational and flexible attitude in 
dealing with the emerged situation. He was of the view that the Arabs 
could not afford to take a very tough stand in the prevailing 
circumstances. He tried to bring Nasser and other Arab leaders in his 
support and asked them to seek a pacific political settlement. The 
meetings which were held in Cairo during the middle of July between 
Nasser, Syrian President Nureddin al-Attasi, President Abdel Rahman 
Arif of Iraq. Algerian President Boumedienne, and Ismail al-Azhari. 
Chairman of the Sudanese Supreme Council of State, were not attended 
I H 
by King Hussain because he was not invited. Most probably his 
presence was avoided because of his lenient attitude and pro-western 
posture, which was likely to be disapproved by the hard liners. His 
efforts to bring about an early summit meeting and a unified Arab policy 
largely failed because of the split between hardliners and moderates. 
Presidents al-Attasi and Boumedienne with Ahmad Shukairi, Chairman 
of Palestine Liberation Organization opposed any idea of political 
compromise to regain captured territories in the six day war. Instead. 
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they urged the Arabs to launch guerilla warfare in order to keep the 
enemy off balance and force it to give up the conquered Arab land. They 
strongly opposed any relaxation in the existing oil embargo and 
economic boycott against the United States, Britain and other countries 
favouring Israel. On the basis of hint given by President Nasser in 
favour of Hussain, Ismail al-Azhari of Sudan called for a summit 
meeting, which was finally held in Khartoum at the end of August. 
Mohd. Riad, Egyptian Foreign Minister, gave an account of Nasser's 
gratefulness to King Hussain after 1967 war: 
Nasser was deeply impressed by how King Hussein of Jordan 
had stood shoulder to shoulder with him during the war 
which, with his limited forces and lack of aerial cover, had 
cost him the whole of the West Bank. He later received the 
King in Cairo while on his way to the United Nations to tell 
him that Egypt was ready to share everything it had with 
Jordan, even it meant sharing the last loaf of bread between 
them.2<' 
Although Syria and Algeria, showing militant posture, did noi 
attend Khartoum summit, it proved a mixed success.^' The agenda 
before the conference, beside other things, included three main points: to 
consider political events after the ceasefire, to evaluate the Arab 
weaknesses, and to formulate a long-term strategy for the future course 
of action. After four days of hectic activity, debate and discussion, Arab 
leaders finally adopted resolutions on various issues. They mutually 
consented on continued non-military struggle against Israel; lift the oil 
embargo on the West, UAR-Saudi Arabia agreement to end the civil war 
in Yemen and creation of Arab fund amounting 140 million pounds 
from the oil rich states of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya to assist the 
war torn economies of the UAR and Jordan.^ '^  Conference also argued to 
take "unified efforts at internal and diplomatic levels to eliminate the 
consequences of aggression and to ensure the withdrawal of aggressor 
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forces from Arab lands."" "' Taking into consideration the general Aran 
mood, the Conference decided that there must be "no negotiation with 
Israel"", "no peace with Israel", "no recognition of Israel"" and the rights 
of the people of Palestine would be maintained in their nations. The 
resolutions adopted on September 1^ ' gave a sign of increasing realism in 
the attitude of Arab moderates. Although Egypt had severed relations 
with America and maintained this policy even after Khartoum 
Conference. Nasser did not ask the other Arab states to do the same, 
especially those countries that were intimate to US. With this polic\ 
Nasser wanted to keep an Arab door open for dialogue with the US 
because only America was in a position to exert pressure on Israel t( 
give concessions to the Arabs. Encouraged by Egypt and other Arab 
states. King Hussain visited Bonn, Paris and Washington in order to 
seek Western support for the Arab cause and to press for action by the 
UN Security Council, which had become deadlocked over the Arab-
Israeli conflict. He also hinted that the Arabs were ready to adopt a "new 
and positive approach" and were willing to give a "great deal"" to bring 
about a solution to the current problem emerged as a result of June 
war.~ '^ Despite militant attitude of Syria, Algeria and members of PLC), 
the Khartoum Conference paved the way for moderate Arab leaders to 
seek political solution and to offer in exchange for their conquered 
lands, important concessions, short of actually recognizing Israel and 
negotiating formal peace treaties with her. The change of Arab attitude 
was explicit in the meeting of the General Assembly and through pro-
Arab states in the Security Council. The deterrent measures suggested in 
Iraqi Plan were accepted by Syria and Algeria but rejected by moderate 
Arab leaders particularly by oil producing countries. Before the 
Khartoum Conference took place, President Josef Broz Tito of 
Yugoslavia, a close friend of Nasser, took the initiative to visit Cairo. 
Damascus and Baghdad in mid August. While meeting with the Arab 
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leaders he emphasized the desirability of a political solution of the 
present crisis. At the end of his peace mission. President Tito gave 
certain suggestions in the form of a proposal known as Tito Plan. 
Although Tito Plan was not accepted but it succeeded in bringing about 
a positive change in Cairo's attitude which was apparent in Khartoum 
conference and, moreover it served as the starting point in the way of 
political solution within the framework of the United Nations.' 
Beside the peace efforts, which were made at the regional and 
international level, many incidents and some large scale clashes 
occurred along the Egyptian-Israeli and Jordanian-Israeli cease firt 
lines. The Arab-Israeli war of 1967 did not solve any of the basic issues 
involved between them, but it added new and complicated problems to 
the existing conflict. It intensified militancy of Palestinian guerilla 
organizations. The most important event that increased the popularit) 
and credibility of the commandos in general and Al-Fatah in particular 
was the battle of Karamah fought on 21 March 1968, near the Jordan 
River. The heroic resistance by the fedayeen in their first ever head-on 
confrontation with the powerfiil, much larger and well-trained armed 
forces had consolidated the position of Al-Fatah among the Palestinian 
and Arab masses. Al-Fatah commandos, together with Jordanian troops 
gave a severe blow to Israeli aggression that resulted into an early retreat 
of the enemy. After this episode, Palestine resistance movement 
became a major force in Arab poHtics and a factor, which could not be 
ignored in any attempt to solve the Arab-Israeli problem. Syria was the 
main patron of Fatah and other smaller guerilla groups but in the 
consequent years Jordan gradually became the key center of armed 
attack on Israel. Most of the new Fatah recruits lived in Jordan who. 
after June war had become convinced of the need of guerilla operations 
against Israel in order to keep the existence of Palestinians alive and to 
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divert the attention of the world toward their plight. But somelimes-
terrorist activities of fedayeen harmed the Palestinian organizations 
more than they helped them. For example. King Hussain who had 
permitted the organization to establish its headquarters in Jordan, the 
hijackings in September 1970 gave King Hussain a pretext to attack 
them and to drive world support for his actions. 
C. Rise of Palestinian Liberation Organization: 
After the heavy defeat of the Arab armies in the 1967 war it had 
become clear that the regular armies alone could not meet Israel's 
military might. Until 1967 Palestinian refugees looked upon Nasser and 
the militar) power of the Arab world as the primary instrument for 
regaining Palestine on their behalf. They came out of their illusion after 
the six-day war. Their faith in the official Arab leadership and the 
ritual resolutions about Palestine that were passed by the governments 
and the Arab League was completely shattered. Palestinians started to 
believe that only on their own initiative would they achieve self-
determination and national recognition."^^ The Palestinian resistance that 
evolved in the diaspora got momentum after the 1967 war. "The Arab 
defeat freed the Palestinian people from the yoke of the Arab 
bureaucracies and provided it, itself a chance of launching a 
revolutionar}' struggle for the liberation of their homeland."^' The aims 
and objectives of PLO were not clearly understood till the 1967 war 
since it did not play an independent role free from Egypt's influence. 
PLO"s infrastructure, recruitments, training and policies were largely 
"decided by the Arab League and in fact by Egypt." '^* With the rise in 
the popularity of Al-Fatah after 'Battle of Karamah", Shukairi\s 
credibility to run the organization effectively became doubtful. As a 
result the old leadership of PLO stepped down on December 24, 1964 
and Yahia Hamuda was elected acting chairman.^'' Finally, when the 
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Fourth PNC was convened in Cairo on July 1968 the debates regarding 
the power struggle came to an end and the members decided in favour of 
Al-Fatah (Harkat Al-Tahrir Al Falistini)"^^ - the Movement for the 
liberation of Palestine. Capturing of PLO by Al-Fatah under the young 
and dynamic leadership of Yasser Arafat, brought a radical change in 
the basic objective, strategy and tactic of the organization. At the fifth 
PNC meeting, which was held in Cairo in February 1969. Yasser Arafat 
was elected as the chairman of the PLO executive committee. After the 
restructuring and change in leadership of PLO it soon became thu 
umbrella organization of various commando groups, which joined it. 
Although each fedayeen group retained its identity, some 
differences regarding ideology and methods emerged among them to 
achieve the aims of PLO. The major fedayeen groups with PLO were 
Al-Fatah (which dominated the organization till the Hamas 
Parliamentary victory in 2005), the Popular front for the liberation ol 
Palestine (PFLP), the Popular Democratic Front for the liberation ol 
Palestine (PDFLP), the Popular Front for the liberation of Palestine 
General Command (PFLP-GC) and the two Arab sponsored groups: the 
pro-Syrian As Saiqa and the pro-Iraqi Arab Liberation Front (ALF). Al-
Fatah continued to be the largest and dominant group in PLO and opted 
for the tactics of "small war", "cautions" armed struggle and 
conventional guerilla method based on Chinese and North Vietnamese 
style.' It enjoyed the support of the conservative states of the Arab 
world. Other radical states like PFLP and PFLP-GC performed their 
militant activities on an international level. Airline hijackings were 
carried out on short intervals, in order to keep the question of Palestine 
alive, which led to large-scale reprisal raids by Israel.^ *^  Al-Fatah and 
other like-minded groups denounced such terrorist activities but could 
not save themselves from being blamed because responsible factions 
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were part of the PLC). As regard the politieal settlement of the 
Palestinian problem neither PLO as a whole, nor its groups individual 1\. 
were ready to accept it. Sometimes their activities did more harm rather 
than helping the Palestinian cause. The PLO overplayed its hand in 
Jordan and its attempts to resist August 1970 ceasefire triggered the 
Jordan civil war in the subsequent year and resulted in its expulsion 
from Jordan. After 1970, Lebanon became the territorial base of PI (> 
from where it carried out its armed activities against Israel.^ 
However, under the leadership of Yasser Arafat. PLO succeeded 
in diverting the attention of the world toward Palestine question into a 
more comprehensive way. Third world countries were the first to show 
their concern to Palestinian cause. In September 1969 an Islamic summit 
conference invited PLO representatives in its meetings and supported 
the national rights of Palestinians. In 1973 non-aligned nations 
recognized PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestine people. 
USA and USSR also started noticing PLO because they could no longer 
avoid it.**'* In the following years of June war, PLO showed that it could 
obstruct any settlement scheme to end Arab-Israeli conflict, which 
excluded it. As a founder member of Arab League, Egypt alwa>s 
claimed that in its policy towards Israel, Palestinian issue occupied 
central place. After 1967 war, Egypt with Jordan, was prepared to accept 
a final peace settlement with Israel based on Resolution 242. which 
described Palestinian problem merely a problem of the refugees."" The 
restoration of lost territories from Israel had become the main objective 
to them and they were least concerned about the Palestine question 
Their moderate stand was criticized by Syria, Algeria and the extremist 
groups among the Palestinians who pressed for more aggressive policies 
and actions against Israel, including guerilla warfare. Progressive Iraq 
with conservative Saudi Arabia and Kuwait joined Syria and Algeria in 
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opposing any solution, including Resolution 242. which did not take into 
account adequate Palestinian national rights. It led to the development of 
serious disagreement among the Arabs themselves on the issue of 
agreement. Despite flexible attitude adopted by Egypt and Jordan 
Israel's position had not been softened. Moderate Arab leaders sax^  
much value in Rogers plan; Israel, however, objected it on various 
grounds. 
D. War of Attrition: 
Israel's major territorial gains, her military might and US direct 
and indirect backing placed her in a very strong position. It became 
obvious that Israel was not in a mood to withdraw from the Arab 
territories occupied in the six-day war."*^  "The 1967 conquests in their 
view was a simple ramification of that Eisenhower mistake."' In a 
statement published in the New York Times of 8' May 1969 Israeli 
Premiere Golda Meir declared that Israel could not be expected to return 
the strategic areas captured in 1967.'*'* As settlement continued to be 
delayed, and all initial efforts in this regard failed, the impatient 
Egyptian President decided to launch a "War of Attrition" against Israel. 
Supposedly by initiating War of Attrition he wanted to remind the 
powers of the urgency of resolving the crisis and that Egypt would not 
silently accept an indefinite Israeli occupation of the Sinai. One of the 
aims of the Sinai war was "to make the enemy feel insecure and jittery, 
affect his morale and will to resist, make him deploy more and more 
resources to protect his lines of communication and installation.""^^ Thus, 
the "War of Attrition" was the extension of the Sinai war. which was 
started in the West Asian region just after June 11, 1967. The War of 
Attrition was announced by President Nasser on his own on V^ April 
1969, and effectively waged against Israel from 20*^  July onwards. 
Although there was no complete calm on the Suez Canal front after the 
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end of June war. war of attrition was the first concerted and sustained 
Egyptian offensive against fortified positions of Israel on the East bank 
of the canal to force them to withdraw from the Sinai. Inhial Egyptian 
success took an ugly turn by the end of 1969 when Israel relying 
increasingly on the superiority of its air force, resorted to air strikes on 
Egypt's artillery positions and later for deep raid bombings inside 
Eg>ptian territory which resulted into a large number of civilian 
casualties. Despite Soviet help Egypt's defenses were inadequate against 
the superior Phantom jets the United States had supplied to Israel. F:^ gypi 
had paid a heavy price for this war. Israel also suffered "man> 
casualties, economic dislocation, cracks in the national consensus, and 
above all. the frightening prospect of direct clashes with the Soviet 
Union." Eventually with US efforts the War of Attrition that was 
launched by Egypt came to an end in August 1970.^ *^  
E. US Face Saving Drives: Rogers' Peace Efforts: 
After the failure of Jarring mission in March 1969 and 
unsuccessiiil efforts of Big Four to break the deadlock, the new US 
administration began to review the US policy in West Asia. US 
discovered that the escalation of its military aid to Israel, instead of 
deterring the Soviets and subjugating the Arabs to Israeli demands, had 
actually resulted in increasing Soviet support for its West Asian clients, 
to a level exceeding the scope of the Arab-Israeli conflict and 
intensifying the chances of US-Soviet confrontation. By the end of 
1969, Arab hostility towards the US and Israel increased fiirther, which 
worried Nixon's administration, especially after the unexpected support 
extended to Egypt by those Arab countries who had been considered 
traditional rivals of President Nasser. Moreover US West European 
allies were gradually disregarding her policy on the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. 
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From the beginning of Nixon's first term it was evident that US 
policy on West Asia was contested by two decision making teams with 
different strategies, one representing State Department and the other 
National Security Council. For Secretary of State William Rogers, 
concern with Russia was secondary to the immediate goal of an Arab-
Israeli settlement.'*^ While National Security Adviser; Kissinger did not 
want a settlement until Moscow lost her influence in the region. 
Kissinger saw foreign affairs in global perspective while Rogers" 
strategy was regional. Defense Adviser regarded that militar>' assistance 
to Israel could be used as leverage to encourage increased Israeli 
diplomatic flexibility while Secretary of State saw it as a major cause of 
Arab irritation. Nixon had supported the views of both men in part. In 
this background Secretary of State William Rogers was assigned the 
duty to solve the Arab-Israeli problem, which was likely to be unsolved 
in the prevailing circumstances. Rogers Plan, which was announced on 
December 9, 1969, gave outline of what the United States considered to 
be an essential element in any peace settlement. Rogers described the 
US policy posture as a "balanced one". Rogers Plan put forward a series 
of proposals, which included: 
1. Establishment of a "state of peace'' between the Arabs and 
Israelis and an end of belligerency. 
2. A "sense of security" among the countries of the region should be 
created by establishing "demilitarized zones" and "related 
security arrangements" between the disputing parties. 
3. Withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied Arab territories. 
4. Any changes in the pre-existing lines should not reflect the 
weight of conquest and should be confined to insubstantial 
alterations required for mutual security. 
5. "Desires and aspirations" of the refugees should be taken into 
account which was essentially required for a "just settlement". 
6. "Unilateral action by any party to decide the final status" of 
Jerusalem v^ould not be allowed. Jerusalem should be a "unified 
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city" with free access for all faiths and nationalities. Israel and 
Jordan both would enjoy "the civic, economic and religious life 
of the city." 
7. A ''negotiated settlement" under the framework of Resolution 
242. 
8. Complete Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai in return for Egypt's 
acceptance of a final peace agreement. 
While moderate Arab leaders showed their interests in Rogers" 
Plan. Israel, however, reacted sharply to it. Soviet Union, which was 
engaged in a search for a solution in co-operation with the United States 
strongly criticized the proposals advocated by Secretary of State 
William Rogers. Addressing a news conference on 4"^  March 1969. 
President Nixon claimed that "the position of our European friends - the 
British and the French - are now closer to ours than the case was 
before." Regarding USSR he said: "we have had encouraging talks with 
the Soviet Ambassador. The Secretary of State and 1 have both talked 
with the Soviet Ambassador with regard to Mid-East."^° President 
Nixon was not very hopeful for the success of Rogers Plan even before 
its announcement but he was also determined that something had to be 
done. ""Thus he rejected both State Department calls for pressure on 
Israel and Israel's apparent preference for joint American-Israeli 
firmness to make the Arabs negotiate." In response to Jewish protests 
Washington asked Max Fisher to read a Presidential message that did 
not disavow the Rogers Plan but assured the Jewish leaders that the 
United States would not impose a peace settlement saying that ""an 
agreement can be achieved only through negotiations" between the 
parties in dispute.^' Applying Kissinger's strategy Nixon's message 
even hinted a positive response to Meir's request for additional 
Phantoms and Skyhawks. Although the plan was rejected by all relevant 
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parties - the Arabs, the Israelis and the Russians, the Presideni. 
however, did not scrap it. 
While the controversy over the Rogers peace proposals was still 
going on. the US representative to the UN Charles Yost, presented 
proposals on an Israeli-Jordanian settlement at the Big Four talks in New 
York on 18"" December 1969.^ ^ Yost proposals had an even more 
debilitating effect on the Israelis than Rogers' speech of December 
9.1969 did. However, Nixon's inability to support Rogers Plan 
politically revealed that US policy was split between the official stand of 
Rogers and statements emanating from the White House such as the 
"State of the World"^^ message and the Nixon letter to Max Fisher. 
According to New York Times the plan was kept secret from the general 
public. The main provisions of the Yost plan included: Israel's return to 
the 1949 Armistice lines with minor alterations in exchange for 
guarantees; improved access to the holy places in Jerusalem; it called for 
a state of peace, permanent frontiers; recognition of each others 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence; it also 
called for Israel's acceptance to take back some Arab refugees.^ '* Like 
Rogers Plan, the Plan presented by Charles Yost was also rejected by 
Israel. Israeli leadership bitterly criticized the entire American peace 
initiatives. In the wake of controversy over Rogers Plan, the war of 
attrition along the Suez was in full swing. It turned so badly against 
Egypt that President Nasser sought Soviet help to defend Egypt from 
Israeli air attack."" In late January the Egyptian leader had traveled 
secretly to Moscow where the Russians agreed to supply Cairo with 
advanced Soviet anti-aircraft missiles to stop the Israeli raids.^^ In mid 
Februar>' an Egyptian factory on the outskirts of Cairo was hit by Israeli 
air raids inflicting about 150 casualties and drawing US condemnation." 
164 
Meanwhile. French President Pompidou on his visit to the United 
States was harassed by a group of Jewish people protesting his recent 
arms deal with Libya. French President took serious note of the incident. 
C O 
which arose Nixon's grave concern over it. He feared that the 
demonstrations would disturb his efforts to improve US relations with 
France. Realizing that Israel's policies and actions caused difficulties for 
US. the White House announced that Israel's request for additional 
aircrafts would be postponed. It was done despite US knowledge of the 
Soviet help to Egypt and Kissinger's secret warnings. But in private 
conversation, the US President acted in a somewhat different manner. 
He assured Israeli ambassador, Yitzhak Rabin that "you can be sure that 
1 will continue to supply arms to Israel, but I shall do so in other 
different ways. The moment Israel needs arms, approach me, by way of 
Kissinger, and I'll find a way of overcoming the bureaucracy."^^ He 
explained his political difficulties in granting additional arms requested 
by Israel, due to strong opposition by some sections of the bureaucracy. 
So he had to opt some other way to meet Israeli request. 
US moves to invite the Soviet Union to share the burden of 
resolving Arab-Israeli problem did not really mean that their objectives 
in the West Asia had been reconciled. On the contrary, each of the two 
powers continued pursuing their own selfish interests. On the surface 
US Ambassador to the UN Charles Yost, held a series of bilateral 
consultations with the representatives of the Big Four in New York in 
late March 1969. The bilateral exchanges paved the way for the meeting 
of the representatives of Big Four in New York on 3'^ '^  April 1969, to 
find out a general formula for a peace settlement between Arabs and 
Israelis. All of them expressed concern over deteriorating situation in 
West Asia and called for revival of the Jarring Mission.^' While Charles 
Yost was busy in consultation with his British. French and Russian 
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counterparts at the UN, US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Easterr. 
and South Asian affairs. Joseph Sisco held conversations with Soviet 
Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin in Washington." On the basis of NSC 
advise, Sisco continued his talk with Soviet Ambassador in the month ot 
Ma\. Meanwhile Soviet Foreign Minister Andrie Gromyko arrived in 
Cairo to acquaint Nasser with the Soviet stand. ' After Gromyko's 
return to Moscow the venue of the US-Soviet talks was changed. Further 
discussions between Sisco and Gromyko were held in Moscow. Soviet 
Union and United States, both were optimistic about the result of the 
mutual discussions, although they had yet to sort out various differences 
over the West Asian problem. Unfortunately, neither bilateral talks nor 
Four Powers consultations brought any success to their efforts to find 
out a peaceful solution acceptable to both the parties. Finally Israeli 
rejection of the Proposal entailed Egyptian rejection. With the outbreak 
of 'war of attrition' Soviet military role in Egypt was greatly expanded 
Soviet Union had sent highly sophisticated anti-aircraft missiles and 
personnel to Egypt.^ Defense aid, which was provided by Russia to 
Egypt in 1970. was unprecedented to a non-Communist country.^ '^  The 
secret mission of President Nasser to Moscow on 22"^ * Januar\' 1970 was 
successful. As the war of attrition had grown out of proportion, there 
began an exchange of letters between Soviet Premiere Alexi Kosygin 
and President Nixon on the latest developments in West Asia. 
Allegation and counter allegation were made from both sides. USA 
alleged that Soviet was responsible for escalation of the war and 
cautioned it that US "would view any efforts by the Soviet Union to 
seek predominance in the Middle East as a matter of grave concern."''*' 
In response Russia blamed USA for its acceptance of Israeli demands 
for most sophisticated arms and ammunition, which enabled her to 
launch offensive attacks against neighbouring Arabs.**^  Soviets' repeated 
warnings to Israel and her military role in Egypt, both required 
166 
immediate US attention towards the crisis in West Asia. Although 
involved in other crisis, US administration realized the urgency of some 
remedy to neutralize Soviet overtures in the Arab world. It was the time 
when Roger initiated his second peace plan; the so-called "stop 
shooting, start talking"^^ project. Rogers' revised plan, despite 
Kissinger's objections, proceeded with the approval of the US President. 
Regarding Rogers" initiative, US Security Adviser argued that it did not 
address the growing problem caused by the presence of Soviet combat 
pilots in Egypt. His remarks on Rogers' proposals provoked public 
controversy over US role in Cambodia. Realizing the sensitivity of the 
issue. White House spokesman quickly made US position clear h\ 
stating that America did not intend to expel the Russian troops from 
Egypt by force.^ *^  The later developments increased possibility of Soviet-
Israeli confrontation - the situation that USA was trying to avoid for 
long. In this situation United States was not supposed to remain mute. In 
order to prepare the ground for a fresh US effort to settle the Arab-
Israeli dispute Rogers deputed Joseph Sisco to West Asia. Sisco visited 
Arab countries as well as Israel holding discussions with the leaders of 
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concerned parties. Agamst his proposed visit to Amman and to resist 
US efforts, the PLO overplayed its hand in Jordan. The demonstration of 
Jordanian students led by Palestinian Commandos soon turned so 
violent that it posed a danger to Jordan's sovereignty. On 17'*' September 
1970. King Hussein finally ordered his army to move against the 
Fedayeen. Ihey were eventually forced to leave the country. After their 
expulsion from Jordan, PLO made Lebanon as their territorial base and 
initiated their activities from there.^' 
Sisco"s report was somewhat encouraging to USA since there 
was a general recognition in West Asia that America could play a 
decisive role in the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Encouraged 
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by Sisco"s report and by receiving indications for positive Egypiiai 
signals, Rogers hastened to give a practical application to his initiative 
Beside manifested diplomatic and political activities, various behind tht 
scene activities and maneuvering of United States played an important 
role in bringing a ceasefire between Egypt and Israel, at least 
temporarily. The reaffirmation of the existing ceasefire agreement 
between Israel and Jordan had also taken place. The ceasefire came into 
effect on 7"^  August 1970. Nixon gave Rogers and Sisco the credit tor 
this accomplishment. According to Mahmood Riad, Egyptian Foreign 
Minister, "in all these stages of political maneuvers, the US was quick to 
niake additional political and military concessions to Israel only to 
discover, later, that Israel was seeking even more concessions." "" Nasser 
regarded ninety days ceasefire as a "breathing space'"^' and the one 
which Egypt needed for some defense arrangement while Moshe Dayan 
argued that "we are strong enough not to be forced into accepting 
dictates of enemies or friends, but we are not strong enough to dispense 
with our allies." 
F. Nasser's Death: Beginning of Sadat's Era: 
Before the expiry of ninety days ceasefire accord there came the 
end of Nasser's life. He died of a massive heart attack in Cairo on 28^ *" 
September 1970 leaving the unfinished task to be finished b\ his 
successor Anwar-el-Sadat.^^ 
Since the US peace proposals were accepted by Jordan. Egypt 
and Israel, indirect negotiations between the three countries began in the 
last week of August under the auspices of UN special representative 
Gunner Jarring. But the talk was soon disrupted because Egypt violated 
the •standstill agreement' and Israelis announced that they would not 
return to Jarring talks.'^ ^ Israel's position had not softened despite, by 
applying US old tactic, Nixon permitted the sale of eighteen more 
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Phantom jets to compensate Israel for the canal violation by Egypt. As 
the expiry date of the ninety days ceasefire came closer the danger o\ 
escalation of hostilities became imminent. All the "Big Four' did not 
want the War of Attrition to be resumed. The Foreign Ministers of the 
US, the UK, the USSR and France made efforts to reactivate Jarring 
mission and an extension of ceasefire beyond ninety days. As a result, 
on 4'*^  November 1970, the General Assembly adopted a resolution 
calling upon the Israelis and the Arabs to extend the ceasefire by three 
months. From the beginning "the only interest Israel had in the Rogers 
initiative was the ceasefire." So, Israel with the Arabs agreed to abide 
by General Assembly resolution. Their acceptance to continue the UN 
sponsored ceasefire promoted an atmosphere conducive to negotiations 
Moreover, US encouragement of the Jarring mission and its pressure on 
Israelis to resume peace talks with the Arabs through the UN special 
representative helped to bring Israel back to the negotiating table m 
January 1971. The end of Jordan civil war of 1970 brought the PLC) in a 
severely weaker position if not totally destroyed it. As a result "some 
modifications towards a political process were introduced in the 
ideology'" of PLO. The change of leadership in Egypt and Syria had 
also been an important factor, which should not be ignored in the 
context of future developments in West Asia. But despite a conducive 
atmosphere and Sadat's cooperative attitude to UN and US. which 
obviously did mean Egypt's readiness to compromise with Israei on 
certain issues, Israel's conviction that time was on Israel's side and ihev 
could maintain their superiority over the Arabs, indefinitely resulted into 
disruption of negotiations once again. Israel's repeated insistence that 
Egypt should commit for a "peace agreement" before discussing other 
issues was turned down by Egyptian leaders, who wanted the complete 
withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied territories and solution of 
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the refugee problem as the primary condition for the beginning of 
negotiations. 
The diplomacy conducted by Rogers could not be carried 
through. The division at high level of the American government created 
difficulties in the implementation of Rogers Plan. It often created 
inconsistencies, which resulted into formulation of complex policy 
choices to deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict. The record of Nixon's first 
term revealed that differences between the Secretary of State and NSC 
Adviser over the settlement strategy led the US President to adopt an 
ambivalent attitude. Nixon accepted Rogers 'optimism' but also 
accepted Kissinger's 'skepticism'.^^ It was often seen that although US 
President supported Roger' s Peace Plan he failed to endorse it publicly 
or back it politically. The implementation and success of Rogers peace 
initiatives required three basic things on the part of the United States: 
sincere efforts, earnest desire to settle the continuing Arab-Israeli crisis 
on an impartial basis and a coherent foreign policy to West Asia. 
Unfortunately all such things were lacking in the first term of Nixon s 
administration. Kissinger's influence was so great that none of the 
President officials could act as "second secretary of state'" which became 
Security Adviser's role in Nixon's first term.^ ^ Kissinger did not oppose 
America's precipitating a settlement but he wanted to achieve this end 
through a different way. In his view before reaching to any agreement 
with Israelis. Arab radicals should be brought to look to the United 
States and not to the Soviet Union. However, Rogers did not give up 
hope even after repeated setbacks. Since comprehensive Rogers Plan did 
not make any headway and Israel's negative replies had hampered 
Jarring's efforts, US Secretary of State launched his third initiative for a 
limited settlement along the Suez Canal. In early February 1971. the 
UAR favourably responded to Rogers appeal for further extension of the 
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ceasefire. President Anwar-el-Sadat, who succeeded Nasser in October 
1970, proposed a plan of "interim settlement" and declared that Egypt 
was even prepared to reopen the Suez Canal if Israel would withdraw its 
forces some distance from the canal's East bank.^ * It was also reported 
that Sadat was also ready to sign a peace treaty with Israel if its troops 
would vacate all the Arab territories occupied in the 1967 June war. 
Kissinger regarded the proposals as inadequate and was not hopeful for 
success. To explore the proposed agreement, Nixon approved the 
secretary's trip to Egypt and Israel in May 1971. Rogers and Sisco 
arrived in Egypt on 4^ May and tried to convince Egyptian officials of 
US sincerity towards Arab and said, "that this was the first time that a 
US Secretary of State had visited a country with which he had no 
diplomatic relations." He expressed his concern over the Soviet presence 
in P^ gypt and regarded it "a complicating factor." Rogers indicated that 
in case of continuous presence of Soviet military experts and troops. 
Cairo would not get total American support and it was also not possible 
for USA to deny additional arms requested by Meir on the pretext of 
Soviet threat to Israeli security and existence. The reference by the 
secretar>' of state to the Soviet presence in Egypt as an obstacle to an 
American effort to establish a comprehensive settlement had not gone 
unnoticed which was evident by Sadat's decision to expel Soviet 
military advisors and combat pilots from Egypt in July 1972.**'' When 
Roger and Sisco arrived in Jerusalem, they encouraged by Egyptian 
positive response, anticipated success to their efforts. But the subsequent 
events adversely affected whatever progress Roger had made for the 
interim settlement. 
Rogers" visit to Cairo aroused Soviet apprehension. It gave a 
dangerous signal to Kremlin particularly in the background of Ali 
Sabri's arrest by the order of Anwar-el-Sadat.^^ Ali Sabri, the Egyptian 
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Vice President was generally assumed to be a Soviet protege. After 1967 
Egypt did not resume any direct contact with USA. US direct overture 
with Egypt was a matter of grave concern to Moscow. In the last week 
of May, Soviet-Egyptian Friendship Treaty was concluded in Cairo after 
a hastily arranged trip by Soviet President Nicolai Podgosny. The treat) 
was officially signed on 21^ May 1971.^^ Regarding the nature of the 
treaty Steven has remarked: "It was weaker than documents that 
Russians were signing during this period with other countries." During 
the ongoing discussions over limited settlement the memorandum 
produced by Donald Bergus, the US representative in Cairo (in the 
continued absence of diplomatic relations) created controversy over its 
authenticity. Mahmud Riad, Egypt's Foreign Minister, who was 
basically opposed to the idea of interim settlement, disavowed Bergus 
"phantom" memorandum as it was being called. America also denied 
her prior knowledge of this move, which was not believed by Israelis. 
These events had a negative impact on settlement process.'^' 
On their arrival to Jerusalem after visiting Cairo, William Roger 
and Joseph Sisco held conversations with Israeli leadership. Their 
discussions with Israeli officials did not produce any fruitful result. 
Roger failed to convince Prime Minister Meir who adopted a tough 
attitude regarding the withdrawal or partial withdrawal of the Israeli 
forces from the Canal's East bank. The issue of disagreement was that 
how much Israel would have to withdraw in eventual peace agreement.'" 
Since no progress was made from Israeli side. President Sadat was 
beginning to lose his pafience. As an unexpected move he declared 1971 
the "year of decision." The motive of the declaration was seemed to 
make the Americans realize that Egypt could no longer rely on US 
efforts; there were other options too. Sadat wanted an early resolution to 
the conflict. In view of Soviet opposition to war against Israel and its 
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restraint on the supply of anus, which were urgently needed to counter 
the most recent US deliveries to Israel, presence of Soviet troops had 
become more a liability than an asset to Egypt. Sadat was convinced that 
only the United States was able to help the Arabs to regain their lost 
territories. But normalization of relations with America was ruled out b\ 
Soviet presence in Egyptian soil. In a sudden move the President of 
Egypt expelled thousands of Soviet military personnel stationed in the 
country. It proved less effective since presidential and congressional 
elections were approaching and no contesting candidate could afford to 
antagonize American Jews and their supporters. Sisco visited 
Jerusalem on the advise of Roger to work on an interim settlement with 
Israel but failed to achieve any progress. Rogers on the basis of Dayan's 
positive response to his proposals, contrary to Meir's adamant position. 
concluded that "Israel would agree to a substantial withdrawal and had 
so informed Sadat." When Egyptian President came to know the reality, 
he accused the Secretary of State for misleading him with "false 
optimism."*^^ Rogers although highly desperate, did not give up hope. He 
decided to take the matter to United Nations. Rogers presented in earh 
October 1971 a six-point proposal to the UN General Assembh 
balancing the positions of both sides.^^ The problem that the Secretar> 
of State was facing was that how to separate the connected issues and in 
the absence of connection how to deal a single issue without linking it 
with the whole problem. The problem could not be solved in parts; it 
required the solution for the existing problem in totality. Consequently 
the third Rogers initiative failed in the fall of 1971. Sadat knew it well 
that since 1972 was a Presidential election year in United States, no 
progress in the way of settlement could be expected. Israel, for its part, 
was also conscious of its importance to USA during election period. 
After the three unsuccessful attempts Roger no longer directed the 
administrations approach to an Arab-Israeli settlement alone. Henr> 
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Kissinger had become actively involved in US diplomacy to West Asia 
for the first time. Kissinger's direct involvement relegated Rogers to a 
reduced role. Kissinger utilized every opportunity to detach Moscow 
from Cairo. Kissinger held behind the scene discussion with the Russian 
leaders and explored secret Egyptian contacts. Meanwhile, he continued 
secret discussion with Rabin over his country's policy in West Asia.'' 
However, signs of distrust had developed between Cairo and Moscow 
since President Sadat started to believe that Soviets would help the 
Arabs, but would not fight in their place. His distrust over Soviet policy 
intensified after President Nixon's visit to Moscow in May 1972.''^  
Availability of other centers of influence (like Syria and Iraq) in the 
region reduced the Russian dependency on Egypt. Kissinger's 
diplomacy was largely motivated to reduce Soviet support for key Arab 
states and oust the Soviet military personnel from Arab soil. He did not 
give priority to settlement over his strategy of reducing Soviet influence 
in the Arab world. Instead of pressing Israel he tried to moderate 
Russian and Arab stance over the terms and conditions of the agreement. 
In case of Israel, US government used its arms grants and sale policy to 
induce her to be more receptive to the implementation of UN Resolution 
242 and Rogers initiatives. By virtue of its veto power USA also 
protected Israel of being called as an aggressor or her condemnation by 
the Security Council. America used its rare vetoes on September 10^*^  to 
kill a Security Council resolution censuring Israel for large-scale land 
and air attacks on Syria and Lebanon following a Palestinian commando 
attack on the Israeli Olympic team in Munich.'^ '' Sadat failed to reap an\ 
political gain out of his decision of expelling Soviet troops from his 
country. His action forfeited military advantages Egypt had possessed. 
The timing of the decision was also not favourable since it was an 
election year during which Nixon could not afford to antagonize the 
Jewish-American lobby. 'The ousting of Soviet experts was a US 
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objective overtly declared by Kissinger in 1970 and referred to b\ 
Rogers in his talks in Cairo in 1971."'^" But when President Sadat took 
the step. US behaved so indifferently as if it had no concern of the 
episode. Initially Anwar Sadat had tried to reach a peace settlement b> 
responding positively to the proposals submitted to him by US special 
representative Jarring and Secretary Rogers. Hafez Assad who resumed 
power in Syria in November 1970, brought a change in Syrian policy. In 
a speech in Damascus on 8* March 1972, President Assad indicated for 
the first time that Syria would accept Resolution 242 provided that Israel 
withdrew from all Arab territories occupied in 1971 and that the "rights" 
of the Palestinians were recognized as part of a final peace settlement. 
All such overtures made by the Arab countries did not bring a change in 
the Israeli attitude. Arabs hoped that after 1972 Presidential elections 
and after the termination of Vietnam war, Nixon administration would 
take more interest to find out more effective means for settlement of 
Arab-Israeli dispute. Arabs hope had gone into vain when they came to 
know that Israel was awarded with more military concessions in earh 
1973 despite their non-compromising attitudes to US sponsored 
proposals. 
The prolonged wait to regain their lost territories, the intensified 
refugee problems, the continuous failure of all efforts made by major 
powers and third world countries through the US machinery and 
otherwise had a cumulative effect on vanquished Arab leaders which 
generated a deep sense of insecurity and frustration in them. Although 
US growing relationship with Beijing and Moscow was a significant 
development in the global perspective, it was not perceived as a good 
sign by the Arab radicals who in the absence of American help relied on 
Communist support. The projection of policy of "co-existence" in the 
context of detente did not mean, in reality the cultivation of American 
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friendship with Russia. US policy of containment against her traditional 
rival remained intact. As a direct consequence of the establishment ol 
the Soviet-American detente and the apparent subordination by the 
USSR of its interests in Egypt to that of detente, Egyptian President 
Anwar-al-Sadat decided that he could not rely on Soviet assistance t(> 
meet his cardinal objective of recovering the Egyptian territory occupied 
by Israel since 1967. Soviet reaction to Sadat's unfriendly gestures wa> 
seemingly not very harsh. While Russians refused to supply Egypt the 
advanced MIG-25 aircraft and electronic counter measures equipment, 
they did resume routine shipment of other arms. While these events 
were taking place Egypt continued to develop its secret contacts with the 
United States. Hafiz Ismail, Sadat's National Security Advisor, after 
visiting Moscow went to Washington in February 1973.'^'' But Sadat 
soon realized that without a war neither the Soviet nor the American 
diplomatic efforts would lead the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai. 
Sadat's intention to resort to war had become more apparent in his 
public speeches and pronouncements in the mid 1973. He made his 
intention so open that it came to be generally believed. But surprisingly 
Soviet Union as well as America did not perceived the possibility of war 
despite repeated warnings given by Egyptian President. America denied 
her prior knowledge of the forthcoming war since CIA and Israeli 
intelligence agencies reported that war in the 'Middle East' was 
unlikely. This was less true, however, of the Soviets. Soviet Union was 
well informed about Sadat's decision, although without concrete details 
of his plan, which was kept secret till the last moment.'°'* Moscow urged 
the Egyptian leader, both indirectly in public commentaries and directly 
in private talks to concentrate on the peaceful measures rather stressing 
on the idea of war. 
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During Nixon's first term, US West Asian policy was greatl\ 
marked with lack of consistency and coherence basically due to 
difference between his Secretary of State and his National Securit> 
Adviser. Moreover, President's ambivalent attitude created much 
confusion between State Department and National Security Council 
(NSC). His ambivalence had often been reflected in his public 
statements and his private talks, which revealed his weakness in 
decision-making. However, in the second term this decision-making 
confusion was replaced by a well-calculated and firmly determined US 
policy to achieve a definite goal in West Asia. Behind this firmness his 
Secretary of State played a significant role having received an 
unprecedented mandate at the poll he was expected to take any bold 
decision. But once Watergate scandal threatened Nixon's political 
survival, he abdicated American diplomacy to Kissinger."'^ He had to 
make an early exit from the white House and the Vice President, Gerald 
Ford, made his entry as the 38' President of America. Himself a 
creation of Nixon he followed the policy of his predecessor, and 
therefore retained Henry Kissinger as his Secretary of State. He needed 
the services of Dr. Kissinger because of his lack of experience in foreign 
policy affairs. Watergate episode strengthened Kissinger's domination, 
making him the most powerful secretary of state after John Foster 
Dulles.'^^ 
Kissinger was not only a Jew but also a staunch Zionist and his 
policies were largely motivated to serve the Jewish interest in West 
Asia. His strategy of 'peace in pieces' reflected his actual motive to trap 
Sadat who proved to be a soft target in his sheer frustration after Egypt's 
consecutive defeats in the Arab-Israeli wars. He desperately wanted to 
retain Egypt's territory captured by Israel in 1967 war, which had 
become essential to establish his power and influence in Egypt and rest 
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of the Arab world. US apathy in realizing the urgent need for a 
settlement, Soviet subordinated position due to its increasing interest in 
detente, UN inability to improve its decision and growing unrest m 
Egyptian public compelled Sadat to take a drastic step at a heavy risk to 
Egypt's armed forces and economic stability. 
Ever since Glassboro, which followed a number of summits 
attended by America and Soviet Union aimed at improving East-West 
relations created apprehensions in the Arabs about Moscow's sincerity 
towards Arab cause. The Arabs generally suspected that America cowed 
the Russians. After 1972 Sadat had become increasingly dissatisfied 
with the Soviet indifference. Soviet lack of concern with no-war no-
peace situation disturbed Sadat to a great extent. Soviet refusal to 
provide sophisticated equipment to Egypt led to his expulsion of Soviet 
advisors from Egyptian territory. Egypt's deteriorating relations with 
Russia provided a rare opportunity to US to improve its tarnished 
reputation in the world with Cairo's cooperation. After 1967 war, 
America had become completely exposed to the world particularly to the 
Arab world as far as its pro-Israeli stand was concerned. Even American 
Western allies became indifferent to its policies regarding Arab-Israeli 
dispute. As a result United States had become isolated from the rest of 
the world. US lost its credibility and respect in the Arab world although 
a few conservative Arab countries still had a leaning toward 
Washington. Despite being the biggest hypocrhe in the world America 
wanted to enjoy the respect of a nation believing in the ideals of liberty, 
freedom, human rights and rights to self-determination. Bringing Egypt. 
the most powerful country in the Arab world, in the American orbit was 
an excellent idea, which might neutralize the negative opinion of the 
Arabs against the US. If the scheme succeeded it would produce a 
precedence, which other Arab countries might follow in due course. 
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With this view Kissinger offered various economic, poHtical anu 
military concessions to Egypt. He convinced Sadat to accept reaHt\ tor 
the sake of Egypt's national interests. Arabs weaknesses were well 
known particularly to West European countries, having experience o^  
their long association with the Arab people. Kissinger's knowledge >^1 
history as a scholar and diplomatic experience helped him a lot lo 
understand Arabs' real temperament. Arabs emotions dominated their 
actions; their personal rivalries overlapped their emotionally oriented 
decisions. Moreover they lacked ability to read between the lines. On the 
economic and military fronts they were short of resources and technical 
know how. Kissinger, like his predecessors, exploited Arabs 
weaknesses in the interest of his country but with much more tactful 
manner without losing his image in the world. He was remembered as a 
"peace-maker'", a man with diplomatic achievements in West Asia who 
sought to induce the Israelis to spare the Third Army and saved Egypt 
from a substantive defeat in the 1973 war. 
From the very beginning of the US entry to West Asia it regarded 
Egypt as the only country capable enough to influence the Arab world. 
America made various efforts to induce Egyptian leadership to join 
Western sponsored defense alliance for the security of the region from 
Soviet influences which were merely perceived at that time. Independent 
posture of the Arab countries particularly Egypt's tough stand during 
Nasser's regime jeopardized American strategic interests in the area. 
Israel's services, no doubt, provided enough help to America in 
achieving her imperialist goal but only Arab's cooperation could save its 
image as the champion of justice, freedom, equality and human rights. 
Kissinger knew well that a united Arab, even temporary unity would be 
harmful for American ambhions in West Asia. It also posed a danger for 
the establishment of Israeli empire in the Arab areas - the very' tempting 
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idea of Zionists. To achieve this long-term goal Arab unity had to be 
thwarted first and fast. 
Sadat's disenchantment with the Soviets was seen as an 
encouraging sign for the success of Kissinger's strategy, which was 
largely dependent upon Egypt's cooperation. The recovery of lost land 
in the war of 1967 was Sadat's priority, which he could not alter for the 
sake of other subsidiary objectives including the case of Palestinians. 
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Chapter - V 
THE OCTOBER ARAB-ISRAELI WAR AND 
KISSINGER'S DIPLOMACY 
A. Why Did The Arabs Start The War? 
Anwar Sadat, who had become Egypt's President after Nasser's 
death in September 1970, adopted a more cooperative attitude than his 
predecessor toward UN and US peace efforts from the outset. He also 
proposed an 'interim settlement' in which he even offered to reopen the 
Suez Canal if Israel agreed to remove its troops from more than half of 
the Sinai in return." Egypt's relations with the West, particularly United 
States, showed a sign of improvement, since Sadat began to realize that 
"the key to Egyptian-Israeli impasse was in the Washington, not 
Moscow.'"^ In February 1973, Hafiz Ismail, Sadat's national security 
adviser, visited many Western countries and Moscow in search for a 
diplomatic breakthrough.^ But despite his various diplomatic overtures 
he could not succeed in regaining Egypt's lost territory in the war of 
1967. The displacement of the radical Ba'ath in Syria by General Hafiz 
al Asad in November 1970, followed by his indication to accept the 
Resolution 242 on March 8, 1972 provided to certain conditions, did 
not bring any change in the status-quo or "no war no peace"' situation 
between the Arabs and Israelis. The inability of UN to persuade Israel to 
see reason, and the deliberate avoidance of urgency of a peace 
settlement on the part of America who accepted the responsibility of 
such a noble cause, compelled Sadat and Asad to go to war. Sadat made 
his last attempt in July 1973 to secure Israel's withdrawal from the 
occupied Arab lands by pacific means by requesting a meeting of the 
Security Council to consider the situafion. In response of his request, a 
resolution was jointly introduced by eight members of the Securit\ 
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Council which reaffirmed Resolution 242 and endorsed Gunner 
Jarring's proposal for an Israeli withdrawal linked to an Egyptian peace 
pledge, and stressed respect for the rights of the Palestinians. The draft 
resolution was opposed by Israel insisting on its previous conditions, 
which were not acceptable to Egypt. Moreover Israel opposed any 
reference in the draft resolution 'to the rights and legitimate aspirations 
of the Palestinians." The draft resolution was put to vote on 26' July 
1973 and had received thirteen of the fifteen affirmative votes (including 
Britain, France, Austria and Australia). China abstained from the voting 
since it thought that the resolution was too weak, and USA vetoed the 
resolution on the ground that it was unbalanced, and that it would have 
"undermined" Resolution 242 which was "the one and agreed basis"" on 
which the future course of peaceful settlement in the West Asia rested. 
Both USA and Israel were criticized even by West-European countries 
for their moves; USA for vetoing the resolutions and Israel for rejecting 
every initiative meant for peacefiil settlement of dispute regarding Arab 
lands occupied by Israelis in the June war of 1967. After the defeat of 
Security Council draft resolution 331 Sadat's hope to bring the end of 
stalemate through pacific means had gone into wane.^ Sadat had two 
options before him; either the stalemate with Israel would be broken by 
peaceful means or he would resort to war. 
Consequently President Sadat with President Asad decided to 
take the second option to break the deadlock, which led to the October 
war of 1973 often referred to by the Egyptians as the 'Ramadan War" 
and by the Israelis as the 'Yom Kippur war.'^ The major powers 
perceived or not, or underestimated Arabs' capability to launch a war 
against Israel after the humiliating defeat in 1967 war, the possibility of 
war could not be ruled out in the prevailing circumstances. Sadat was 
facing a tough time at home. Egyptian public was getting impatient and 
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demanded action. Egyptian President did not want to be branded as a 
coward, leaving Egypt on the mercy of big powers for the restoration of 
its lost territor>. To regain the Egyptian territory from Israel had become 
a challenge to Sadat who was desperately eager to recover his 
popularity, which was then at a low ebb. The expulsion of the Soviet 
advisors gave Sadat an opportunity to prepare for a war without any 
hindrance from Moscow.** Through his skillful diplomacy he secured the 
cooperation of other states, especially the backing of the Arab countries. 
He secured the financial help of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia to buy anns 
for hard currency, the agreement of Syrian President Hafiz al Asad to a 
limited war for the recovery of territories lost in 1967, improved his 
relations with King Hussain of Jordan and finally succeeded in securing 
the arms required by Egypt from Soviet Union.*^  Even after ousting 
Soviet advisers and troops, Sadat very wisely maintained Egypt's 
working relations with Moscow."^ In contrast to the six-day war of 1967. 
in which four Arab countries were involved to varying degrees, the 
motive of October war of 1973 was limited to Egypt and Syria. Both 
these countries wanted to attack the Israeli forces stationed in their 
respective occupied territories in the hope of bringing an end of the 
gloomy status quo, which prevailed since long. Sadat had become 
convinced that "any victory, no matter how small, was the only way to 
regain his country's prestige and bring Israel to the bargaining table, 
where he might regain the Sinai."" This time Cairo and Damascus 
plunged into the war, not with the motive of Israel's liquidation, but 
only to liberate their territories captured by Israel and to seek the 
restoration of the rights of Palestinians. Before the outbreak of October 
war Israeli intelligence suspected Arab intentions but they failed to 
assess the gravity of the situation. Moreover America regarded it as 
Israeli exaggeration of Arab military build up and Israeli pessimism 
about Arab intentions. American officials had become accustomed to 
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what they often called Israel's over sensitivity regarding its security and 
existence. Israel's own guilt was largely responsible for its fear 
psychosis, no matter how strong was its military capacity and how much 
economic, military and diplomatic support was provided by USA. As for 
America it took Sadat's warnings very lightly since Americans believed 
that the Arabs were not capable of matching Israeli military strength and 
moreover Egypt and Syria would not dare even to think of starting 
another war with Israel after such a shameful defeat in 1967 war. 
The problem of faulty assumptions in Washington began with the 
intelligence failure to read the events correctly. Nixon himself admitted 
that, "The news of imminent attack on Israel took us completely by 
surprise. As recently as the day before, the CIA had reported that the 
war in the Middle East was unlikely."'^ Russia did not give any hint of 
forthcoming Egyptian-Syrian attack and it was hard to believe that 
without the knowledge and consent of Moscow the two countries took 
such a drastic action, which involved a heavy risk to their armed forces, 
their economies and their prestige. According to Steven L. Spiegel "1 he 
progress of detente in 1972 and 1973, as confirmed by summits in 
Moscow and San-Clemente, led Nixon and Kissinger to believe that the 
Russians would honour their commitment to inform the United States of 
impending conflict in the Middle East."''* In fact Soviets gave repeated 
warnings to the United States of the danger and the need for diplomatic 
action to avoid the recurrence of armed strife but Russia's warnings 
were not taken seriously since it did not provide concrete plan, such as 
the precise date and time of the joint Egyptian-Syrian attacks.'' 
Although Soviets were aware of Arab intentions and even received 
informal information about the impending attack early in October 1973 
yet they were not made a party to Arab war plan.'^ Since Arabs 
experience of Russians' profile during the war of 1967 was not ven. 
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encouraging so Sadat could not fully rely upon Soviet assistance 
particularly after expulsion of Soviet troops and development of her 
increasing interest in the establishment of detente. With regard to So\ iet 
attitude Quandt had observed, "The Russians would not wish to be more 
visibly associated with what must have seemed a risky enterprise. If the 
Arabs were determined to act, Moscow would not try to prevent them, 
nor would it publicly reveal their intentions.... Above all, the war must 
appear to be the primary responsibility of Egypt and Syria.'" Nixon 
later said that if Russians knew about the Egyptian and Syrian plan of 
military attack before it actually happened "and did not inform us. that 
would have been. I think, a very great breach of all of the understanding 
we had.""* However, it was evident that on the night of October 4 and 
October 5 the Soviets evacuated their civilians from Egypt and Syria. 
even diverting some of Soviet airlines to complete their task. 
B. The Outbreak of October War: Shaping of a New US 
Role: 
The combined Syrian-Egyptian attack on 6 October 1973 on their 
respective territories occupied by Israel in the June war of 1967 caught 
the Israelis and Americans by surprise, despite many indications that it 
was going to occur.^ *^  Probably fear of worldwide criticism to Israeli 
aggression against the Arab countries in 1956 and 1967 refrained Israel 
to take the first step without concrete evidence of Egypt and Syria's 
moves. Israel's misinterpretation to their factual military data "was the 
clever Arab deception." Even "Arab diplomats including the Egyptian 
foreign minister were not informed of the impending assault."^^ Their 
behaviour at United Nations and their deliberations with US officials did 
not show any sign of their prior knowledge of the Egyptian-Syrian 
attack. They continued to resume their diplomatic efforts under UN 
auspices. The initial thrust of the Egyptian and Syrian offensives were 
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effective and successful. Israelis and even Americans were not 
expecting such a bold step from Arabs despite Sadat's clear indications 
to resort to war if necessary. The Arabs' decision to go to war took 
everybody by surprise particularly those who always underestimated 
Arabs because of their own military might. Israel was not accustomed to 
what it faced in October 1973 as George Lenczowski had observed: 
The October war was a traumatic experience for Israel 
because for the first time it suffered a surprise attack and its 
forces did not emerge unquestionably victorious. The myth of 
Israeli military invincibility was, if not shattered, at least 
seriously eroded. From then on Israel would have to face a 
front of Arab States that had regained not only self-respect 
after a series of humiliations but also a good deal of self-
confidence, an important factor in the conduct of any war. 
At the height of the war massive airlift of military weapons to 
Israel by Americans and to Egypt and Syria by the Russians brought the 
two countries nearly to a confrontation transforming the regional 
conflict into a global one. Heikal says that "when the airlifts were finally 
halted it was found that the amount of arms which America had supplied 
to Israel almost exactly balanced ton for ton, the amount which the 
Soviet Union had supplied to Egypt and Syria." 
The element of surprise and careful planning with a good 
military showdown, allowed both Syrian and Egyptian forces to make 
headway during the first week of the war. The timing of the assault was 
also not accidental. With public services in Israel effectively suspended 
because of observation of Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the Jewish 
calendar, Israel's army found it difficult to mobilize its forces rapidl>. 
Within few days of Egyptian-Syrian attacks on their respective fronts, 
Egypt and Syria made significant advances in their own territories 
occupied by Israel in 1967 war and achieved their primary objecfives.^' 
The war proved very costly to Israelis. Their proportionately high 
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casualties and losses in equipment weakened their invincible position. 
The early success in the war created a feeling of elation and pride in 
Egypt. "Egyptians army felt secure in its new position and President 
Sadat was in no hurry to end the war." ^ Sadat made a grave mistake by 
undermining the possibility of strong US backing to Israel, particularK 
when it terribly needed American help to turn its early defeat into a tlnal 
triumph. As planned earlier the purpose of war was ver>' limited. Both 
Egypt and Syria wanted to bring an end to the 'no war no peace 
situation prevailing between Arabs and Israel. It was assumed that after 
two or three days of war a cease-fire would be imposed and the impasse 
in negotiations would be broken. But the initial success and Soviet 
acceptance to provide latest arms and equipment in massive quantities to 
both Egypt and Syria changed the mind of proud Arab leaders. The cali 
for a cease-fire on 13"^  October was rejected not by the Israelis but b> 
the Arabs.^^ Sadat and Asad decided to continue the war until the\ 
would achieve their larger goals. It was the turning point in the war. 
Because of substantial losses in men and equipment in the first few days 
of war, and because of Soviet Union's supply of unprecedented large 
quantity of war materials to both Syria and Egypt, the United States in 
order to stave off a Soviet backed victory of the Arabs provided every 
possible help to Israel to turn its early military disadvantage into an 
advantage. Although Soviet Union apparently did not encourage the 
war, which was launched by its Arab allies against Israel but it could not 
turn down their request of urgently needed advanced military equipment 
to match with LfS military aid provided to Israel. Initially, the Soviets, 
who were then pursuing detente, maintained a posture of non-
involvement, however, the subsequent events brought her into a position 
of confrontation with USA, a thing which both of them wanted to avoid 
for long. Fearing Soviet unilateral action, Washington Special Action 
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group called for an American military alert that would increase the 
worldwide readiness of both conventional and nuclear weapons. 
C. United States' Role During The October 1973 War: 
During the initial stages of 1973 war which was started by Egypt 
and Syria, the American policy rested on two basic assumptions: that 
Israel was capable enough to defeat its Arab foes and the United States 
should maintain a low profile and avoid manifested involvement. 
America wanted to improve its relations with Egypt, since both Nixon 
and Kissinger knew the importance of Egypt in the West- Asian politics 
Both the Americans and Israelis felt that the expulsion of the Soviet 
militar} observers had severely reduced the effectiveness of the 
Egyptian army and chances of practical application of Sadat's utterances 
of war had become a remote possibility. The Egyptians did much to 
further their misconception. On the part of Egypt the lack ol 
professional expertise in defense personnel to operate the most advance 
military equipment was also propagated. Planning of war was done in 
absolute secrecy. Even the high ranked officials were told about the 
plans a few hours beforehand. The outbreak of war was not regarded as 
a matter of grave concern by USA. It did not shake American belief in 
Israeli invincibility. However, on fourth day of war when Israeli 
Ambassador in US, Simcha Dinitz, brought the truth to State 
Department Officials, they realized the complexity of the situation. On 
seeing the weak position of US closest ally in West Asia both Nixon and 
Kissinger felt the urgent need of fundamental reassessment of American 
strategy toward Arab-Israeli conflict. They were particularly worried 
about Israel's security, which for the first time in reality was 
successfully challenged by the Arabs. A desperate Israeli Prime Minister 
had telephoned the US President several times pleading for more arms, 
and even gave indication of Israeli defeat. Despite various diplomatic 
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concerns and practical difficulties Kissinger was highly impatient lo 
consider the urgent Israeli request for war material and militar\' 
equipment. Many US officials believed that Israelis in order to obtam 
massive arms quantities for stock piling were deliberately exaggerating 
their chances of retreat at the hand of the Arabs. As the war continued 
during the first week, the problem confronting the State Department was 
how to reconcile with two conflicting objectives of US policy in West 
Asia. It wanted to retain the confidence of Israel and its supporters at 
home without hampering the possibility of reopening relations with the 
Arabs. "The Arabs had to be convinced that the United States was doing 
little for Israel while the pro-Israeli lobby had to think that the US was 
doing a great deal."^' USA could not go with this attitude for long. As 
the war progressed US leaning towards Israel became certain. Ihc 
Soviets, anxious to retain their influence in Egypt were now apparently, 
willing to meet most of the Egyptian requests for arms. While busy in 
soliciting American effort for a ceasefire and maintaining a posture ol 
non-involvement, USSR indirectly encouraged the Arabs, which had a 
desired effect on their morale. On October 9 Premiere Kosygin sent a 
note lo Algerian President Bomedienne to unite the Arab states behind 
Egypt and Syria. It was followed by Soviet decision of airlifting of arms 
to Cairo and Damascus. In the emerging circumstances US was bound 
to accept the Israeli request for more and more war materials. Israel took 
the advantage of the situation for gaining full US support, which the 
latter was reluctant to provide openly. To counter Soviet airlifting of 
arms. America decided on a direct military airlift. As Steven has 
observed, "To hide the fiill extent of US assistance, the secretaries of 
state and defense agreed that the planes would fly at night."'^ Nixon and 
Kissinger were highly disappointed by the non-cooperation of US 
NATO allies in its arms airlifting programme. Their refusal to meet the 
US request was the result of their anticipated fear of Arab oil embargo -
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the only effective weapon that the Arabs could use against the pro-
Israeli Western nations/ Despite the negative attitude of allies and 
warnings of several officials "the magnitude of the American airlift o\cr 
the next several weeks was larger than the Berlin airlift of 1948-49." 
Kissinger himself regarded the period from October 13 to 20 as "the 
week of the airlift."^^ Nixon's decision to throw all the weight of US 
into the battle on the side of Israel created a new and critical situation 
for the Arabs. The main reason for a US intervention on this colossal 
scale was the refusal of both Egypt and Syria to accept a ceasefire 
Israel's initial failure strengthened Arabs' temptation to continue the 
war. By 8* and 9* October, it began to appear that the war would lasi 
longer than had been anticipated. Therefore, the US intervention was 
aimed at bringing an end to the battle in Israel's favour which in the 
prevailing circumstances seemed to be unlikely. USA even pressurized 
King Hussain of Jordan to keep himself out of war." Although Jordan 
did not open a third military front against Israel, units of the Jordanian 
army were sent to the Syrian front, placed under Syrian command, and 
took part in the fighting in that area. Egyptian and Syrian attacks were 
launched simultaneously. On the Egyptian front its forces had crossed 
the Suez Canal to the East bank, washed away with water jets the sand 
walls erected by the Israelis along the waterway, captured and destroyed 
the fortifications of the 'Bar lev line', and breaking into Sinai. At the 
same time Syrian army had forced their way into Syrian territory b\ 
sweeping the thin defensive line with armoured columns and recaptured 
most of the Golan area occupied by Israel since 1967. Having made up 
their losses with the United States arms airlift and mobilizing its highly 
trained reserve forces, Israel managed a counter-offensive against Egypt 
and Syria.^ *^ * By 12* October the Syrian army was pushed back of the 
1967 ceasefire lines and Israeli troops had penetrated into Syrian 
territory, and encountered strong resistance. On October M'*'. the day 
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American airlift started, the Egyptian front, which had been relative!) 
calm since the lO' , became suddenly active in response to repeated 
Syrian pleas for help that were strongly endorsed by the Russians. The 
Egyptians launched a second offensive that was repelled by the Israelis 
at a very heavy cost to the Egyptian armour. Ihe counter Israeli 
offensive took the Egyptians by surprise. "As soon as the Egyptian 
annour tried to advance beyond its SAM umbrella, it fell easy prey to 
Israel's deadly Phantoms and Sky hawks"'*' provided by America. By 
the time Sadat fully realized the extent of Egyptian military disaster the 
entire war picture had changed beyond imagination. As a result of Israeli 
offensive Egypt's communication link was disrupted which left Sadat 
unaware of the actual happenings. Despite US efforts to keep the airlifts 
secret by flying the planes at night it soon leaked out to the world 
Anticipating a possible turn of war in favour of Israel, Kosygin arrived 
in Cairo on 16'*^  October and held several meetings with Sadat till the 
morning of October 19. Kosygin was far better informed and had 
infinitely better communications than the Egyptian President who had 
no idea of the Israelis crossing the West bank even after forty hours of 
the happening. Sadat came to know about it from Israeli Prime 
Minister's address, which she gave to the Knesset. He did not make it 
public due to psychological reasons. Kosygin had to work hard to 
persuade the President to accept a ceasefire. On 18'*^  October Kosygin 
had shown Sadat satellite photographs of the real extent of Israeli 
penetration and threat. ^ On 16"^  October President Sadat delivered an 
address to the People's Assembly in which he alleged that the US was 
supplying Israel with arms that would enable it to continue controlling 
the occupied Arab territories.'*'* While criticizing Israel and America he 
made Egypt's position clear by declaring Cairo's readiness to accept 
Security Council and General Assembly resolutions and its acceptance 
to a ceasefire provided Israel withdrew forthwith from all the occupied 
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territories under international supervision."*^ He further added that Iigypi 
was ready to attend a peace conference at the UN immediately after 
Israeli withdrawal and that he would do his best to persuade other Arab 
leaders involved and the representatives of Palestinian people lo 
participate in it. He also showed his willingness to reopen the Suez 
Canal and clear it for international shipping."*^ A day after his address to 
the Assembly four Arab foreign ministers met with Nixon and 
Kissinger. Both men advised the Arab representatives not to link a 
ceasefire to a total settlement. They urged them to accept an 
unconditional ceasefire to be followed by active US diplomatic efforts 
on a step-by-step basis. Realizing the danger of Arabs' alienation to US. 
Kissinger had sent secret messages to Sadat and Faisal explaining that 
the airlift would increase US influence over Israel for an equitable peace 
settlement with the Arabs. The same day four foreign Ministers 
conferred with US President and Secretary of State. White House 
received a letter from King Faisal of Saudi Arabia asking for immediate 
termination of shipments of arms to Israel and called upon Israel to 
withdraw to the 1967 ceasefire lines.'*^ It was followed by Arab 
Ministers of Petroleum meet in Kuwait, who showing Arab solidarity in 
the battle announced that they would cut oil production by 5 percent 
every month until Israel withdrew from all occupied Arab territories.^ 
On 19* October, US President asked the Congress to approve $2.3 
billion to cover the cost of military assistance to Israel - an 
unprecedented figure credited by the US for military aid to its Jewish 
ally.*^ ' The reaction of Saudi King was sharp and quick. He announced 
an embargo on oil shipment to both US and Holland and stated that he 
would henceforth decrease his country's oil production by ten percent 
every month. The other oil producing countries soon followed suit. 
Bahrain abrogated its agreement with US for special facilities in Bahrain 
Port."'^  Arab support to Syria and Egypt in their on going war was not 
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confined to the mere use of oil weapon, the oil producing countries 
extended substantial financial aid while Iraq and Jordan participated 
militarily in support of Syria. Morocco, Kuwait, Algeria, Saudi Arabia 
and Sudan sent small contingents to help their Arab brothers fighting 
with Israel - and medical personnel came from Tunisia and Lebanon to 
treat the soldiers wounded in the war.^ ^ However, as a result of massix e 
deliveries of anns and equipment to Israel and its use with all haste m 
the battlefield against Egypt, the military situation deteriorated along the 
Egyptian front. According to Steven, "the supplies and equipment ma\ 
not have decided between victory and defeat, but they were crucial to 
Israel's morale."^"* In reality, US backing strengthened Israel's militar\ 
position as well as enhanced its morale. Egyptian President through a 
cable informed President of Syria that in the changing situation he had 
to accept the ceasefire because he could fight the Israelis but not the 
United States.'' 
As soon as Kosygin arrived in Moscow from his Cairo trip. 
Brezhnev sent a personal message to Washington inviting Kissinger for 
discussion.^^ Nixon was facing a tough situation because of oil embargo 
by oil producing Arab countries and growing complexity in Water Oate 
scandal.^^ Both these factors increased the urgency of the solution to the 
West Asian crisis. It clearly placed Henry Kissinger at the helm of US-
West Asian policy. The Secretary of State received a message en route 
to Moscow in which US President informed him that he had told the 
Russians that Kissinger was authorized to take decisions regarding terms 
and conditions of ceasefire for which he did not require further approval 
CO 
from White House. Kissinger did not want the Soviets to know this, 
because it deprived him of a delaying tactic urging that he needed 
President's approval, for which he had to refer back to Washington.'*^ 
Throughout his negotiations with Brezhnev in Moscow, the whole thrust 
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of Kissinger's strategy rested on separating a ceasefire from any kind of 
specific poiifical solution. Kissinger planning was to initiate some tbmi 
of step-by-step diplomacy largely aimed at excluding the Soviets from 
negotiations and reducing their influence in Egypt and Syria.^ *^  Brezhnev 
and Gromyko both wanted to avoid prolonged haggling of the war 
While talking with the Soviet leaders, Kissinger expressed his conceni 
over the extremely dangerous situation of West Asia but insisted that the 
ceasefire had to be linked to peace negotiations, not only to a mere 
repetition of Resolution 242. To avoid further delay. Brezhnev accepted 
Kissinger's formula. The result was the joint sponsoring of Resolution 
338. which was unanimously adopted by the Security Council on 22""* 
October 1973 and became the legal basis for ending fourth Arab-Israeli 
war.^' It called for an immediate ceasefire in place, implementation of 
Resolution 242, and immediate negotiafions between the parties 
concerned under appropriate auspices to ensure peace. The third 
paragraph of Security Council Resolution 338 was a major concession to 
Israel but the phrase "under appropriate auspices" was an escape clause 
that allowed the Arabs to avoid direct negotiations with Israel.^^ The 
same day Egypt and Israel accepted the ceasefire but Syria did not 
accept it until 24"^  October.^^ Soviet-American agreement to an 
immediate ceasefire came as a shock to Israeli government since Israel 
was not consulted before the decision was taken - unlike what Brezhnev 
did with Sadat. On his way home from Moscow Kissinger stopped at 
Tel Aviv to provide Israeli government clarification and explanation.^^ 
There he hinted to the Israeli leaders that he might tolerate a few hours 
"slippage"*' in the ceasefire which was obviously meant for screwing on 
the Egyptian Third Army by Israel. Later Kissinger told Israeli 
Ambassador Dinitz that his real intentions for Moscow visit was to gain 
extra time for Israelis to complete their operations. On the eve of 
Kissinger's visit to Moscow both Eban and Dinitz asked him "to play 
198 
for lime for Israel and suggested that any mention of Resolution 242 
should be coupled with a reference to negotiations for peace.^^ Later 
developments proved that Kissinger disappointed neither the Israeli 
Foreign Minister nor the Ambassador in Washington. Soviet position 
was described by Egyptian Foreign Minister in the following words: 
"Brezhnev was unable to enforce the Arab demand; the best he could 
achieve was an agreement for a ceasefire, while demanding that all 
concerned parties should implement Resolution 242 and the US and the 
Soviet Union would jointly chair the peace talk.'"''^  Soviets argued that 
Moscow cooperated in producing Security Council Resolution 388 with 
USA on its dictated terms for the sake of progress in detente. It was a 
significant change on the part of Soviet Russia, which had been 
described by Nixon in the following words: 
The terms of ceasefire were especially notable because they 
were the first in which the Soviets had agreed to a resolution 
that called for direct negotiations between the parties without 
any conditions or qualifications. It was also the first time that 
they had accepted a 'general call' for adherence to Resolution 
242 and not insisted on Israeli withdrawal from the occupied 
territories as a prerequisite for any further negotiations. 
Despite the ceasefire to which both Israel and Egypt had agreed 
on 22'"^  October, further heavy fighting occurred on the Suez front from 
the next day. As soon as Kissinger returned to Washington early in the 
morning of l-i'^ he was approached by Soviet Ambassador Anatoly 
Dobr>'nin complaining Israeli advances with reminders that Soviets had 
guaranteed Egypt, prompt and effective compliance with the ceasefire.^ '^  
Kissinger's reply was his ignorance of the matter. The secretary of state 
asked the explanation from Israeli Ambassador and later blamed the 
Egyptians for the truce violations. US collusion with Israel was 
suspected by the Russians who alleged America for undermining Soviet 
trust. While giving Israeli explanations to Soviet Ambassador. Kissinger 
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proposed that Moscow and Washington should draft a second ceasefire 
resolution that would include enforcement provisions. Meanwhile. 
Israeli forces taking advantage of US undeclared backings reached the 
outskirts of the city of Suez, nearly completing the encirclement of the 
Egyptian Third Army. On 23"* October Egypt made a request for a 
meeting of the Security Council to consider the non-implementation of 
the ceasefire resolution by Israel. The Council met and adopted 
Resolution 339. which confirmed its decision contained in Resolution 
338 and urged the return of the two sides to the positions they had 
occupied on 22"*^  October.^ *^ Before accepting second ceasefire Sadat 
asked for an American guarantee this time since Soviet guarantee was 
not honoured by Israel. Nixon assured Egyptian President in a secret 
message that he would do everything to keep his promise. As a response 
US joined the Soviets in sponsoring Resolution 339 passed by the 
Security Council on October 24, which called for an immediate ceasefire 
to be supervised by the United Nations personnel in the area, and a 
return of the forces to the lines they held on October 22, at the time the 
first ceasefire was to come into effect. Since Israel continued fighting 
and an E^gyptian Red Cross convoy from Cairo carrying medical 
supplies for wounded Third Army Personnel was turned back by Israeli 
forces; a desperate Sadat sent an urgent message to Nixon and Brezhnev 
asking them to send American and Soviet forces to West Asia to enforce 
the ceasefire in accordance with the assurances they had separately 
7? 
made with him. Sadat's appeal to send contingents of USA and USSR 
forces to the war zone to drive out Israel back to the ceasefire line of 
22"^ * October was promptly rejected by the State Department, since it 
neither wanted a return by Israelis to the line of 22"'' October nor desired 
7"^  
to see Soviet forces in the area. Soviet Union gave a positive response 
to President's appeal and urged Washington for bilateral intervention in 
the conflict to put Resolution 338 in effect. The dangerous situation 
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created by USA by refusing Soviet suggestion to send their respecti\e 
military contingents to ensure the implementation, not only ceasetlrc. 
but also of their mutual understanding on the guarantee of 
implementation of the decisions of the Security Council aimed at 
imposing a comprehensive peace, brought the two superpowers nearh 
into a position of confrontation. As a response to US rejection of Soviet 
proposal, Brezhnev sent a message to Nixon threatening of appropriate 
steps unilaterall) to ameliorate the situation.^ "* 
Soviet threat of unilateral intervention was taken ver)' seriously 
by Nixon who was undergoing great convulsions over the Watergate 
affair. "It was one of the most serious challenges to an American 
President by a Soviet leader."''^ Under prevailing situation US President 
wanted to project the image of a strong man who could refuse to bow to 
pressure. Nixon shocked the world and his West European allies by 
declaring a state of military alert of United States forces all over the 
globe on 25^ *^  October 1973.''^ The alert included the readiness of both 
conventional and nuclear weapons to be used in case of extreme 
emergency. "A Soviet threat had become a ritual at the end of each 
Arab-Israeli war'", although in reality it was contrary to Russian practice 
77 
to intervene in crisis like that. Previously such Soviet warnings were 
regarded by America as merely rhetoric since its capacity for action was 
doubtful. But the year 1973 was not the year 1967 ~ the airborne 
military capabilities of Soviet Russia had grown with high speed. It was 
thought that Russians would not tolerate another decisive Israeli victory 
and despite their supposed faith in detente they would not hesitate to 
intervene to avoid giving another chance to their Arab friends to doubt 
their credibility. On the other hand, USA was not in favour of allowing 
the Soviets to take all the credit for stopping Israelis and saving the 
Arabs from further damages and a shameful defeat by taking a unilateral 
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action. US deliberate over-reaction was the outcome of realization of 
White House's weaker position in the prevailing circumstances. I'he 
grave concern which Nixon and Kissinger exhibited over Russians notes 
by ordering demonstration of military high alert of United States forces 
around the world was not supported by the intelligence agencies and 
Pentagon who doubted such a Soviet intervention. The real motive of 
the nuclear alert announced by the United States had not been cleared to 
the political observers of the West Asian situation. Whether it was 
directed solely against Soviet Union or was also meant to deter Israel to 
comply with the ceasefire resolutions before achieving a decisive victorv 
over Egypt. However, Kissinger's strategy to end the war without a clear 
victory for either side had been successful. 
D. Consequences of The War and Later Developments: 
The Arab-Israeli war of 1973 thus ended inconclusively. Israel 
was unable to improve its military position in the war with the help of 
America for which Kissinger deserved the credit. Though Israel was 
barred to gain a complete victory by the tactics of the same man whose 
position and power even surpassed John Foster Dulles's because of 
Nixon's preoccupation with Watergate during his last year in office and 
Ford's lack of experience. It has been said that "Kissinger's 
overwhelming authority was a by-product of President's weakness.'"** 
It was also asserted by some journalists that the US nuclear alert was 
obviously meant for diverting the public attention from Watergate, 
which threatened President Nixon's political survival. These 
assumptions were not baseless. It was not possible for Nixon's 
administration to ignore the Soviet warnings altogether or to put the 
entire future of American-West Asian strategy at stake by acting firml\ 
against Russians. However, Kissinger remained the dominant force in 
the US foreign affairs because during Nixon's second term he had no 
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genuine rival. Kissinger worked out the tactics and policies in 
connection with the West Asian crisis, which was largely based on 
carrot and stick formula. The demonstration of force was followed by a 
conciliatory message to Brezhnev, which denied Israeli violations, 
opposed sending Soviet or American forces to West Asia, indicated that 
the United States could not accept unilateral Soviet action and 
reaffirmed the American intention of preserving the ceasefire. 1 he 
message also urged the Soviet Union to support the dispatch of United 
Nations observer and peacekeeping forces drawn from countries without 
veto power.'^ '^  The subsequent events had shown that Kissinger's 
diplomacy achieved an extraordinary success in West Asian crisis. 
Kissinger was the man who deserved the credit for Israel's improved 
military position to a great extent in the fourth Arab-Israeli war without 
letting Israel undo all of Egypt's initial gains. He had also barred Israel 
from a complete victory. Kissinger's strategy to end the war without a 
clear victory for either side succeeded. Israel was grateful to Kissinger 
to provide it every possible help to maintain its previous record, though 
to a lesser degree, in the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, while Egyptians saw 
him as the one. who saved them from total defeat and induce the Israelis 
to spare the Third Army. The October war of 1973 thus ended 
inconclusively. It was already late when Syria accepted first ceasefire 
since Israelis succeeded in driving the Syrian army beyond the 1967 
lines transforming its initial territorial gains into a sizable territorial loss. 
As the Israeli military efforts concentrated on the Egyptian front the 
fighting on the Golan front slowed down. The arrival of Iraqi, Jordanian 
and other reinforcement on the side of Syria refrained Israeli forces for 
further advancement in the Syrian territory.**' On the Egyptian front the 
trap of Third Army by the Israeli forces left Egypt with no choice but to 
surrender. However, politically Syria and Egypt achieved their 
objectives - despite their military defeat. They broke the diplomatic 
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stalemate and proved that Arab forces were capable of fighting. It was a 
known fact that without US backing Israel's victory against the Arabs 
was not certain; even impossible in 1973 war. Initially, while making 
joint efforts for bringing the hostilities to an end, both the superpowers 
did not propose measures to stop possible violations of the ceasefire 
resolution of Security Council. If it was not deliberate, it was a blunder 
mistake made by Kissinger and Russians, "an omission that resulted two 
days later in a nasty US-Soviet confrontation.'" Therefore, as a result of 
exchange of notes between Brezhnev and Nixon, the highly inflammable 
situation was defused and the two great leaders agreed to provide joint 
support to Resolution 340 on 25'^ October, which reaffirmed the 
ceasefire resolutions 338 and 339 of October 22"'* and 23'''* respectively 
and called for dispatch of a UN emergency force to the Canal Zone. 
Such emergency force was to be composed of personnel drawn from 
Member States of the United Nations other than the five Permanent 
Members of the Security Council. This limitation designed by America 
was probably meant to rule out Soviet participation but it also precluded 
British. French. Chinese and US forces from participation. With this 
the war came to an end. The American alert was lifted on October 26 
and the Soviet momentum was also relaxed. The Israelis did not. 
however, return to the October 22"^ * line. The United States, v^ 'ho 
pressurized Israel to permit resupply of the Third Army, did not demand 
Israelis to return to the original ceasefire line. The Soviets were ver\ 
tactfully cutout of the picture after October 27.*^ ^ The Arab-Israeli 
confrontation assumed a changed aspect, which paved the way for direct 
negotiations replacing armed hostilities between them. America 
emerged the only outside power having confidence of both the parties 
and the resources and opportunities to influence them. Kissinger's 
diplomacy during and after the war had been successful since America 
did achieve its real objective of expansion of its influence over the 
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Arabs at the expense of Soviet Union by preventing a decisive victorv ol 
either side. His efforts to induce the Israelis to spare the trapped fhird 
Army therefore, provided him a golden chance to place the United 
States in the dominant position for post-war diplomacy and reducing to 
a minimum any Soviet role.^^ After the October war Soviet position with 
Palestinians and Syria remained firm but her relations with Egypt 
on 
deteriorated as Egypt moved closer to the United States. Soviet Union 
reduced supply of advanced military equipment to Egypt while it helped 
to rebuild Syria's military power to a great extent.*^ ** Egypt lost its 
credibility in the eyes of Russians in contrast to the Syrian position, 
which enhanced significantly. Disappointed by new US-Egyptian 
rapprochement. Soviet leadership strengthened its ties with Syria, Iraq 
and established relationship with PLO and Libya. At the conclusion of 
the war it was realized by America that there was a great need to resolve 
the Arab-Israeli dispute for the furtherance of US interests in the region. 
The danger of a big power confrontation that the October war generated 
gave some sobering thoughts to American leaders that the neglect or 
failure to find out a workable solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict could 
have fatal consequences for world peace. The October war had an 
adverse effect on US and Israel's international position. Both had found 
themselves somewhat isolated in the world community of nations, at 
least for some time. The October war was a traumatic experience for 
Israelis because in the history of Arab-Israeli wars it was the first time 
when a surprise Arab attack caught them off balance and their forces did 
not emerge unquestionably victorious. '^^  The myth of Israeli militar> 
invincibility was seriously exploded since Egypt's forces not only 
succeeded in crossing over the canal, but also inflicted heaw losses on 
Israel.* "^ The remarkable performances both of Syria in the Golan and of 
Egypt in Sinai took Israelis by surprise who never considered the Arabs 
capable of such heroism. The Arabs not only regained their self-respect 
after a series of humiliations but also a good deal of self-confidence"' -
a crucial factor in the conduct of soldiers fighting a war. Egypt and Syria 
clarified their objectives of the war at the outset. They wanted to liberate 
their land occupied by Israel in the war of 1967. The world could not 
accuse the Arabs for struggling to regain their own territory captured by 
force by an alien country. Egypt and Syria resorted to war when 
superpowers combined efforts to bring peace in the West Asia through 
UN resolution 242, Gunner Jarring peace mission, Roger's Plans and 
Sadat's proposal for interim settlement failed. Majority of the non-
aligned and African countries were sympathetic with the Arabs. They 
announced their unconditional support to the Arab cause. Twenty-nine 
African countries, which had diplomatic relations with Israel, severed 
their ties with Jerusalem.*^^ During the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. India as 
the leader of the non-aligned camp expressed its solidarity with the 
Arabs and accused Israel for the emergence of the conflict. India 
supported the participation of PLO in international meetings, including 
vigorous endorsement of PLCs bid for observer status at the UN in 
1974. In January 1975 India became the first non-Arab country to 
extend formal diplomatic accreditation to the representative of the 
PLO.'^ ^ 
The Palestine issue was not altogether an issue on which the war 
was fought in 1973, but it intensified and spread Palestinian nationalism. 
On the political front, the October war brought about an alteration in the 
Palestinian position worldwide and increased outside support for their 
cause. America and Israel could no longer deny the existence of PLO as 
the legitimate representative of Palestine cause although, the avoidance 
of the Palestine problem and the PLO participation in the peace process 
continued to be the underlying principle of Kissinger's "step by step" 
strategy. US was committed to the security and survival of the Jewish 
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state, while the sole objective of PLO was the liberation of the whole of 
Palestine which obviously meant the destruction of the state of Israel. 
Kissinger had a very negative approach towards PLO, since he regarded 
it as a terrorist organization dedicated to the elimination of the two 
important strategic allies of America in the region - Israel and the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Before the 1973 war, PLO did not have 
international standing of its own. Till then even the Arab states had not 
recognized the political and negotiating rights of PLO. The Arab states 
had absorbed Palestinians but they were not allowed to act 
independently for a long time. They had no voice and choice of their 
own and despite the formation of PLO in 1964 '^*, all matters relating to 
the Palestine problem had been handled by the Arab league in which the 
Palestinians had no direct representation. The Security Council 
Resolution 242 had regarded the Palestinians as mere "refugees"*^^ and 
did not recognize their national identity and their political rights 
Kissinger's Jewishness played an important role in shaping his 
perception of Palestinians and PLO. He was not only a Jew but a Zionist 
as well. Kissinger tried to evade discussion on the Palestine problem and 
the PLO participation in the peace process. His diplomac} faced a 
completely new situation when in October 1974, the Arab leaders at 
Rabat summit meeting, unanimously supported a resolution, which 
declared the PLO to be the "sole legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian people.'"''^ This resolution implicitly removed Jordan from 
any negotiated settlement on the West Bank issue. King Hussain of 
Jordan lost the right to negotiate for the West Bank and the PLO's claim 
to this responsibility gained Arab recognition. The first step in this 
process came at Algiers Arab Summit Conference, which was held 
shortly after the October 1973 war. At the end of the Summit the Arab 
leaders in a resolution, recognized the need for reestablishment of the 
full national rights of the Palestinians.^^ The PLO Chairman Arafat 
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attended the meeting as an observer. It was a major breakthrough for the 
fedayeen movement in view of the subsequent events in the way ol 
peace, ahhough Alexandria communique of July 1974 was disappointing 
in this regard.''^ However, after October 1974 Arab Rabat Conference, 
the Palestine question surfaced as a crucial element in achieving lasting 
peace in West Asia and stability in energy supplies and prices. One 
month later, PLO leader Yasser Arafat was invited to address the UN 
General Assembly. Because of the dominance of Third World countries 
in the United Nations, the General Assembly in November 1975 in a 
vote of 93 to 18 with 27 abstentions approved a resolution equating 
Zionism with racism. 
The October war had a considerable and negative impact on 
American-Western European relations. From the very start of the war 
America had developed grievances with her NATO allies for their 
refusal to provide bases for US forces and for refuting US actions 
resulting into the wrath of Arab oil producers.'^ Only Portugal agreed 
to help; allowing American transports to use Azore islands for refueling. 
Initially Portuguese were reluctant to the use of their bases but after a 
very stiff American warning "to leave Portugal to its fate in a hostile 
world"'*", they agreed to cooperate. "Turkey and Greece even refused 
permission for US over flights while acquiescing Soviet ones."''**"^  Ihe 
West Germany cooperated with America for some time but later asked 
Washington to stop using its territory for such purposes. France, Britain. 
Spain and Italy also acted in the same manner.'**^ On the diplomatic 
front Britain disappointed Kissinger when it failed to introduce a 
ceasefire proposal to the UN without Egypt's prior approval. When 
Sadat was contacted by British ambassador for his approval he bluntly 
refused the ceasefire.'*''* American idea for UN Emergency Force to 
supervise the ceasefire lines composed of personnel drawn from UN 
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member states other than the permanent members of the Securit} 
Council annoyed Britain and France further. US allies objected to its 
unilateral alert to which they had not even been consulted. '"USA 
directly placed the territories of the allies in a superpower confrontation 
where there had been none and when there was no Soviet threat to 
Europe.""^' President Nixon and his secretary of state both were 
disgusted at the allied stand. It was confirmed from a number of sources 
that US officials, particularly Kissinger made infuriated remarks on 
allied actions.'^'^ which as a result weakened the American political 
position in the world and undercut its diplomatic strategy in West Asia. 
American allied differences over handling Arab-Israeli crisis started to 
grow even before the outbreak of October war, however the US moves 
during the war exacerbated them. 
Whatever had been pros and cons of US policy in West Asia, 
before and during the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, Kissinger successtully 
manipulated events to increase US influence in the region at the closure 
of the war and in the subsequent years. Soviet influence was 
significantly decreased in the area and the first progress toward a 
peaceful settlement had been made. Kissinger's domination in tht 
foreign policy implementation provided coherence, which was often 
lacking in American policy. Egypt's alliance with Saudi Arabia and 
Sadaf s leaning towards America created a conducive atmosphere for tht 
progress of peace initiatives in West Asia - the type of peace, which 
America wanted to establish in the region. During the war of 1973. the 
main US concern was to unravel the tangled military position thai 
Kissinger himself had helped to generate.'"^ At the last phase of the 
October war, Kissinger prevented a total Israeli victon, and successful i\ 
utilized this position in bargaining with Israel to obtain its concessions 
to Egypt and Syria. To achieve this end he established diplomatic 
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leverage with Cairo and Jerusalem. Both Israel and Egypt were dragged 
into a position that required US help in any case. The end of the fighting 
between Arabs and Israelis and the UN ceasefire resolutions were 
followed by an unprecedented hectic diplomatic activity which involved 
a number of meetings between Arab Heads of state; visits to Washington 
by the Israeli Prime Minister, Golda Meir and the Egyptian acting 
Foreign Minister. Ismail Fahmy for separate talks with President Nixon 
and Dr. Henry Kissinger. The visits of the Prime Minister and acting 
Foreign Minister respectively to the United States were meant to prepare 
a ground for further diplomatic activities, which were to be expected to 
I n o 
sort out the existing problem. Both Egypt and Israel were eager to 
come out of the prevailing situation. Egypt had to save her trapped Third 
Army and Israel could not go further against the will of the United 
Slates who helped her so enormously in time of peril. Fahmy's meetings 
with Nixon and Kissinger were encouraging since Sadat was committed 
to settlement. Kissinger made it clear to Fahmy that Egypt and Syria 
could not immediately attain all their demands. Kissinger proposed a 
'"long range" strategy on the basis of "step by step" approach in which, 
disengagement of the forces of both sides would be the first step.'^ *"^  
Kissinger tried to manipulate the military stalemate to achieve that end. 
The Kissinger diplomacy brought a radical change in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. Kissinger's diplomatic triumphs were possible because he was 
more articulate than his predecessor, William Rogers, and enjoyed the 
full confidence and support of President Nixon. After being involved 
extensively in the politics of West Asia, particularly during Nixon's 
remaining days in US Presidency, Kissinger was looked upon as the 
champion of peace making process. Though the entire Arab world was 
not happy with Kissinger due to his pro-Israeli orientation but they had 
no alternative except to count on him. 
2!0 
E. Kissinger's Shuttle Diplomacy and Its Impacts: 
In early November 1973 Kissinger undertook a ten days trip to 
nine countries of West Asia to explore peace mission."*^ It was the first 
of his eleven trips he took over the next two years in the region.'" His 
shuttle diplomacy worked which resulted in the signing of a ceasefire 
agreement between Israel and Egypt on November ll''', 1973 and tlrst 
round of Arab-Israeli talks in Geneva on December 21-22"'^  and two 
other disengagement agreements in 1974 i.e. Egypt and Israeli 
agreement in January and Syria and Israeli agreement in May. 
November 11^ ^ ceasefire agreement between Egypt and Israel was at 
kilometer 101 on the Cairo Suez road. It called for Israeli forces to leave 
the West Bank of the Suez and withdrew to a position 12 miles (19 
kilometers) from the East Bank."^ Kissinger's meetings with Sadat were 
a grand success. The Egyptian leader also accepted a basic "six point" 
agreement proposal of Kissinger."'* Both Syria and Israel had powerful 
incentives to reach an agreement on the disengagement of their forces. 
Israel needed her prisoner of war back and diminish the chances of war 
of attrition while Syria needed to show her territorial gains to justify her 
decision to go to unprovoked war. Despite this, handling of Syria was a 
tough job. Kissinger's attempt to bring about a settlement on the Israeli-
Jordanian sector (West Bank) failed in view of the Rabat Arab Summit 
decision. 
Kissinger also visited Saudi Arabia where he met with King 
Faisal who. like Sadat, accepted his strategy of step by step diplomacy 
but. refused to lift the oil embargo unfil Israel returned to her 1967 
borders."'' Kissinger's second trip to West Asia was aimed at arranging 
a peace conference in Geneva sponsored by the United States and the 
USSR, chaired by UN Secretary General Waldheim, and attended by 
Israel, Egypt. Syria and Jordan. Geneva conference was not attended by 
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Syria since Syrians decided to stay away. At Geneva Kissinger's actions 
demonstrated to the Arab representatives that oil and Arab-Israeli 
diplomacy were indeec* interlinked. He also asked Sadat to help 
convince King Faisal to lift oil embargo."^ After successfully 
manipulating the events at Geneva, Kissinger channelised his 
negotiating skills to arrange for bilateral disengagement agreements 
between the combatants. Both agreements, which were concluded in 
January 1974 and May 1974*'^  respectively, stated that they were not to 
be regarded as a final peace settlement but only a first step toward one 
based on Resolution 242 and 388. Syria and Egypt obtained the return ol 
some of their lost lands and American promises of economic aid."Mn 
return United States obtained an end of the oil embargo, the renewal of 
diplomatic relation with Egypt and Syria, and greatly improved relations 
with much of the Arab world, especially Egypt. Israel, in turn, was able 
to demobilize part of her army, to gain more time, and to receive 
renewed assurances of continued American economic, political and 
military support. "Nixon and Kissinger had always been prepared to 
military and economic aids as tools of diplomacy,""*^ stated Steven. The 
New York Times called the accord a "notable achievement'" and 
complemented Kissinger for his "extraordinary diplomatic skill." 
Meanwhile, the leadership in both the United States and Israel 
was going through a very tough situation. Ultimately Nixon and Meir 
both had to step down. In Israel the new cabinet included Yitzhak Rabin 
as Prime Minister, Simon Peres as Defense Minister, in place of Moshe 
Dayan, and Yigal AUon as Foreign Minister. Although Watergate crisis 
marched toward its conclusion, Nixon in a surprise move decided to take 
a West Asian trip by himself. Six days after returning to Washington he 
visited Moscow. But neither of his diplomatic performances saved him 
from the traumatic end of his political career.'^^ When Gerald Ford 
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made his entn to the White House following Nixon's resignation on 9 ' 
August 1974, Kissinger continued to remain as the secretary of state 
pursuing the same strategy under a new president. The change of 
president did not bring much change in the US foreign policy approach 
toward West Asia. Kissinger had strong and well-developed views on 
foreign affairs than the less experienced Ford's notions on the subject. 
Therefore, the new US President accepted Kissinger's step by step 
strategy with little resistance. In comparison of Nixon-Meir cordial 
relationship. Ford's relations with Rabin remained casual. Kissinger 
wanted to settle the sensitive West Bank issue before the forthcoming 
Rabat Arab Conference to avoid the anticipated problem of involvement 
of PLO in this matter. But Rabin was not interested in discussion about 
the West Bank and focused his attention toward Sinai. The decision 
taken in Rabat meeting of October 1974 was in favour of PLO ending 
the long controversy over the West Bank representation. PLO was 
recognized as the "'sole legitimate representative" to negotiate on any 
Palestinian land that was liberated. By the time Israel seriously tried 
to introduce limited home rule on West Bank, PLO established itself 
firmly as the voice of the Palestinians to be defined either in Jordan or 
West Bank. In the new Labor party cabinet few Israeli leaders warned 
Rabin of the need to assume a positive attitude regarding Palestine and 
PLO. In their view, pursuit of flexible policy would be in Israel's 
interest.'"'* Kissinger working as an intermediary, made a major effort to 
achieve second Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement in March 
1975. Israel insisted Egypt to end the state of belligerency before 
granting her any concession. But Sadat was unwilling to accept Israeli 
condition unless Israel returned all the occupied territories.'^^ Kissinger, 
despite his heav> efforts could not bring the two sides together and 
negotiations eventually broke down. Meanwhile, the shuttle diplomacy 
continued without apparent change. In order to soften the Israeli position 
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Sadat announced reopening of the Suez and rebuilding of canal cities on 
5^ ^ June 1975. with or without a second Sinai accord.'^^ Israel responded 
by unilaterally pulling back troops from the limited force zone 
established under the 1974 disengagement agreement. Rabin's stubborn 
attitude created difficulties for Kissinger to achieve his diplomatic 
success in West Asia, through his step-by-step strategy. Ford and 
Kissinger desperately wanted the second Sinai accord and put it on 
administration's highest priority.'^^ Kissinger relied on his old strategy 
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to buy Arab friendship with Israeli concession. The unilateral actions 
taken by Sadat and Rabin demonstrated their sincere wish for peace. 
Negotiations between Israel and Egypt with Henry Kissinger as an 
intermediary began soon. Eventually a second disengagement agreement 
was initiated on September 1, 1975, and formally signed on September 
4, 1975. The second Sinai accord, as it was known, provided for: an 
Israeli withdrawal from the Abu-Rudeis oil fields and from two strategic 
passes in Sinai, Gidi and Mitla, a new buffer zone controlled by a UN 
peacekeeping force; American monitoring of the new pact by its radar 
technicians; the transit of the Suez Canal by non-military Israeli cargos: 
and a mutual commitment to resolve the Arab-Israeli disputes through 
peaceful means. Soon after the signing of the second disengagement 
agreement the Ford administration agreed to most of the aid Israel had 
requested for the forthcoming year.'^^ 
In addition to arms assistance commitments, other significant 
promises were made to gain Israeli approval of Sinai II. US assurances 
to Egypt were brief in comparison to huge incentives given to Israel. 
The Sinai II agreement was criticized from many sides. After this accord 
Egypt's relations with Syria, the PLO, and the USSR deteriorated while 
it helped to promote warmer Egyptian-American relations. Syria and 
PLO bitterly criticized Sadat for virtually leaving them alone in the 
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temptation of achieving Egypt's interests. Both President Hafiz Assad o) 
Syria and King Hussain of Jordan felt betrayed by Sadat who made a 
separate peace agreement with Israel leaving them in the midwa\ 
Although Egypt did not specifically declared that it would end the state 
of belligerency, the two sides agreed not to use force or the threat of it in 
resolving their dispute and Egypt publicly allowed non-military Israeli 
cargos passing through the Suez Canal. The Sinai II accord virtually 
removed Egypt from active confrontation with Israel. They also 
criticized a US civilian presence in the Sinai, which would paralyze 
Egypt in case it felt compelled to resort to force to regain its rights. The 
attitude of Iraq, Libya, South Yemen, Algeria and certain militant 
element of PLO were even more harsh to Sadat. They regarded not only 
the disengagement agreements harmful to the Arab cause but also the 
very idea of a peace settlement with Israel.'^" However, such 
emotionally oriented statements were far from realistic assessment of the 
situation which required a well calculated, tactful and comprehensive 
strategy to deal with their enemy which is unquestionably highly strong, 
particularly in terms of military might and skillful diplomatic tactics. 
Moreover, the most powerful state of the world is committed to protect 
Israel's interest in the region in return of Jewish services to promote 
American objectives in the most important area of the globe. 
Sadat justified his action claiming that the second disengagement 
agreement with Israel was another step in the Egyptian struggle to regain 
the areas captured in the 1967 war. He also disclosed US promises to 
initiate the diplomatic process toward another Syrian-Israeli agreement 
and that Damascus would not be left alone in case of Israeli attack. 
Palestinian participation in any Arab-Israeli settlement was also ensured. 
Kissinger was aware of the growing sympathy of the third world 
countries to the cause of Palestinians and recognizing PLO as their "sole 
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legitimate representative" of the people of the wiped out Palestine in and 
outside of United Nations. President Sadat and Soviet leaders also 
urged America to recognize PLO as the representative of the Palestinian 
people repeatedly. President Ford answering a question at a news 
conference hinted the possibility of PLCs participation in the settlement 
negotiations: "We of course feel that there must be movement toward 
settlement of the problem between Israel and Egypt on the one hand, 
between Israel and Jordan or the PLO on the other."'^^ 
Public!} Kissinger gave vague statements when asked about 
Palestinians' participation in the settlement negotiations but privately 
with Israeli leaders he clearly denied the possibility of PLO's 
involvement. However, after Sinai II accord of September 1975, Robert 
Anderson, a State Department spokesman publicly denied US approval 
for PLO's participation.'^^ 
In the fall of 1975 the American government began to reveal ;i 
slight change in its policy regarding Palestine issue. A growing number 
of specialists expressed their views that by considering Palestinians 
rights danger of another oil embargo, production cut and energy crisis 
would be prevented.'"''^  Israel had become a reality but the existence of 
Palestinian state before, and the political rights of Palestinians over it 
had also been a reality, which could not be denied by force for long. One 
example of the realization of this naked truth came in the form of 
Saunder's document. It was a policy statement submitted by Deput> 
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs to a 
congressional subcommittee which referred the Palestinian issue as the 
""heart" of the Arab- Israeli conflict. "The issue is not whether 
Palestinian interest should be expressed in a final settlement, but how? 
There will be no peace unless an answer is found."'^^ Later Kissinger 
denied his involvement in the preparation of the policy statement to 
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maintain his pro-Israeli image in the eyes of Jews. Soon after the 
October war of 1973 Egypt resumed diplomatic relations with United 
States, which were severed in 1967. Sadat continued his efforts to come 
closer to America, the dream of American leaders for a generation. 
Pragmatic thinking of Egyptian President brought flexibility in 
his approach towards Israel. Establishment of peace was very much 
needed to rebuild Egypt's shaky economy. For the completion of various 
domestic projects and to improve the lives of Egyptian people Egypt had 
to stabilize its economy first. Sadat believed that with the economic help 
of America and other Western Europe countries Egypt's economic 
recovery could be achieved very soon. He knew it very well that his 
close liaison with USA and his apparently soft attitude towards Israel 
after first disengagement agreement would weaken Egypt's relations 
with PLO, Syria and such other hardliner Arab states. Through 
Kissinger's mediations by means of his famous "shuttle diplomacy" 
Egypt was able to reach its goal although step-by-step. The 
disengagement agreements were largely the result of Kissinger's 
diplomatic skills, which he showed by flying back and forth between 
Jerusalem and Damascus and Jerusalem and Cairo.''^ 
Kissinger sought to sponsor another limited accord between Syria 
and Israel but Rabin was unwilling to discuss anything more than 
"cosmatic" territorial changes on the Golan Heights. He also intended to 
retain part of the Syrian territory even in a final settlement. Syria also 
gave sharp reaction by tying future peace steps to progress only if the 
Securit} Council debated the West Asian situation and invited the PLO 
to participate in the debate.'^^ Syria's move was appreciated by the Arab 
world and its prestige and influence enhanced among the Palestinians. 
The discussion on Palestine question was not confined to the General 
Assembly alone, it was also debated in the Security Council in early 
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1976. All the permanent members of the Council, except United States. 
Strongly supported the "inalienable national right" of the Palestinians. 
In the end: the United States vetoed the pro-Palestinian resolution that 
was brought to vote. As a result of this even the moderate Palestinian 
leaders had become embittered and lost hope in achieving anything 
through the United States. The chances of PLO's participation at any 
stage of negotiation at Geneva or elsewhere had also become bleak due 
to strong Israeli opposition.'^ "^ Moreover throughout his diplomatic 
mission Henry Kissinger tried to avoid the PLO's participation in the 
peace process. He concentrated on the territorial aspect, neglecting the 
main cause of the problem. Since Palestinians had been uprooted from 
their native country they were put under constant US pressure to 
recognize the existence of Israel - the country that was mainly 
responsible for their country's non-existence. Kissinger's secret 
understanding with Israel over this issue kept PLO out of negotiations 
regarding the future of West Bank and Gaza Strip for long. Kissinger 
wanted the settlement of such areas between Israel and Jordan without 
involvement of Palestinians. The recognition of PLO as the sole 
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people by the Arabs and their 
"inalienable rights" by the world body disturbed US-Israeli strategy 
During the Lebanese civil war of 1975-1976 US tried to crush PLO, 
Lebanese civil war weakened the PLO but could not eliminate it.'"*^  
From the very beginning, PLO, which was composed of various 
Palestinian factions, was divided over strategy and tactics to achieve 
their common objectives. Their split had become widened after 1973. 
When PLO freed itself from the domination of Egypt, it adopted an 
independent posture towards Israel. Its militant activities harmed it more 
than to serve its purpose. But gradually it had moderated its stand. This 
created a rift between hard-liners and moderate factions of PLO. With 
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the increased backing of the third world countries and Arabs' 
recognition, followed by UN encouraging attitude to PLC), a dominant 
faction of the organization led up by Yasir Arafat made a change in 
PLO's predominantly militant strategy to achieve its goal. Yasir Arafat 
had realized that mere Arab and international concern for the plight of 
Palestinians was not enough to regain their lost territory and end their 
homelessness. After the June war of 1967 the restoration of their 
captured lands from Israel remained the main objective of the Arab 
states leaving the Palestine issue in oblivion. During the post October 
war and its aftermath negotiations mediated by Kissinger between Israel 
and Egypt and Israel and Syria, neither the Palestine question nor the 
PLO's participation was given priority over withdrawal. With the 
passage of time Syria and Egypt were seen adopting an independent 
posture in pursuance of their own national interests bypassing the 
interests of Palestinians and PLO. 
America used to give various tempting incentives to Sadat as a 
reward for his moderation and rejection of the USSR. As a gratitude to 
US generosity for Egypt, Egyptian President abrogated the 1971 fifteen 
year Treat\' of Friendship with Moscow.'*' During 1976-1977 President 
Sadat made various efforts to bring all concerned parties together to 
resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict through reconvening the Geneva 
Conference of 1974.''*^ When Sadat multilateral approach failed he 
returned to the bilateral approach between Egypt and Israel. 
F. Camp David Accord: The End of a Turbulent Era: 
The year 1977 brought a change in US-Israeli leadership. Jimm\ 
Carter assumed office in January 1977, while in Israel a new 
government led by Menachem Begin captured power in June 1977.'^ ^ 
''Jimmy Carter emerged on the world scene, projecting the image ot a 
man who adheres to principles and upholds human rights."'''* The two 
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important personalities who had a significant influence over Carter's 
policy approach towards the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian 
problem were the Secretary of State, Syrans Vance and the President's 
National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski. Despite their 
differences about Soviet Union and other areas of foreign policy, both of 
them had a similar approach favouring an active American role in search 
of peace regarding Arab-Israeli dispute through a balanced policy.''*^ As 
a result of their influence Carter followed a strategy for settling the 
Arab-Israeli dispute, which included "skepticism of Israeli policies and a 
new interest in the Palestine question." Vance did not see West- Asian 
crisis through the global foreign policy perspectives. It opposed the use 
of force to achieve diplomatic objectives. The basic differences between 
Vance and Kissinger's approach to achieve the US goals in West-Asia 
were apparent in the policy adopted by Carter's administration. Taking 
the view of the "Brookings Report", which already was at the disposal 
of Carter's administration, Vance was sent on a tour of West-Asian 
countries including Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Israel. 
Vance's talks during his tour were based on the conclusion of 
'Brookings Report'. The report of the draft, which was submitted in late 
1975. was prepared by a number of West Asian experts including 
Zbignev Brzezinski. The study regarded Palestine question as the crux 
of the problem contrary to the approach adopted by Kissinger. Brooking 
stud) group outlined a comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli 
dispute, which could not be achieved without a phased Israeli 
withdrawal from the territories captured in June 1967 with minor 
modifications accepted by both the parties. It also emphasized the need 
of establishment of peaceful relations also in stages, together with the 
rights of the Palestinians to self-determination, which meant either an 
independent state or federation with Jordan, subject to the Palestinian 
acceptance of Israel's right to exist. It was also stated in the report that 
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for a just and durable solution of the problem "the participation of 
credible Palestinian representation" was essentially required in the Arab-
Israeli peace process. 
Carter had adopted an approach, which was different from that of 
Nixon and Ford. He tried to project his views to American people in 
order to win their support. No other President of America was so 
involved himself in the intricacies of Arab-Israeli negotiations than 
Jimmy Carter.'*^ In the crucial negotiations at Camp David and the 
peace treaty discussions, Carter himself played the key role. On his part. 
President was showing signs of genuine interest in the plight of 
Palestinians and tried to resolve it honestly. The energy crisis, American 
dependence on Arab oil, possibility of further warfare between Arab 
States and Israel, fear of growing Palestinian militancy and concern for 
US relationship with Saudi Arabia and Egypt were also the factors ver> 
much related to the Palestine question directly or indirectly. 
To achieve the solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute he first 
proposed a return of Geneva Conference. Secondly he sought to widen 
Arabs' participation in Sadat's initiative. Third, he made an attempt at 
Camp David.'"' Only his last effort was successful since neither the 
Arab participation in Sadat initiative nor a return of Geneva Conference 
worked. 
On 9 November 1977, President Sadat in a surprise move made 
an announcement before the Egyptian National Assembly about his 
decision to fly to Jerusalem.'"^^ At first no one believed this and regarded 
it merely rhetoric. But by visiting Jerusalem on 19 November 1977 
Sadat proved that how serious he was about this. The Egyptian President 
hoped that his visit to Jerusalem might lead to a speedy peace agreement 
with Israel. Prime Minister Begin also made reciprocal visit to Ismailia. 
Realizing the sensitivity of his decision Sadat had asserted that his visit 
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had not resulted in relinquishing any legal or historical right of the Arab 
nation, including Arab claim over Arab Jerusalem. Sadat's justification 
did not satisfy either the Arabs or PLO and Russia. He invited 
representative of Arab countries PLO, Israel, USA, USSR, and the 
Secretary general of UN, to a meeting in Cairo, which was going to be 
held in December 1977. The Arab countries, PLO and Soviet Union 
refused to attend the Cairo meet. The Egyptian Foreign Minister, Ismail 
Fahmy. to whom the visit came as a surprise, resigned.'^ "^ The proposed 
Geneva Conference became meaningless after this episode. Sadat had 
become convinced that the hope for Arab unity was a mad man's notion; 
it could never be achieved in true sense. Eventually, Sadat decided to 
give priority to Egypt's interests, which beside other things included the 
recover^' of the whole of Sinai. His action weakened the cause of 
Palestinians to a great extent and pushed back the efforts of preceding 
months - involving the Arab governments, the PLO leadership, Israelis. 
Americans and Russians for a peaceful solution of the West Asian crisis. 
However, the Carter administration was prompt to take initiative for a 
bilateral peace agreement between Egypt and Israel - the very idea that 
suited the American policy in West Asia ver>' much. Sadat tried to 
persuade the Arab states and the PLO to participate, but the> 
vehemently refused and bitterly criticized Sadat for his betrayal.'"'^ ' The\ 
felt that the Egyptian President cheated them. After initial failures in the 
progress of peace initiatives at the bilateral level, eventually a tripartite 
summit meeting at Camp David in the United States was held on 5"" 
September 1978 and ended on 17"" September. The Camp David accords 
were signed on the last day of summit meeting, which consisted of two 
major documents: 
(a) Framework for peace in the Middle East. 
(b) Framework for peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. 
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Ihe first document referred the settlement of Palestine question. 
directly linked with West Bank and Gaza occupied by Israel in June 
1967 war. The responsibility to work out modalities for establishing the 
elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza was given 
to Hgypt. Israel and Jordan in accordance to the terms and conditions 
stipulated in the Camp David agreement. In the negotiation to determine 
the final status of West Bank and Gaza, elected representatives of the 
two areas had to take part in addition to Egypt, Jordan and Israel. The 
accord made no mention of the PLO all through its text.'"''^  The Camp 
David accords were considered only a preliminary agreement leading to 
a formal peace treaty within next three months.'^' It was believed that 
negotiafing sessions to conclude a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel 
would go smoothly. But during the negotiations new problems arose 
since both parties were insisting for the acceptance of their conditions. 
By giving his consent to the bilateral agreement Sadat made himself 
alone to bear the brunt of his own action. No one in the Arab world 
supported him. For months their talks dragged on as Egypt and Israel 
were unable to resolve their differences. But eventually President Carter 
succeeded to bring the two sides together. As a result, an Egyptian-
Israeli peace treaty was signed on 26* March 1979 under the terms ot 
the Camp David and based on Security Council Resolution 242 and 
338. ' Israel agreed to a staged withdrawal from Sinai, which was 
finally completed in April 1982. There came an end of Egyptian-Israeli 
longstanding state of belligerency, and normal diplomatic relations were 
established between the two nations. By signing this treaty Egypt 
became the first Arab state to establish diplomatic relations with Israel 
and recognize its rights to exist. 
Egypt had achieved its main objective for which it abandoned 
Palestinians and the Arab allies and altered the power equation in the 
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Arab-Israeli conflict completely. But Egypt had to pay a high price for 
its achievement. The Egyptian- Israeli rapprochement was bound to 
have adverse effect on all the parties involved in the conflict except 
Israel. As for Israel, the most remarkable achievement out of the peace 
treaty was its success in breaking the alliance of the Arab states that 
threatened its very existence time and again. It also weakened the cause 
of Palestinian National Movement and acquired the approval of both 
Egypt and the US for the continuation of its occupation of the West 
Bank and Gaza. The talks between the concerned parties over West bank 
and Gaza remain hampered for long since Israel had never been sincere 
to the establishment of an independent state of Palestinians. Israel 
returned Sinai to Egypt because it was not so important to it, compared 
to the West Bank. It was Likud government that returned Sinai to Egypt 
but regarding West Bank it was strongly opposed to anything beyond 
granting limited autonomy to Arab residents.'^' Relations between the 
Arab countries and Egypt had collapsed. Sadat was charged of 
undertaking commitments involving fornier allies without their 
approval. The Arab leaders reiterated that Egyptian President had 
absolutely no right to speak on behalf of the Palestinian people and was 
not empowered to accept the continuation of Israeli occupation of the 
Palestinian territories. After signing peace treaty with Israel separately 
Egypt was officially out of the Arab-Israeli conflict. With the exit ot 
Egypt, the strongest Arab country, from the "consortium of Arab 
nations"'^^ that deterred Israeli ambitions, Israel was posing new threats 
to the PLO's refuge in Lebanon after its departure from Jordan in 1970. 
The result was the first Palestinian uprising called in Arab language as 
intifada' in response to the continuous Israeli provocations. The signing 
of a peace treaty when the underlying cause of the conflict had not 
actually been resolved had dangerous implications as far as the question 
of Palestinian state was concerned. The groundwork for alienation of 
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I^gypt from its Arab counterparts was prepared by the master of US 
West Asian diplomacy - Dr. Henry Kissinger; Carter's administration 
just completed his unfinished task. 
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CONCLUSION 
The main Western culprit in case of the Palestinian tragedy was 
Britain who had made a promise to the Zionists for the creation of a 
Jewish home over a land it did not possess at that time. The First World 
War was yet to be concluded when the promise was made. In case of the 
Palestinian people all moral values and legal principles of the civilized 
world were completely forgotten by the Western Allies who alwa\s 
talked about liberty, freedom, justice and human rights. From the ver\ 
beginning the Zionist leaders were in contact with European powers, 
particularly Britain, to obtain British help in acquiring Palestine. 
The First World War provided a golden opportunit}' to Herzefs 
successor Dr. Chaim Weizmann to extract concessions in return of his 
valuable services to Allied war aims. British Government's greatest 
award, which was bestowed on Zionists, was its promise for 
'the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish 
people.' The promise was made through the Foreign Secretary, Arthur 
James Balfour in the form of a letter to Lord Rothschild, head of the 
British Zionist Federation on 2"^ * November 1917. The promise was 
popularly known as Balfour Declaration. Before making promise to the 
Zionists, Britain had already entered into two other conflicting 
agreements during the war. Through 'Sykes Picot' agreement Allied 
powers sought to establish their control in the Arab provinces of the 
Ottoman Empire. The agreement was signed between Britain and 
France on 16''' May 1916 with the inclusion of Russia and Italy in their 
partition scheme. Earlier, in March 1917 British concluded a deal with 
the Arabs promising them independence in the provinces of the Ottoman 
Empire in return of their revolt against Turkey, if allied powers turned 
victorious in the war. Arabs kept their words, but allied powers, instead 
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of granting Arab independence, divided the Promised Land among 
themselves with the help of newly created League of Nations 
The incorporation of Balfour Declaration in Palestine Mandate by the 
League of Nations provided British promise to the Jews an international 
recognition and a legal basis, which was obviously a major victor> of 
Zionists over the Arabs. 
The British policy to support the Zionist cause was not totall\ 
based on humanitarian ground as asserted by most of the Western 
countries. There were many other political, strategic, cultural and 
imperialist considerations, which were seriously taken up. No one could 
deny the right of the Jewish people to live in peace, but not at the cost ot 
the peace of other people. However, unfortunately Palestinians were 
forced to accept the Jews in their own land to expiate for European 
crimes against them. 
After establishment of British Mandate over Palestine. 
Palestinian territory was left open for legal and illegal Jewish 
immigration. Arabs resented and protested against it but British policy 
did not change until the outbreak of World War II. Under war 
compulsions, British Government tried to regain Arab goodwill by 
declaring various policy statements including the White Paper of 1939, 
which indicated a favourable change towards the Arabs. But it was too 
late since neither the Arabs nor the Jews seemed ready for any sort of 
compromise regarding their claims over Palestine. Arab nationalism and 
political Zionism had grown side by side. Ultimately, armed with 
Western support - Zionist's fake claim over Palestine won over genuine 
claim of Palestinians in their own land occupied by them for centuries. 
Until 1939, many factors prevented active American involvement 
in Palestine question. Firstly, despite brief US involvement in world 
affairs during World War I, Monroe doctrine remained a hallmark of US 
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foreign policy till the end of thirties. Secondly, International Zionist 
Organization chose Britain as the working ground for their movement. 
It got tremendous support and backing from British leadership. Britain 
brought a change in its policy regarding Jewish immigration to Palestine 
only after the outbreak of World War II. America first confronted the 
Palestine issue in 1917 when the British requested President Wilson for 
his advice and support on Balfour Declaration. But the Palestine 
question was of minimal priority for US Presidents till Harry Truman 
made his entr> in White House after Roosevelt's death on 12* April 
1945. Truman's personal sympathy and support for the Jewish cause had 
greatly influenced his handling of Palestine question during its crucial 
phase. Turning the Holocaust into a political asset by Zionists served 
their purpose to acquire Palestine for Jewish statehood without bothering 
about the original inhabitants of the land who owned it. The pro-Zionist 
leanings of President Truman made the Zionist task easier. Zionists" 
pressure who shifted their center of gravity fi-om Britain to Washington 
had also played a significant role in seeking unprecedented support of 
the American President to the Jewish cause. 
Beginning with World War II, America's realization of the 
importance of West Asia increased her involvement in the affairs of the 
region. USA had no colonial past in West Asia like Britain and France. 
Its reputation among the Arabs was that of its educational, social and 
missionary missions. Initially, the increasing American oil interest in 
Iraq, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia did not change her attitude of neutrality. 
United States started to play an active role in West Asia during the 
World War II. By the end of the war in 1945, America had become 
deepK involved in the political, strategic, militar>' and economic affairs 
of the region. Truman Doctrine, Marshal Plan and Eisenhower Doctrine 
revealed growing US interests in the area. 
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West Asia had remained an area of Angio-Frencii domination and 
exclusive presence for long. In late forties their power and influence 
greatly declined. Exhausted by war efforts and faced with growing Arab 
nationalism and aggressive political Zionism, these two powers were no 
more in a position to accept the challenges of the post war period. 
After the publication of 1939 White Paper, the killing of British 
authorities and destruction of official buildings by Zionist paramilitar> 
forces in Palestine, shattered British morale further. Britain had borne 
the brunt of her faulty policies. However, the withdrawal of France from 
control of Syria and Lebanon in 1946, and gradual decline in existing 
British position in the areas of its domination created a political and 
strategic vacuum in the region. It encouraged Soviet advances towards 
the Islamic world which made the American involvement inevitable. 
Since then United States assumed the responsibility of protection of 
Western interests in the region and became the self appointed police to 
check every activity of the Arab nations, more precisely, their defense 
programmes, in accordance of its own dictated criterion, particularly 
after the disintegration of Soviet Union. 
US took first step in the direction of its long-term strategy in 
West Asia by supporting partition resolution 181 of UN General 
Assembly and recognizing the state of Israel within few minutes of its 
formal establishment. Creation of Israel produced a permanent faithful 
ally of Western powers, especially America, in the oil rich area of the 
world. Britain's hurriedly planned departure from Palestine left the 
whole situation in the hands of Zionists. Taking advantage of the 
opportunity. David Ben Gurion declared the birth of the State of Israel in 
Tel Aviv on 15* May 1948 - even before the UN debate over the option 
of trusteeship arrangement for Palestine was over. The declaration did 
not specify the borders of the newly created state of Israel; because Ben 
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Gurion wanted to keep open the possibility of expansion beyond the l)N 
decided borders. 
Soviet Union supported Jewish statehood in Palestine because o) 
its own selfish interest in the region although it was contrary to 
traditional attitude towards the Jews. Soviets were the first to provide 
de-Jure recognition to Israel. It supported the side of Israel in the first 
Arab-Israeli war of 1948. But Soviet rapprochement with Israel proved 
short-lived. In the subsequent years Israel's alliance with the West in the 
East-West Cold war brought Soviet Union in the Arabs camp. 
Arab leaders failed to project the Palestinian cause at the UN 
effectively because of their shortcomings and shortsightedness. 
Their actions and decisions were largely motivated by their selfish 
interests rather than for the interest of the Palestinian people. Even their 
decision to launch a war on Israel was not totally based on their sincere 
desire to save Palestinians from catastrophe but for the fulfillment of 
their territorial and political ambitions. The result of the war was more 
disastrous than the UN partition plan for Palestinians. Israel captured 
more area than was allotted to it by UN and the remaining Arab 
Palestine was occupied by Jordan and Egypt. The area, which came 
under the authority of Jordan, was named as West Bank and the 
territories brought under Egyptian control was called as Gaza strip. 
Israel with her huge territorial gains established her superiority over the 
Arabs. The humiliating defeat in the Palestine war had a profound and a 
far-reaching effect on the entire Arab world. In the subsequent years 
riots and revolutions occurred in Arab countries, which were responsible 
for the retreat. The old existing regimes were overthrown and in some 
cases their rulers were assassinated. Egypt was the first Arab countr>. 
which faced the consequences of shameful defeat. The 1952 revolution 
in Egypt brought the age old Mohammad AH dynasty to an end. 
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It turned the Egyptian state into a republic. In 1954 Nasser became 
Egypt's President and attempted to work for Pan Arab renaissance 
In the following years he became a symbol of Pan Arabism and Arab 
nationalism. US hope to trap Nasser in her Western defense alliance 
system had gone into vain. In reaction USA had withdrawn her offer ol 
loan for the construction of Aswan High Dam. Britain and World Bank 
followed suit. It resulted into the nationalization of the Suez Canal b} 
Nasser. Nasser took this bold step under the influence of Nehru - the 
champion of non-aligned movement and Prime Minister of the world's 
largest democracy. His anti Western policies directly hit the Anglo-
French interests in Egypt. Britain and France were shareholders in Suez 
Canal. Eden and Molit both regarded nationalization of Suez Canal as a 
great challenge to their countries. From 1882 British Government had 
controlled Egypt. Egypt's struggle for her emancipation from the foreign 
domination had a long history, but Nasser was the lucky Egyptian ruler 
who succeeded in driving foreign powers from his country. Behind 
Algerian war of independence, France saw the hand of Egyptian 
President and blamed him for French retreat. Nasser's growing power 
and influence threatened Israel's territorial ambitions in the region. 
All of the three powers wanted to eliminate Nasser from Egyptian 
politics. This mutual hatred towards Nasser brought them closer to each 
other that resulted into a secret collusion aimed at punishing the 
Egyptian leader for his bold policies. USA was not directly affected b> 
nationalization of Suez Canal. Egypt's growing amity with the Arabs 
was the major cause of US hostility. Despite its bitter opposition to 
Nasser's policies. US was not in favour of using force against Egypt. US 
President, Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, Dulles, both were 
hopeful for an amiable solution of the Suez crisis. Aware of US stand, 
the three colluding powers kept it in dark about their plan. But on the 
part of America it was hard to believe that despite having a very active 
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intelligence network all over the world, it did not smell the Anglo-
French and Israeli plan against Egypt. Whatever might be the case, but it 
had become certain after the Suez war that America gave priority to 
national interests over protection of the interests of her Western allies in 
the region. In comparison to Britain and France, Israel's decision to go 
to war was well calculated and did bear few positive results. Once again 
her military superiority against Egypt was established. But Israel's 
mission with collaboration of Britain and France to liquidate Nasser had 
not succeeded. Nasser emerged more powerful after the war, his 
leadership established all over the Arab world. The existence of the 
'Non-Aligned Bloc' proved to be a major force behind Nasser. 
The outcome of the Suez war was very discouraging and humiliating for 
both France and England who dominated the West Asian region for 
long. They did not achieve anything out of the war except frustration, 
shame and shattered image. In the subsequent years their role in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict became confined to the limit of United Nations 
where Britain always followed the US stand. In comparison to Britain. 
France adopted a somewhat independent attitude. England and France 
overlooked the possible grave consequences of their collusion with 
Israel, which eroded their power and prestige in the Arab world 
completely. With their final departure from the region United States" 
position was fiirther stabilized because no other Western power was 
there to compete with America. Growing US involvement in West Asian 
affairs intensified Cold War between East and West. The rivalry of the 
two superpowers and the thrust of their respective policies conducted in 
their selfish interests contributed a lot in the increasing Arab-Israeli 
hostility. 
Nasser was punished by the Western powers for his courageous 
actions in defiance of the West which included his rejecfion of US offer 
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to join defense alliance, demand for full freedom from British control. 
nationalization of Suez Canal, support for independence of subjugated 
countries, intense relations with the communists, efforts for Arab unity 
and, moreover, his belief in principle of non-alignment. United States 
punished Nasser by economic means while Britain and France used 
military means against him. 
These developments benefited the two countries most - Israel and 
Soviet Union. Israel had achieved its immediate objectives from Sinai 
war if not its long-term goals. Its long terms objectives were later 
achieved with the help of United States in the war of 1967. 
In the late 1950's USSR established close ties with a number of 
Arab states, provided them with moral, material and military support, 
encouraged Arabs' instinct of fighting with the Israelis but never 
seriously tried to solve Palestinian problem, the core issue of the 
conflict. The Soviets had supported the Arab cause, especially Egypt 
and Syria, because of their anti-westemism. They opposed the 
pro-Western stand of Israeli government but never questioned the fact of 
Israel's statehood. Until Palestinians opted for militant posture to stress 
their genuine demands, they were just referred as refugees with no land 
to be called as their own. Soviets had a negative attitude towards PLO, 
which was formed in 1964, and its chairman Ahmad Shukairy - PL()"s 
pro-Chinese overture was the main cause of Soviet indifference. 
The formation of pro-Soviet Ba'ath government in 1965 in Syria after 
toppling the government of moderates brought Damascus on high 
priority list of the Soviet Union. Preservation and protection of left 
oriented Ba'ath government in Syria became major responsibility of 
Moscow. In their obsession of Israeli threat to the leftist regime. Soviet 
leaders exaggerated the danger of its attack on Syria. Under compulsion 
of 1966 mutual defense pact with Syria, Nasser was bound to protect it 
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from perceived Israeli threat. Egypt's decision to mobilize its troops was 
merely aimed at deterring Israel but Israel used it as a pretext to launch a 
war against the Arabs in 1967. Nasser committed a great mistake b\ 
requesting UN Secretary General for the withdrawal of UNEF, which 
led him to take other decisions relating to security of Egyptian territon.. 
His over confidence as regards Soviet support proved wrong. Soviet 
support to the Arabs during the June war of 1967 was more verbal than 
actual. 
No sooner the US attained Arab goodwill in Suez war than it 
resorted to destroy it by adopting pro-Israeli policies thereafter. US 
realization that it could no longer woo the whole of the Arab world, 
particularly Egypt, made it fearless of Arabs' reactions towards its open 
support of their enemy - Israel. Although the declared major aim of 
Eisenhower Doctrine was to combat international communism, it was 
generally used as an instrument against growing movement of Arab 
nationalism initiated by Nasser. The pro-Western Arab countries were 
provided with huge economic and military aid from USA as a price of 
their disloyalty to the cause of greater Arab unity. In order to weaken the 
Arab cause, United States made various efforts to exploit intra-Arab 
rivalries, which proved its greatest achievement in its West Asian 
strategy. On the basis of divide and rule policy, USA established her 
hold in the West Asian region to capture its oil resources and to use 
strategic locations for defense purposes. Presence of Israel in the Arab 
world as a local Western ally provided great help in materializing US 
programmes in the region. In return of Israel's services and 
unquestioned loyalty. United States accepted the responsibility to justify 
every right and wrong action taken by it against its neighbouring Arab 
countries and Palestinians. The role of Jewish lobby in US policy 
formulation and implementation remained significant. Biblical 
239 
influences over various US Presidents, confronting Arab-Jewish 
problem, had also been an important factor in their decision-making in 
favour of the Jews. But the similarity in Israeli-American objectives in 
West Asia was one of the major causes, which brought them together. 
Americans* thinking and their approach to the Arab people matched 
with that of Israelis. The June war of 1967 proved disastrous for the 
Palestinian cause. The war triggered a second mass exodus of 
Palestinians, many of whom became refugees for a second time, as they 
had sought refuge in the West Bank and Gaza after having being 
departed from their homes in 1948-49. The possibility of solution of 
Palestine question became more tenuous since Israel had adopted a 
tough attitude because of its military superiority over the Arabs and its 
confidence in the American backing and support in and outside of 
United Nations. The war brought Israel in control of all Palestine 
(including the West Bank of Jordan and Gaza Strip), the Sinai Peninsula 
in Egypt and the Golan Heights in Syria. After 1967 war, the restoration 
of captured territories became main objective of the Arab states and 
Palestine question receded into the background. 
The Soviet Union dragged Egypt into the Syrian-Israeli war 
because Syria alone could not fight with Israel. Jordan's reluctance to 
support Syria increased its dependency on Egypt's backing. Soviet 
Union did not want its direct involvement in the crisis since it wanted to 
avoid direct confrontation with America. Nasser also wanted to avoid 
war with Israel at this juncture. Egypt's economic condition was in a 
ver>' bad shape and about seventy thousand of its finest soldiers were 
engaged in war with Yemen. Besides USSR, Nasser's Arab rivals 
contributed a lot in bringing him in a position where he could not avoid 
war. Although, despite Nasser's bellicose statements and initial moves 
which indicated his intention to go to war, US military expert and 
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intelligence officials did not expect the Egyptians to start a war. Even ii" 
they did, the CIA forecasted Israel's victory over the Arabs. These 
reports relieved Johnson's tension, who was very much worried about 
Congressional opposition to any US action which might create a second 
Vietnam in West Asia. CIA report confirmed Israel's military capability 
to win the war without US direct involvement from the side of Israel. It 
was enough reason for US lack of interest in reducing the chances of 
anticipating war in West Asia, particularly when it was engaged in 
Vietnam. Nasser' s initial move was basically motivated to make his 
Arab rivals silent because he was very much conscious of his image as 
the undisputed leader of the Arab world. He could not let his prestige 
shattered at any cost. Nasser knew that Israel could not tolerate the 
closure of Straits of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba for Israeli shipping, and its 
reaction was obvious. Nasser was confident enough of Soviet support if 
Egypt's security was threatened by Israel and especially in case of US 
intervention on her behalf. He miscalculated Soviet worth. US with the 
cooperation of Britain tried to seek international support to meet Israeli 
demand regarding reopening of two waterways. Majority of the 
maritinie powers did not take much interest in the matter and eventual!} 
US efforts failed. The closure of Straits of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba 
provided a long awaited pretext to Israel to launch a war against the 
Arabs without taking a risk of worldwide criticism. Israel avoided 
repeating the mistake of 1956. Israeli leaders and officials were 
continuously in touch with American President Johnson and his 
secretary of state. Dean Rusk, in the early days of the outbreak of 1967 
war. Although USA did not declare its overt support, it was pertinent to 
belie\e that without US approval and consent Israel would not dare to 
take such a drastic action in which Soviet intervention could not be 
completely ruled out from the side of the Arabs. USA repeatedly asked 
Egypt to exercise 'self restraint', but did not put strong pressure on 
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Israel not to resort to war. Despite removal of UNEF and closure of (luif 
of Aqaba and Straits of Tiran, Nasser did not close the door for 
diplomatic solution of the crisis. He agreed to send Zakaria Mohieddin. 
Vice President of Egypt to hold talks with President Johnson on the Gulf 
issue. But before his proposed visit to Washington, Israelis launched an 
attack on the Arabs. Within six days of war Israel achieved a complete 
military victory over its Arab opponents. Israeli actions were calculated 
and its planning was perfect. Having destroyed the Syrian air force, 
Dayan did not want to proceed in Syria further, probably to avoid Soviet 
intervention. But he received green signal from US officials to teach a 
good lesson to Syria for her role in instigating guerilla warfare against 
Israel. During Johnson era, US policy gradually tihed more openly 
toward Israel. His pro-Israeli overtone cemented into a more intimate 
relationship between Jerusalem and Washington after the June 1967 
war. USA was not "neutral in thought, word or deed" as asserted by US 
Department Press Officer, Mc-CIoskey at the beginning of the war. The 
sailing of powerful US Sixth Fleet closer to the site of battle was a 
definite proof of its concern about Israel's security and survival. No 
doubt, it was aimed at reducing likelihood of Soviet militan, 
intervention. Not only this, US attempted delay in ceasefire proceedings 
at the UN was also meant to provide Israel extra time to complete its 
objective. American delegates took every effort to defeat those 
resolutions, which were not compatible to Israel's objectives. Amongst 
the Western countries, Britain's support for the Israeli cause was 
significant, which always followed US stand at UN. In the subsequent 
years of 1967 war the hoUowness of US claims of 'impartiality' and 
"evenhandedness" had been exposed and its hypocrisy towards the Arabs 
was being seen by the whole world. 
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After humiliating defeat of the Arabs and total destruction of the 
idea of the Palestinian state, the so called champion of "territorial 
integrity', right to 'self determination' and "national right" came forward 
with a formula to bring a just and lasting peace in the area. Here too US 
diplomacy to protect Israeli interest succeeded. Security Council 
Resolution 242 did not make any reference of Palestine people; they 
were just referred to as refugees. The draft resolution submitted b\ 
British delegate. Lord Caradon, was not exclusively a British text; it was 
a great US achievement in Arab-Israeli diplomacy. Ambiguit>' in the 
language of Resolution 242 left room for different interpretations by 
Arabs and Israelis. 
All diplomatic efforts to bring peace in the area failed because of 
lack of sincere and honest efforts of the major powers and UN 
inefficiency. US-Soviet rivalry and Israeli arrogance to dictate terms and 
conditions to the defeated parties were also responsible for defeat of all 
peace efforts. During Nixon's period West Asian problems were 
perceived in the framework of East-West rivalry. Kissinger's whole 
perception of the Arab-Israeli problem was dominated by this theory. To 
cut down the Soviet influences in the Arab region with reducing the 
power and prestige of Arab radicals was regarded as the first step in 
American diplomacy to deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict. Rogers peace 
initiatives did not achieve success due to wide perceptual differences of 
the problem between US secretary of state and security advisor - plus 
Nixon's ambivalence. 
Despite enormous efforts made by the Arabs and Soviet delegates 
to seek the UN support for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal 
from the occupied territories by Israel in the war of 1967, defeated Arab 
nations could not achieve their purpose. Israel was determined to hold 
onto the newly occupied territory of the Arabs. Khartoum conference of 
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Arab states to evaluate the situation atller the June war ended with a 
growing sign of realism in the attitude of the Arab moderates despite 
their three NO's. The deterrent measure suggested in Iraqi plan were 
accepted by militant Syria and Algeria but rejected by moderate Arab 
leaders. PLO, who expressed its sheer disappointment over the outcomes 
of the Khartoum conference with Syria and Algeria, intensified its 
guerilla activities under the leadership of Yasser Arafat - new chairman 
of the organization. The worst affected by the Palestinian war were the 
Palestinians because even the Arabs diverted their attention from their 
problems to the restoration of their own territorial loss in the war. 
Before the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, PLO did not perform any independent 
role. It was under the influence of Arab bureaucracies, particularly 
Egyptian bureaucracy. The humiliating defeat of the Arab countries 
freed the Palestinians from their hold. They started to believe that onl\ 
on their own efforts would they achieve self-determination and national 
recognition. With this realization, PLO intensified their militant 
activities and adopted an independent posture. In the battle of Karamah. 
fidayeen heroism and steadfastness against the mighty army of Israel 
enhanced the popularity and prestige of PLO amongst the Arab masses 
and Palestinian people alike. Nasser's frustration knew no bounds, since 
neither the major powers nor the UN could make any headway in the 
practical application of resolution 242. In order to show that, despite 
crushing defeat in 1967, Egypt continued to fight for the Arab cause. 
Nasser started a "war of attrition" against Israel. Egypt paid a heavy 
price for a war meant to remind the powers of the urgency of resolving 
the crisis. Neither the guerilla warfare nor the war of attrition could 
change Israel's fundamental position, who had the backing of the most 
strong and powerful nation of the world. It turned the Palestinians 
towards terrorism and Anwar-al-Sadat, Egypt's new President after the 
death of Nasser in 1970, towards a new initiative in search of peace. 
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Failing in his efforts to achieve peace through peaceful and 
diplomatic measures he resorted to war to break the stalemate, which 
had become unbearable for Egyptians. The October 1973 war was based 
on a well-calculated strategy, not the result of emotionally oriented 
decision of Anwar Sadat. This war was limited to Egypt and Syria in 
contrast to the six-day war of 1967 in which, four Arab countries were 
involved to varying degrees. The expulsion of the Soviet troops and 
advisors from Egypt gave Sadat an opportunity to prepare for a war 
without any hindrance from Moscow. It was not the onh cause of 
ousting Soviet military personnel; there were other reasons, which had 
been taken into consideration. Both Egypt and Syria simultaneous!) 
launched attacks on the Israeli forces stationed in their respective 
occupied territories in the hope of bringing to an end the gloomy status 
quo. which prevailed since long. The purpose of 1973 war. which was 
started by the Arabs themselves, was not to liquidate Israel but iv 
liberate their territories captured by Israel in 1967 war. The combined 
Syrian-Egyptian attack on 6* October 1973 on their own territories 
occupied by Israel caught the Israelis and Americans off guard, despite 
many indications that war was going to occur. Both Israel and America 
took Egypt's warnings very lightly since they had become accustomed 
to listening Arabs* bellicose statements ever since the creation of state of 
Israel in Palestine. If America and Israel miscalculated renewed militan,' 
worth of the Arabs because of military superiority of Israeli army over 
them. Sadat made a grave mistake by undermining the possibility of 
strong US backing to Israel despite knowing American historv of 
extreme generosity toward the Jewish state. America could not leave 
Israel alone as it was committed to the safety and survival of the latter. 
Prior to the outbreak of war, Soviet attitude remained confusing. 
It did not apparently encourage the war which was launched by its Arab 
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allies against Israel but it was not possible to refuse them urgentl} 
needed sophisticated military arms and equipment to match with I S 
military' equipment provided to Israel. Both the superpowers made 
unprecedented emergency arms transfer to their respective allies during 
the war. Soviet initial hesitation to play an active role in Egyptian-
Syrian war planning, due to its pursuance of detente, faded away when 
the vv^ a^r took a turn in favour of Israel by virtue of American help. When 
the UN approved ceasefire was not fully implemented in time, the USSR 
announced its decision to take unilateral action of deployment of Soviet 
forces in the region since US refused to cooperate with Moscow. Soviet 
Union wanted to prove its credibility to the Arabs, particularly to Egypt. 
that had lost faith in it. It did not want to let Egypt go in the lap of 
United States forever. America's guilt made her insecure to the extent 
that it responded to the Soviet unilateral decision with a worldwide 
military and nuclear alert. Before 1973 US believed that it was contrar} 
to Soviet practice to intervene in matters like this. US fear that USSR 
might take the credit of Arabs' victory or imposition of ceasefirt 
resolutions forced her to take Soviet threats and warnings seriously. 
America was eager to improve its relations with Egypt. Being the 
most powerful Arab country, Egypt's position in Nixon-Kissinger 
strategy of West Asia was great. Kissinger knew that Sadat wanted 
Egypt freed of the burden of confrontation with Israel. Domestic 
constraints were serious, in addition to Israeli threats. The pressure from 
within and without was driving the Egyptian President toward the war. 
In five years between 1968-73, Egypt spent sizable amount of national 
income on the war effort, which caused much economic strain on 
Egyptian public. 
The initial superiority of Arab forces over Israelis was the rarest 
chanced success which was hailed throughout the Arab world and by the 
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supporters of the Arab cause with great enthusiasm. The majority ot^the 
Arab countries extended their moral and material support to Syria and 
Egypt who by their tactful manner and courage had broken Israeli 
military invincibility. It no longer looked invulnerable. The 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) used their 
control of oil as a political weapon in the Arab-Israeli war. Linking oil 
with American West Asian diplomacy, Nixon himself proved that US 
had realized the implication of oil embargo on it and other Arab 
adversaries. The attitude of US NATO allies was also discouraging. 
Even France and Britain, the closest American allies started 
disapproving her policies toward Israel, which caused danger for world 
security and placed them in a difficult position. To bring an end to oil 
embargo. America needed to compel Israelis to give some concessions 
to its Arab opponents. Thus, under US pressure, which involved various 
tactics, Israeli advances were restricted and resupply of the Third Arm} 
was restored. It is amazing to note that America herself turned Israel's 
initial disadvantages into advantages after the few days of war. and was 
now trying to take the credit for establishment of peace in West Asia, 
Therefore US strategy to end the war without a clear victor)' for either 
side worked. Sadat had no option but to count on US help to save 
Egypt's Third Army trapped by Israel. Heavy dependence of Israel on 
American help did not allow her to ignore US pressure for keeping 
restraint after certain limit. US confidence on Israeli militar\ 
invulnerability had been shaken and its hypothesis regarding Israeli 
invincibility went wrong. Soon after realizing that they had 
miscalculated. American leadership brought a change in US policy 
toward Arab-Israeli conflict. America had become convinced that 
without giving some concessions to the Arabs, peace in West Asia could 
not be established and Israel's own security would always be in a great 
danger. It led America to moderate its past support for Israel and 
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accepted a new role, which the present situation demanded. In tne 
following years after the 1973 war, United States tried to establish her 
image in the Arab world as a peacemaker. In order to improve its 
shattered image in West Asia and to avoid world wide criticism on its 
intentionally neglected Palestine question in and outside of United 
Nations, the United States needed the support of Anwar Sadat, the 
President of the country which had been regarded as the champion of the 
Palestine cause. By the end of the war Henry Kissinger, tinally 
succeeded in attaining diplomatic leverage with both Cairo and 
Jerusalem, the dream of American leaders for a generation. The October 
war did not bring any conclusive result, and ceasefire agreement 
produced no resolution of the basic dispute between the combatants. 
Continued minor clashes between the adversaries posed a threat of 
renewal of war. This threat was largely defused in mid January 1974 by 
an Israeli-Egyptian agreement to disengagement of their militar\ forces 
at the Suez Canal zone. It was followed by another limited accord 
between Syria and Israel sponsored by Kissinger. The second 
disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel, known as Sinai II 
accord, removed Egypt from active confrontation with Israel. After this 
agreement Egypt's relations with Syria, Jordan, the PLO, and the USSR 
deteriorated, while it helped to promote Egyptian-American relations 
further. Arab countries regarded that Sadat by committing not to use 
force or threat as means to solve the dispute with Israel, surrendered to 
their enemy. 
Kissinger continued as the secretary of state pursuing the same 
policy under new US President Gerald Ford. Rabin, new Israeli prime 
minister, proved tougher than Mier. Throughout his diplomatic 
adventure with Egypt and Israel, Kissinger tried to avoid the PLO's 
participation in the peace process. He concentrated on the territorial 
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aspect, neglecting the main cause of the problem - the legal and political 
aspect of Palestinian demand for national self-determination. 
US condition for considering Palestine question was the PLOs 
recognition of the existence of Israel. It was ironic that Palestinians were 
asked to recognize the existence of the countr>' that herself was 
responsible for the non-existence of their own statehood. This condition 
kept PLO out of negotiations regarding the future of West Bank and 
Gaza Strip for long. USA tried to crush PLO during Lebanese civil war 
of 1975-76. It weakened PLO but wasn't able to eliminate it. 
Sadat, in an unprecedented action for an Arab national leader, 
announced in November 1976 that the Arabs were prepared to make 
peace with Israel. The unilateral decision made by Egyptian President 
gave a big jolt to the Arab nations. Sadat was charged for undertaking 
commitments involving former allies without their consent. Sadat was 
so obsessed with the idea of making peace with Israel that he did no' 
foresee the adverse consequences of his extreme step to the cause of 
Palestinians. In continuation of his peace efforts, Anwar Sadat's surprise 
visit to Jerusalem on 19^ November 1977 shocked the entire Arab 
world. It was a de-facto recognition of state of Israel by Egyptian 
President, which got de-Jure acceptance after signing a peace treaty with 
Israel on 26^ "^  March 1977, also known as Washington treaty as a part of 
Camp David accords signed on 17* September 1978. 
The Camp David accords and peace treaty represented a 
landmark in Egyptian-Israeli relations. President Jimmy Carter, who 
assumed office in January 1977, took keen interest in solving the 
intricacies of Egyptian-Israeli negotiations regarding peace treaty. After 
months of prolonged diplomatic activities. President Carter succeeded to 
bring the two sides together. However, the unfinished task of Henry 
Kissinger was accomplished by his counterpart, Syrans Vance, under the 
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Presidentship of Jimmy Carter in 1978 leading to a formal peace treaty 
in the following year. 
By signing peace treaty Egypt became the first Arab countn, \o 
establish diplomatic relations with Israel and recognized its rights io 
exist. Israel agreed to a staged withdrawal from Sinai, which was tlnalK 
completed in 1982. 
Sadat regained Sinai after paying a high price for this. He 
concluded peace treaty with Israel without having achieved a deal on the 
key issues of Jerusalem, Palestinian statehood or a full Israeli 
withdrawal from Arab territory. The vague autonomy plan for the 
Palestinians to be implemented in stages covered a number of years and 
created many new and complicated problems to the restoration of peace 
not only in West Asia but also in the entire world. Abounded by the 
Arab country on which Palestinians counted most, made them insecure, 
frustrated and desperate. Prevailing sense of betrayal, hopelessness and 
desperation, hurt and anger and their sufferings of refugee life generated 
terrorist instinct in them. Mixing of militancy with religion made the 
Palestinian cause further weak, since the use of religion to achieve 
political goals could not get support of the world community; even the 
support of co-religionists. The illusion that the Palestine question was 
the greatest force, which kept the disunited Arab world united, faded off. 
Since World War I, the fate of Palestinian people was decided by others. 
This time by Anwar Sadat who took the initiative to undertake 
commitments on behalf of Palestinians without their consent or 
approval. After signing peace treaty with Israel separately, Egypt was 
officially detached from Arab-Israeli conflict. It weakened the cause of 
Palestine National Movement beyond repair. Disunity became the 
outstanding feature of the Arabs; even the members of the PLO were 
divided into two different factions - Al-Fatah and Hamas believing in 
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two different ideologies to achieve their target. The latest events, which 
occurred in Palestinians' autonomous areas of West Bank and (ia/.a. 
revealed the ideological difference between Hamas and Al-Fatah clearly. 
Western backing to Al-Fatah, particularly President's Bush's loud 
support aggravated the situation further. 
As for Israel, the most remarkable achievements out of the peace 
treaty included its success of neutralizing the most powerful Arab 
military force, and subsequently destabilizing the forces of Palestine 
national movement in Lebanon. Arabs' own weaknesses, drawbacks, 
and lack of conviction increased their dependence on the West for the 
restoration of peace in the region. After every outburst of Palestinian-
Israeli crisis, the ritual conferences and summits of the members of the 
Arab League and other Islamic nations organizations were nothing else 
than the face saving measures of the Arab leaders. Their impotence 
regarding Palestine tragedy is a matter of grave concern. 
Behind every major crisis of the world the role of America is 
signitlcant. The US very tactfully cut-off Soviet influence from Wesi 
Asia and finally achieved disintegration of the Soviet Union - the very 
thing for which American leaders dreamed for long. World has become 
more insecure after the fall of Soviet Union, non-existence of NAM 
force and absence of any other power, powerful enough, to compete 
with America. United States' unquestioned growing power and 
influence established its domination all over the world. Being the most 
crucial region in the world in terms of strategic location and oil 
resources. West Asia was bound to be the prime target of American 
ambitions. 
The prevailing situation in West Asia is highly inflammable. 
Constant US interference in the affairs of the Arab world, its physical 
presence in Afghanistan and Iraq, repeated warnings and threats to Jran 
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forcing it to stop its nuclear programme are the apparent proofs of 
Washington's highhandedness in Islamic world. American mischievous 
attempts to link a particular religion with terrorism, projection of 
Islamophobia. encouragement of anti-Islamic forces, subservience to 
Israel overlooking Palestinians' plight and uncertainty of establishment 
of an independent sovereign state of Palestine totally free from Israeli 
control are the major causes of increasing militancy not only in West 
Asia but all over the world. Anti American feeling is rising to new 
heights particularly in Islamic world. Without removing the root causes 
of growing terrorist instincts among the Arab youths, we cannot hope 
for a lasting peace in the world. Western powers are the main targets of 
their attacks since they regarded them responsible for their sufferings. 
To save the mankind from the havoc of terrorism. US-Israeli 
brutality against the Arabs should be stopped. For this noble cause 
American public should come forward. 
American and Western public must accept their responsibility to 
restrain their respective leaders who are responsible for perpetuation of 
policies leading to war and violence in West Asia. In a democratic setup 
no political leadership can afford public criticism for long because oi 
fear of periodic elections. 
The Arab states too bear a heavy responsibility in giving America 
a free hand in the affairs of the Arab world. Arabs' slavery to United 
States and their firm belief that only America can bring peace in West 
Asia is deplorable. They should stop behaving like American stooges 
and should take independent decisions pertaining to Arab affairs. Their 
criminal silence over anti-Islamic activities of Western powers and their 
indifference to the Palestine problem is extremely shameful. They must 
realize their own mistakes, which made them puppets in the hands of 
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Western powers. To achieve larger goals the Arabs have to sacritice 
their petty interests. 
The world should support the victims not the aggressors. By this 
attitude it can contribute in the establishment of lasting peace in West 
Asia. 
As for Palestinians they need justice, not imposed solutions by 
America, ignoring all norms and principles of democracy. 
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